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While extant studies mainly focus on the performance implications of strategies deployed in 
buyer-supplier exchanges, there remain unanswered questions relative to decision-making aspects 
of these exchanges. As the exchanges occur in various contexts (the focal firm, dyad, and supply 
chain), decision-making processes can be shaped by structural, relational, behavioral and 
environmental factors—calling for a contingent view. Furthermore, firms do not always operate 
in a steady, normal mode; rather, they often deal with supply chain disruptions. While the normal 
mode characterizes the organizing of routinized, planned activities, the disrupted mode features 
uncertainty and unexpectedness. Given the distinct nature of the two modes, decision-making 
behaviors can vary. This dissertation thus serves as an inquiry into decision-making in buyer-
supplier exchanges in either a normal mode of operation (Essay 3) or a disrupted mode (Essay 1 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER I THE ROLE OF CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION IN SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS 4 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 5 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES ............................................................................................. 7 
Integrating Causal Attribution Theory and Justice Theory ................................................... 7 
Causal Attributions of Supply Chain Disruptions................................................................. 8 
Responses to Causal Attribution of Supply Chain Disruptions ........................................... 12 
METHODS ........................................................................................................................... 15 
Sample, Procedure and Item Generation ............................................................................ 15 
Model Specification and Estimation .................................................................................. 18 
RESULTS ............................................................................................................................. 19 
Insights from HLM ........................................................................................................... 19 
Robustness Checks ............................................................................................................ 20 
Post Hoc Analyses............................................................................................................. 20 
DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 21 
APPENDIX 1........................................................................................................................ 24 
CHAPTER II WHEN IS THE SUPPLIER’S MESSAGE “LOUD AND CLEAR”? .................. 41 
MIXED SIGNALS FROM SUPPLIER-INDUCED DISRUPTIONS AND THE RESPONSE .. 41 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... 42 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 42 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES .................................................... 44 
Signaling Theory ............................................................................................................... 44 
The Moderating Effect of Disruption Severity ................................................................... 47 
The Moderating Effect of Supply Chain Risk’s Uncertainty .............................................. 48 
RESEARCH METHOD ........................................................................................................ 50 
Sampling and Data Collection ........................................................................................... 50 
Common Method Bias ....................................................................................................... 51 
Measure Development and Assessment ............................................................................. 51 
Model Specification and Estimation .................................................................................. 53 
RESULTS ............................................................................................................................. 53 
Main Analyses .................................................................................................................. 53 
Supplementary Analyses ................................................................................................... 54 
Robustness Checks ............................................................................................................ 56 
DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 57 
Implications ...................................................................................................................... 57 
Limitations and Future Research ....................................................................................... 59 
APPENDIX 2........................................................................................................................ 60 
CHAPTER III UNEXPLOITED POWER IN MULTIMARKET BUYER-SUPPLIER 
NEGOTIATIONS: .................................................................................................................... 72 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY................................................................................................ 72 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... 73 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 73 
vi 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES .................................................... 76 
Power Use in the Form of Negotiation ............................................................................... 76 
Dependence Asymmetry and Value Appropriation ............................................................ 76 
Power in Multimarket Buyer-Supplier Exchanges ............................................................. 77 
Exchange Diffusion and Power Non-Use ........................................................................... 77 
Spheres of Influence and Power Non-Use .......................................................................... 78 
Mutual dependence and Power Non-Use ........................................................................... 80 
An Optional Breakdown Bargaining Model with Random Proposers ................................. 81 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES .............................................................. 84 
Setup ................................................................................................................................. 84 
Treatment and Session Design ........................................................................................... 84 
Participants and Procedures ............................................................................................... 85 
DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS ................................................................................... 86 
Data Preparation ................................................................................................................ 86 
Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................................... 87 
Model Specification and Main Results .............................................................................. 87 
Supplemental Analysis and Results ................................................................................... 88 
Robustness Checks ............................................................................................................ 89 
DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 90 
Implications ...................................................................................................................... 90 
Limitations and Future Research ....................................................................................... 91 
APPENDIX 3: TABLES AND FIGURES ............................................................................. 93 
APPENDIX 4: THE UNIQUE SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM (SPE) ................... 102 
APPENDIX 5: INSTRUCTIONS ........................................................................................ 105 
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................... 109 
LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 110 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table A-1.1: Description of Attribution Conditions ................................................................... 24 
Table A-1.2: Description of Justice Conditions ......................................................................... 26 
Table A-1.3: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Reliability ............................................... 28 
Table A-1.4: Measurement Invariance Tests Results ................................................................. 29 
Table A-1.5: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results .................................................................. 29 
Table A-1.6: Effects of Attribution Variables on Perceived Responsibility Before Resolution (H1-
5) ...................................................................................................................................... 31 
Table A-1.7: Effects of Perceived Responsibility on Continuity Before Resolution (H6) ........... 32 
Table A-1.8: Effects of Perceived Responsibility Before Resolution and Justice Variables on 
Continuity After Resolution (H7) ...................................................................................... 33 
Table A-1.9: Internal-Locus: Effects of Perceived Responsibility Before Resolution and Justice 
Variables on Continuity After Resolution .......................................................................... 35 
Table A-1.10: External-Locus: Effects of Perceived Responsibility Before Resolution and Justice 
Variables on Continuity After Resolution .......................................................................... 36 
Table A-1.11: Before-After Change in Continuity by Justice Treatment Condition ................... 37 
Table A-1.12: Internal-Locus: Linear and Curvilinear Effects of Responsibility Attribution on 
Continuity Before Resolutions ........................................................................................... 37 
Table A-1.13: External-Locus: Linear and Curvilinear Effects of Responsibility Attribution on 
Continuity Before Resolutions ........................................................................................... 38 
 
Table A-2.1: Sample Profile of Buying Firms ........................................................................... 60 
Table A-2.2: Survey Instruments and Confirmatory Factor Analysis ......................................... 61 
Table A-2.3: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Reliability ............................................... 63 
Table A-2.4: Discriminant Validity Test ................................................................................... 64 
Table A-2.5: Main Analysis Results (HLM) .............................................................................. 65 
Table A-2.6: Supplementary Analysis #1: Curvilinear Effects (HLM) ....................................... 66 
Table A-2.7: Supplementary Analysis #2: High Severity versus Low Severity (HLM) .............. 67 
Table A-2.8: Supplementary Analysis #2: High Uncertainty versus Low Uncertainty (HLM) .... 68 
Table A-2.9: Supplemental Analysis #3: Effects of Justice Actions by Disruption Type (HLM).
 .......................................................................................................................................... 68 
 
Table A-3.1: Parameter Table for Outside Options .................................................................... 93 
Table A-3.2: Session Details ..................................................................................................... 94 
Table A-3.3: Summary of Treatment Manipulation ................................................................... 95 
Table A-3.4: Effects of Treatments on Power-Advantaged Firms’ Value Appropriation ............ 96 
Table A-3.5: Effect of Exchange Diffusion By Levels of Spheres of Influence (SI) ................... 97 
Table A-3.6: Effects of Treatments on Power-Advantaged Firms’ Deviated Value Appropriation
 .......................................................................................................................................... 98 
Table A-3.7: Effects of Treatments on Power-Advantaged Firms’ Value Appropriation: 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: An Overview of Essay 1............................................................................................... 3 
Figure 2: An Overview of Essay 2............................................................................................... 3 
Figure 3: An Overview of Essay 3............................................................................................... 3 
 
Figure A-1.1: Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................... 39 
Figure A-1.2: Buyers’ Attributional Process .............................................................................. 39 
Figure A-1.3: Changes in Responsibility Attribution Before and After Resolution by Locus of 
Causality ........................................................................................................................... 40 
Figure A-1.4: Curvilinear Relation Between Responsibility Attribution and Continuity (External 
Locus) ............................................................................................................................... 40 
 
Figure A-2.1: Conceptual Framework ....................................................................................... 69 
Figure A-2.2: The Curvilinear Effect of Procedural Justice on Buyers’ Satisfaction .................. 69 
Figure A-2.3: The Moderating Effect of Severity on the Curvilinear Effect of Procedural Justice
 .......................................................................................................................................... 70 
Figure A-2.4: The Moderating Effect of Severity on the Linear Effect of Distributive Justice.... 70 
Figure A-2.5: The Moderating Effect of Uncertainty on the Curvilinear Effect of Procedural Justice
 .......................................................................................................................................... 71 
Figure A-2.6: The Moderating Effect of Uncertainty on the Linear Effect of Distributive Justice
 .......................................................................................................................................... 71 
 
Figure A-3.1: Conceptual Framework ..................................................................................... 100 
Figure A-3.2: The Moderating Effect Spheres of Influence on Value Appropriation (Main Analysis)
 ........................................................................................................................................ 100 
Figure A-3.3: The Moderating Effect Spheres of Influence on Deviated Value Appropriation 









A supply chain is a network of firms that transform raw materials into distributed products 
(Bowersox, Closs, & Stank, 1999; Hult, Ketchen, & Slater, 2004); hence, interfirm exchanges 
between a buyer and a supplier have become a major focus of supply chain research. While prior 
studies have mainly focused on the performance implications of strategies deployed in buyer-
supplier exchanges, questions about decision-making aspects of these exchanges remain 
unanswered. In addition, buyer-supplier exchanges occur in various contexts (the focal firm, dyad, 
and supply chain); therefore, structural, relational, behavioral, and environmental factors further 
shape decision-making processes. Such a contingent view is critical because strategic choices are 
made depending on the surroundings (Child, 1972). Furthermore, supply chain firms do not always 
operate in a steady, normal mode; instead, they often deal with supply chain disruptions—
unplanned delays or stoppages of planned product flow (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, 
& Handfield, 2007). While the normal mode of operation characterizes the organizing of 
routinized, planned activities, the disrupted mode features unexpectedness and uncertainty 
(Craighead et al., 2007). Given the distinct nature of the two modes, decision-making behaviors 
can vary. In summary, this dissertation serves as an inquiry into decision-making in buyer-supplier 
exchanges by examining cognitions, perceptions, and behaviors. Three essays incorporate one or 
more boundary conditions further shaping decision-making in either a normal mode of operation 
(Essay 3) or a disrupted mode (Essays 1 and 2).  
 
Essay 1 (Chapter I) investigates  buyers’ decisions about the continuity of their relationships 
with suppliers in the wake of supply chain disruptions. While it may be expected that buyers would 
act on the supply chain relationships following a disruption, anecdotal evidence has been mixed. 
Recent studies, notwithstanding insights about what firms do about their focal organization, have 
not addressed what firms do about their relationships following a disruption and the processes 
leading to their actions/inactions. As firms continually scan and make sense of the world (Daft & 
Weick, 1984), we identify buyers’ attributional, sensemaking process following disruptions as 
leading to their decisions about the relationship continuity. We then identify suppliers’ recovery 
actions (in the form of justice actions) as moderators shaping the impact of buyers’ attributions. 
Thus, we integrate attribution theory and justice theory and design a vignette-based study using 
managers to flesh out the mechanisms driving buyers’ relationship decisions in a disrupted mode 
(see Figure 1 for an overview).  
 
Essay 2 (Chapter II) examines when suppliers’ messages in the form of justice recovery are 
well received by buyers in the presence of supplier-induced disruptions While research shows that 
the absence of suppliers’ recovery almost always leads to a deteriorated relationship, it is less clear 
if—or more likely when—the presence of suppliers’ recovery efforts guarantees a restored 
relationship. This study focuses on boundary conditions of a specific set of recovery actions (i.e., 
suppliers’ justice actions): disruption severity and buyers’ supply chain uncertainty. Through the 
lens of signaling theory (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011a; Spence, 1973), we frame 
supplier-induced disruptions as negative signals from suppliers (signalers) to buyers (receivers), 
followed by suppliers’ justice actions as positive signals. We develop rival hypotheses of whether 
the negative signal’s strength (disruption severity) and uncertainty in the signaling environment 
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(supply chain uncertainty) heighten or dampen positive signals’ effectiveness. In addition, we 
explore whether some signals are more effective than others, given the type of negative signal 
(disruptions due to quantity shortage, delays, or poor quality). Using the critical incident technique 
to capture two disruption events from 302 Chinese buyers (i.e., 604 observations), we test the 
boundary conditions shaping the effectiveness of suppliers’ recovery actions in a disrupted mode 
(see Figure 2 for an overview). 
 
Essay 3 (Chapter III) investigates focal firms’ power-related behaviors in multimarket buyer-
supplier negotiations (negotiations as a routine activity of buyer-supplier exchanges). We identify 
two voids in the power literature. First, prior literature has often focused on (or assumed) 
exchanges between focal firms occurring in a single market. Yet, in many cases companies have 
exchanges with their partners across multiple markets. We recognize that exchanges conducted by 
the buyer and the supplier in different markets may interfere with each other; hence, the insights 
obtained based on single-market exchanges may not be extrapolated to the case of multiple 
markets. Second, prior literature has often assumed that firms’ possession of power advantages (in 
the form of less dependence on the focal partner) leads to exploitation of power and thus favorable 
outcomes (e.g., a larger profit share from the exchange). Predicated on this assumption, studies 
have mainly focused on conditions facilitating power use. However, there can be conditions under 
which firms are held back from using power—hence power non-use (Crook, Craighead, & Autry, 
2017). This essay aims to identify exogeneous conditions inherent to the multimarket context (i.e., 
organization, market, and resource) and test how these conditions jointly shape power non-use. 
The three conditions are exchange diffusion (organization), spheres of influence (market), and 
mutual dependence (resource). Modeling the negotiation as a variation of the alternate offer game 
(Binmore, Shared, & Sutton, 1989; Rubinstein, 1982) and via the lens of resource dependence 
theory (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), we operationalize (a) one firm’s power 
advantage over the other derived from having a larger outside option of the focal contracts than its 
partner, (b) low/high exchange diffusion as the focal firms’ centralized/decentralized structure to 
manage the exchanges, (c) broad/narrow spheres of influence as the varying range of the power-
advantaged firm’s dominance over its partner across markets, and (d) mutual dependence as the 
differential between the contracts’ surplus and the sum of the outside options. We conduct an 
economics-based experiment and identify two scenarios leading to power non-use in the 





























Firms increasingly wield supply chains to enhance performance, while inevitably facing supply 
chain disruptions. Little is known about the cognitive processes that drive firms’ actions/inactions 
regarding their on-going relationships with involved suppliers when disruptions occur. We view 
disruptions as one type of relationship violation. Using a behavioral lens to examine buyers’ 
actions about relationship continuity, we incorporate (1) the attributional processes of buyers in 
the presence of disruptions—their sensemaking of why violations occur—and (2) the justice 
actions of involved suppliers in the resolution process—their correction of wrongdoings. Using a 
vignette-based study with 2028 US managers, we find that buyers’ attributions regarding 
disruptions (a function of the disruption cause’s locus of causality, stability, and controllability) 
have both an immediate and a persistent impact on relationship continuity. Such impact’s nature 
(linear/curvilinear, positive/negative) depends on the locus of causality. Notably, buyers’ 
attribution enhances continuity when the locus is external. Relatedly, whether and how suppliers’ 
justice actions shape the impact of buyers’ attributions on continuity depends on the locus of 
causality. When the locus is internal, justice cannot shape the attributions’ impact. When the locus 
is external, justice suppresses the attributions’ positive impact and these suppliers shoulder more 
blame via justice actions.  
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long stated the strategic relevancy of firms’ task environments (cf. Bourgeois, 
1980; Duncan, 1972)—the surroundings that firms continually navigate for opportunities, scan for 
threats (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft & Weick, 1984; Jackson & Dutton, 1988), and act (or do not act) 
on (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). Such an environment is a supply 
chain—a network of firms that transform raw materials into distributed products (Bowersox et al., 
1999; Hult et al., 2004). Within supply chains, firms increasingly seek valuable inputs (e.g., 
products, service, expertise) from suppliers to perform critical tasks (Ketchen & Hult, 2007) and 
purposefully build on-going relationships to gain a competitive edge (Hult, Ketchen, & Arrfelt, 
2007; Hult, Ketchen, & Nichols, 2002). However, this environment as characterized by its 
interlinked nature (Ketchen, Crook, & Craighead, 2014) poses increasing threats as unexpected 
incidents lead to supply chain disruptions1—unplanned delays or stoppages of planned product 
flow (Craighead et al., 2007). Such disruptions can have severe repercussions on a firm’s share 
price (World_Economic_Forum, 2013) and result in abnormal returns (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2005b), particularly in this rapidly changing and intensely competitive economy (Fiksel, 2017; 
World_Economic_Forum, 2013).  
 
Intuitively, disruptions trigger what firms do about their supply chains, such as rethinking and 
redesigning their relationships with involved suppliers. Yet, anecdotal evidence remains mixed 
about firms’ actions/inactions regarding the relationships. Toyota, for instance, maintained its 
relationships with suppliers who had interrupted its inbound product flows because of a severe 
earthquake (Greimel, 2016). Likewise, Lululemon continued working with a supplier who had 
delivered under-qualified fabrics and thus created a snafu for the company (Larcker, Larcker, & 
Tayan, 2014). In contrast, Lumber Liquidators terminated its relationship with suppliers who had 
                                            
1  We use the terms supply chain disruptions and disruptions interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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provided toxic products and thus disrupted the company’s production (Ferrari, 2015). Therefore, 
scholarly understanding of what drives firms’ actions/inactions about supply chains when 
disruptions occur is needed. Yet, research has been lacking on this front, despite insights on 
disruptions’ antecedents (Bourgeois, 1981; Hendricks, Singhal, & Zhang, 2009; Roberts, 1990; 
Weick & Roberts, 1993) and consequences (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003a, 2005b; Jacobs & 
Singhal, 2017; Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 1990; Morgeson, Mitchell, & Liu, 2015; Wan & Yiu, 
2009).  
 
To address this research gap, we take the following stances. First, a firm is an open system that 
scans and makes sense of the environment and responds to its sensemaking (Daft & Weick, 1984; 
Scott & Davis, 2015; Thomas et al., 1993). Second, a supply chain disruption is a type of 
relationship violation that involves a victim (buyer) and a violator (supplier) trying to correct 
wrongdoings in a relationship (Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & Ellram, 2011). As unexpected events 
such as disruptions interrupt the regular progression of work, buyers can first switch from routine 
to mindful cognitive processing (Patriotta & Gruber, 2015)—searching for causes of the violation 
and making attributions about the causes (Eckerd, Hill, Boyer, Donohue, & Ward, 2013)—and 
then respond to those attributions. At the same time, as suppliers take justice actions to correct the 
violation (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; McColl-Kennedy & Sparks, 2003), buyers who 
continually scan the environment receive additional information (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009) and 
modify their actions accordingly. We use Weiner’s (1986) causal attribution theory as a framework 
that predicts how buyers’ sensemaking (i.e., attributional processes triggered by disruptions) 
subsequently shapes buyers’ actions about the continuity of relationships with involved suppliers. 
Furthermore, we complement that theory with justice theory, which explains how involved 
suppliers’ justice actions (procedural, distributive, and interactional) further modify the impact of 
buyers’ attributions on relationship continuity. 
 
We conduct a vignette-based study with 2028 US business managers and show that (1) the 
continuity of buyers’ relationships with suppliers is a function of the responsibility attributed to 
suppliers upon disruptions and suppliers’ justice actions in the resolution process and that (2) the 
attributed responsibility is also a function of attributional dimensions—locus of causality, stability 
and controllability. Thus, we unpack the black box that explains why buyers act in a certain manner 
when disruptions occur, while providing guidance for involved suppliers about how to handle the 
relationship crisis. There are several notable implications. First, while attribution literature 
suggests that attributions to suppliers will damage the relationship in the wake of disruptions 
(Hartmann & Moeller, 2014), we have found that damage only occurs when disruptions are caused 
internally by suppliers. In the presence of disruptions caused by force majeure, a high or low level 
of buyers’ attributions has little damage on continuity. Instead, when ambiguity exists in how much 
blame should be placed on suppliers (i.e., buyers’ blame is neither extremely high nor low), 
uncertainty is added to buyers’ appraisals and disturbs continuity the most. Similarly, while we 
expect the impact of buyers’ attributions on continuity to endure through suppliers’ justice, we 
have found this only for internally-induced disruptions. When disruptions are externally induced, 
buyers’ attributions have a positive, lingering impact on continuity. This observation reinforces 
the important role of buyers’ attributional processes in shaping a disrupted relationship; and based 
on the locus of causality, buyers’ blame can be a liability or an asset. Furthermore, while inter-
organization literature seems to paint a rosy picture of justice (e.g., Colquitt & Rodell, 2011; Luo, 
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2007b; Ren & Gray, 2009), we suggest caveats. When disruptions are externally caused, three 
justice actions weaken the positive impact of buyers’ attribution; and the suppliers will shoulder 
more blame through justice actions. The good news is that justice actions’ net effects on continuity 
remain positive. Finally, while previous studies have suggested a complementary interaction 
between locus of causality and controllability in shaping attributions (Folkes, 1984; Vaidyanathan 
& Aggarwal, 2003), we have found a substitutive interaction.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Prior studies have taken economic or structural perspectives (Bode & Wagner, 2015; Morgeson 
et al., 2015; Perrow, 2011) to examine disruptions’ impact on firms, thus imposing a mechanistic 
view of firms as though they merely react to the environment (Child, 1972). However, firms 
continually make sense of events (e.g., disruptions) and act on the environment (e.g., supply 
chains) (Daft & Weick, 1984; Scott & Davis, 2015; Thomas et al., 1993). Such a cognitive 
perspective is pivotal as it unveils mechanisms accounting for firms’ actions/inactions in response 
to disruptions. We propose that firms’ actions about the continuity of relationships with their 
suppliers can be a function of two components: (1) the responsibility attributed to suppliers and 
(2) suppliers’ actions to resolve disruptions. Our theoretical framework is presented in Figure A-
1.1. All figures and tables are presented in the Appendix 1 of Chapter I.  
Integrating Causal Attribution Theory and Justice Theory 
To investigate the first component—how buyers’ attributions in the wake of disruptions affect 
their relationships with suppliers and how these attributions are formed, we turn to causal 
attribution theory (Weiner, 1986, 2000). The basic processes of attribution have been studied 
extensively in social psychology (Kelley, 1967; Kelly, 1971) and organization behavior including 
motivation (Klein, 1989; Thomas & Velthouse, 1990), leadership (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; 
Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987), conflicts (Bowling & Beehr, 2006; Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985), 
communication (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004), and impression management (Wayne & Liden, 1995). 
Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) applied Weiner’s attribution theory to inter-organizational settings 
to address one instance of relationship violation—trust damage. Our context—a supply chain 
disruption—is likewise a relationship violation that involves a victim (buyer) and a violator 
(supplier) who tries to correct wrongdoings in a relationship (Bode et al., 2011).  
 
One key tenet of attribution theory is that firms’ attributional processes can explain and predict 
the firms’ subsequent actions. Firms act as information processors, frequently trying to make sense 
of the world around them by searching for and making attributions about the causes of events. 
Characterized by threat, uncertainty, and unexpectedness (Craighead et al., 2007; Kleindorfer & 
Saad, 2005), the context of supply chain disruptions is particularly favorable to such attributional 
processes (Weiner, 1985; Wong & Weiner, 1981). We propose that buyers unpleasantly perceive 
disconfirming evidence when disruptions occur. This perception prompts them to identify the 
causes of the event (Weiner, 1986) subsequently shaping their actions regarding the relationship.   
 
Another rationale behind attributional processes is that firms may form different attributions 
in response to similar outcomes depending on the causal inferences made regarding those 
outcomes (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weiner, 1986); those attributions are formed along three 
dimensions—locus of causality, stability and controllability. For example, in the face of 
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performance downturns, firms’ decision makers can make distinct attributions to factors that vary 
in the three dimensions and, thus, respond differently (Ford, 1985b). Therefore, we expect that 
buyers, in the wake of disruptions, can hold suppliers accountable to varying degrees based on 
their causal inferences along the three dimensions.  
 
Also suggested is that attributions’ initial impact on actions can be shaped by subsequent social 
accounts and substantive actions as firms continually search for updated information (Tomlinson 
& Mayer, 2009; Weiner, 1985). Thus, we incorporate insights from justice theory (Bies, 1986; 
Greenberg, 1990b; Leventhal, 1980b) and frame suppliers’ justice actions as one type of these 
substantive actions. Justice theory suggests three actions—procedural, interactional, and 
distributive justice—that produce positive, relationship effects including improved trust (Colquitt 
& Rodell, 2011), commitment (Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995) and alliance 
performance (Luo, 2007b), resolution of relationship conflicts (Ren & Gray, 2009), and repair of 
damaged trust when disruptions occur (Wang, Craighead, & Li, 2014). We propose that suppliers 
can take justice actions to modify the impact of buyers’ attributions on continuity.  
 
Furthermore, justice studies indicate that justice’s effectiveness in correcting wrongdoings can 
depend on the negative events’ specificities. For instance, Smith, Bolton and Wagner (1999) show 
that justice efforts in response to a service failure need to match the failure type to restore customer 
satisfaction. Relatedly, attribution theorists suggest that the modifying impact of substantive 
actions (i.e., justice actions) on attributions depends on the events’ attributional dimensions (e.g., 
Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Along this line, we expect that the effectiveness of suppliers’ justice 
levers varies depending on a disruption’s locus of causality.  
Causal Attributions of Supply Chain Disruptions 
Supply chain disruptions are triggered by events occurring at the focal firm’s supply base or 
during the firm’s inbound logistics process. Such events include supplier’s quality issues, delayed 
shipments, and plant accidents (Bode et al., 2011). Notably, these events do not always disrupt the 
focal firm’s product flows. Rather, a disruption results from a triggering event and the supplier’s 
actions/inactions. For instance, if a supplier misses its schedule to produce required components 
(an event) but purchases components from other sources (supplier’s action), the focal firm will not 
experience disruptions. Similarly, if a tsunami hits a supplier’s seaport (an event) but the supplier 
manages to obtain materials from alternative sources (supplier’s action), disruptions will not occur. 
In these two examples, however, the focal firm would have disruptions if the supplier does not act 
or acts inappropriately. This distinction between a disruption and its triggering event is key to our 
theorizing as we focus on attributions of a disruption (as opposed to its triggering event). 
 
When a disruption occurs, firms retrospectively link it to possible causes through a causal 
search (Ford, 1985b; Weick, 1979). Sensemaking begins with such questions as “Why was 
delivery delayed?” and “Why did product quality decline?” The answers to such questions 
constitute causal attributions. Following Weiner (1986), we propose that each cause can be 
categorized along three dimensions: (a) locus of causality—the extent to which causes are a 
function of internal (i.e., caused by supplier) or external (i.e., caused by nature) determinants; (b) 
stability—the degree to which causes are perceived to either fluctuate or remain constant; and (c) 
controllability—the degree of volitional control suppliers have over the outcomes. These 
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dimensions collectively form buyers’ attributions about disruptions. Figure A-1.2 describes 
buyers’ attributional processes. 
 
Locus of causality. Locus of causality reflects buyers’ perceptions that a cause of a supply 
chain disruption resides in the environment (an external attribution) or in suppliers (an internal 
attribution). This dimension is appraised based on the triggering event. External attributions 
include environmental shocks, competitors’/governments’ actions, and disruptive technologies.  
Internal attributions include suppliers’ strategy, quality control, production, experience, and 
workforce skills (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Ford, 1985b). In the wake of disruptions, locus of 
causality “tells” buyers the source triggering the disruption and to whom to attribute responsibility.  
 
Attribution theory predicts that if the incident is triggered by an external factor, the victim 
tends to blame that external factor rather than the violator (Folkes, 1984) and holds the violator 
less liable for the negative outcome (Lepine & Van Dyne, 2001); otherwise, the victim blames the 
violator. For instance, in a consumer-retail-supplier context, individual consumers attribute 
significantly more responsibility to retailers and suppliers if the incident’s cause was company 
failure, rather than force majeure (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). In the context of supply chain 
disruptions, we argue that buyers attribute more responsibility to suppliers if the disruption is 
triggered by factors internal to suppliers as opposed to external factors. Suppose a tsunami hits a 
supplier’s plant and disrupts buyers’ production. In this case, buyers would perceive the root cause 
of the supplier’s failure to deliver as some force majeure, not within the supplier’s organization; 
i.e., without the tsunami, the disruption would not have happened. Thus, buyers could attribute 
more responsibility for such a disruption to external factors than to the supplier (Weiner, 1986, 
1995). In fact, buyers might even perceive the supplier as a victim of the event (force majeure), 
rather than a violator, and thus tend not to blame the supplier. In contrast, if the buyers’ production 
is disrupted due to the supplier’s internal events (e.g., insufficient capacity), buyers would perceive 
the root cause as man-made within the supplier’s organization and see the supplier as being 
responsible for the incident, which then caused the disruption. Therefore, with internally-induced 
(versus externally-induced) disruptions, buyers are more likely to associate a supplier with the 
negative event and attribute more responsibility. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 1. Buyers attribute more (less) responsibility of disruption to suppliers when the 
locus of causality is internal (external). 
 
Degree of stability. Stability reflects buyers’ perceptions that the cause of a supply chain 
disruption is on a continuum ranging from temporary to permanent (Ford, 1985b), i.e. to what 
degree the cause is perceived to fluctuate or remain constant. If a disruption has occurred regularly 
in the past (e.g., a supplier has consistently delivered late), it would be attributed to a set of stable 
causes (e.g., a supplier’s lack of reliability or capability). In contrast, if a disruption has occurred 
infrequently (e.g., a supplier that has been always on time but is late once), it would be attributed 
to unstable causes (e.g., suppliers’ one-time negligence of monitoring traffic). In other words, 
whether the cause of disruptions is stable can be implied by whether similar disruptions occur 
frequently. Note that we focus on the frequency of disruptions as opposed to triggering events.  
 
10 
Assessment of stability could shape buyers’ expectation of (1) how much their suppliers should 
learn from repetitive events and (2) how likely disruptions will recur (Ford, 1985b). First, when 
similar disruptions occur frequently (instead of parsimoniously), buyers would expect that their 
suppliers may have learned to handle, and even build up resilience against, the repetitive 
disruptions. Thus, the focal disruption indicates that suppliers have not learned from their repeated 
mistakes (Shimizu, 1999). Otherwise, they would have dealt with them. In this case, buyers’ 
attribution may not be driven solely by the focal disruption, but also by suppliers’ repeated 
wrongdoings. For instance, if a supplier of an electronic vehicle manufacturer continually fails to 
deliver because of its provider’s material shortages (e.g., scarce metals), the manufacturer will 
expect this supplier to have established mechanisms (e.g., alternative access to the metal) to deal 
with such shortages. If the supplier fails to deliver again for the same reason, the manufacturer can 
be upset about the supplier’s repeated failures and blame the supplier for not only the focal delivery 
delay but also the past ones. In contrast, if this supplier rarely misses its delivery but happens to 
fail the focal one, the manufacturer will only blame the supplier for the one-time event.  
 
Second, as a stable cause indicates a higher chance of similar disruptions in the future (Ford, 
1985b; Weiner, 2000), buyers may expect the cause to have a long-run impact (Tomlinson & 
Mayer, 2009). Thus, the levels of buyers’ attribution may reflect not only the focal disruption, but 
also expectations of future disruptions. For instance, when a supplier frequently fails to deliver 
due to hurricanes at its seaport, buyers can attribute this failure to the supplier’s bad sourcing 
strategy (e.g., seaport choice) and can expect similar disruptions in the future, given the strategy’s 
long-run nature. In this case, buyers’ blame can be driven by not only the focal disruption but also 
the uncertainty that this supplier brings into the buyers’ supply chains. In contrast, when a supplier 
cannot deliver one time due to a hurricane (regardless of whether hurricanes are frequent at the 
seaport), buyers would possibly attribute this disruption to the supplier’s negligence in monitoring 
weather, and their blame would only center on the focal event. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 2. Buyers attribute more (less) responsibility of disruption to suppliers when the 
occurrences of such disruptions are more (less) frequent.    
 
Buyers blame suppliers even more for frequent disruptions when supply chain disruptions are 
perceived to be caused by internal factors (i.e., untenable suppliers’ behaviors) rather than by force 
majeure. In other words, the effects of stable causes accountable for disruptions are magnified 
when such causes are also believed to be internal rather than external. When disruptions are caused 
by internal factors within a supplier’s organization as opposed to external factors, buyers expect a 
flatter learning curve for the supplier to implement procedures and develop solutions in the face 
of repetitive disruptions. Consider again the example involving the electronic vehicle 
manufacturer. If the disruption is due to the supplier’s lack of production capacity (internal) rather 
than the raw materials’ scarcity (external), the manufacturer would expect it to be easier for the 
supplier to escalate its own production as opposed to finding alternative sources for scarce metals. 
When the supplier fails to deal with its capacity issue and lets such internally-induced delays occur, 
the manufacturer’s blame for the repetitive delays is magnified. Hence, 
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Hypothesis 3. The positive relationship between the frequent occurrences of supply chain 
disruptions and buyer-attributed suppliers’ responsibility of supply chain disruptions is 
stronger (weaker) when the locus of causality is internal(external). 
 
Controllability. Controllability reflects buyers’ perceptions that a cause of a supply chain 
disruption is due to suppliers’ ability to directly influence  situations (Ford, 1985b; Weiner, 1986). 
A key note is that our theorizing of controllability is based on the disruption’s cause rather than 
the triggering event. Regardless of whether the disruption is triggered by internal or external 
factors, its controllability can be perceived either way. Hence, locus and controllability are 
independent dimensions (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Weiner, 1995). For instance, a disruption 
was caused by the supplier’s man-made scheduling mistake (i.e., internal locus). If the supplier 
could have afforded a training program for workers to reduce such mistakes but chose not to, this 
cause was controllable. However, if the supplier did not have resource to provide such training, 
this cause was uncontrollable. Another example is a disruption due to a hurricane hitting the 
supplier’s seaport used to import materials (i.e., external locus). If the supplier could have obtained 
materials from other seaports but chose not to, the cause was controllable. If the supplier did not 
have alternative access to these materials, the cause was uncontrollable. The significance of 
controllability relates to suppliers’ intentions.  
 
Firms seek control and mastery over their environments (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). When firms 
relinquish control, others might perceive this relinquishment as deliberate (Anand & Stern, 1985). 
When suppliers are perceived to have control over the causes leading to supply chain disruptions, 
yet fail to use such options to prevent negative outcomes, buyers are more likely to wonder why 
and possibly question suppliers’ intentions of losing control. For example, a supplier delivered 
defective components due to its aged production line; therefore, the buyer’s assembly was 
disrupted. Furthermore, the supplier had slack resources to purchase a new line but did not. The 
buyer would perceive the supplier’s losing control as intentional, and even as a sign of lacking 
integrity or commitment (Eckerd & Handley, 2015); hence, greater responsibility would be 
attributed to the supplier. In contrast to controllable causes, uncontrollable ones would merely lead 
to less negative perceptions or even to forgiving the negative incidents without the active blame 
(Weiner, 2000). In the above scenario, if the supplier had an aged production line because it could 
not afford to upgrade, the buyer would likely perceive the incident as unintentional and blame the 
supplier less. In contrast, in the hurricane example, when the supplier could have obtained imports 
from another seaport but did not, the buyer would be suspicious of the supplier’s intent and 
commitment, and thus blame the supplier more (Kelley, 1973). On the other hand, if the supplier 
had no alternative access, it  would be perceived as less culpable and less blameworthy (Lewicki 
& Bunker, 1996; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 4. Buyers attribute more (less) responsibility to suppliers when the controllability 
of the cause of supply chain disruptions is high (low). 
 
When the causes of disruptions are under suppliers’ control and are perceived as internal 
instead of external factors, buyers attribute more responsibility to suppliers. Ford (1985b) argues 
that the level of arousal provoking firms to make sense of a negative event is a direct function of 
not only initial expectation of control, but also the event’s implication for other aspects of the firms 
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(Ford, 1985b). As argued previously, suppliers who are better able to influence the disruption but 
let it occur anyway are blamed more because their lack of control is perceived as intentional. In 
this case, if the disruption’s source was also internal, buyers could be more prone to wonder if 
suppliers’ unfavorable intentions might spill over to other aspects of the focal exchange. In the 
example of internal locus, when the supplier failed to produce qualified components because it 
chose not to upgrade its production line (as opposed to being subject to some uncontrollable 
constraints), the buyer would speculate that the supplier might slack in other commitments (e.g., 
training, quality control, etc.) and thus blame the supplier more. In contrast, if a hurricane hit the 
supplier’s seaport and the supplier chose not to search for alternative seaports (despite being able 
to), the buyers’ perceived spillover effect would be less compared to the internal-locus case 
because the buyer would be less certain whether the supplier’s choice was due to its bad intent or 
to the challenges and expense of finding seaports (e.g., seaports have no extra capacity, switching 
fees are too high, etc.). Furthermore, the buyer may perceive the supplier as victim to the hurricane 
and be empathetic regarding the supplier’s choice (Lepine & Van Dyne, 2001).  Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 5. The positive relationship between the controllability of the cause of supply chain 
disruptions and buyer-attributed suppliers’ responsibility of supply chain disruptions is 
stronger (weaker) when the locus of causality is internal (external). 
Responses to Causal Attribution of Supply Chain Disruptions 
Attribution theory contends that how one party perceives the cause of disruptive events and 
attributes the blame has enormous consequences for actions (Kelley, 1973; Moore, 2000; Weiner, 
1986). Specifically, a buyer’s attribution about the cause of a supply chain disruption (relationship 
violation) forms the basis for the buyer’s decision about the discontinuity/continuity of that 
relationship. Continuity—i.e., willingness to continue a relationship—is at the core of a supply 
chain’s quality (Nyaga, Whipple, & Lynch, 2010). It is linked to favorable relationship outcomes 
such as future collaboration (Bercovitz, Jap, & Nickerson, 2006), lower negotiation costs (Artz & 
Brush, 2000), less opportunism (Jap & Anderson, 2003), and stronger ties (Heide & Miner, 1992).  
 
Continuity is partly fostered by a proactive sensemaking process, searching for meaning as a 
way to deal with uncertainty (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). In other words, buyers tend to 
pursue on-going relationships with suppliers if the relationships do not involve high uncertainty of 
violations (i.e., unpredictable negative events such as disruptions) in the future. When buyers 
attribute more responsibility to suppliers for the violation, the buyers are likely to associate 
suppliers with uncertainty and perceive future interactions with them as risky. In this case, buyers 
leave the focal relationship to escape potential damages in the future. In addition, buyers’ 
willingness to continue the relationship (i.e., shadow of the future) is influenced by buyers’ prior 
history of interactions with suppliers (i.e., shadow of the past) (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). A 
history of positive interactions signals that suppliers’ performance is satisfactory and reliable over 
time; therefore, buyers would pursue the focal, stable relationship. In contrast, an unpleasant 
history filled with violations attributable to suppliers could strongly indicate not only that the 
suppliers’ performance was below expectation but also that this unpleasant experience might carry 
into the future. Thus, to avoid such unpleasant experience, buyers are less likely to continue the 
relationship. We propose that in the wake of supply chain disruptions (before suppliers’ attempt to 
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resolve the violation), the more responsibility buyers attribute to suppliers, the less likely buyers 
are willing to continue the relationship. 
 
Furthermore, we expect that the negative impact of buyers’ attribution on continuity when 
disruptions occur will endure after suppliers’ attempts to resolve the violation. This expectation is 
based on attribution literature that has suggested attributions’ strong influence on subsequent 
actions may have a persistent impact (e.g., Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). 
Thus, we predict that when disruptions occur buyers’ attributions may persistently impact buyers’ 
continuity in the presence of suppliers’ corrective behaviors in the resolution process. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 6. Buyers are less (more) willing to continue the relationships with suppliers into 
the future (a) before the resolution and (b) after the resolution as buyers attribute more (less) 
responsibility to suppliers. 
 
Moderations of justice approaches. As suppliers take justice approaches to correct their 
wrongdoings, buyers who continually scan their supply chains can become aware of these 
corrective actions and modify their decisions based on this new information (Tomlinson & Mayer, 
2009; Weiner, 1985). We theorize that three justice approaches (procedural, interactional, and 
distributive) suppliers adopt in the wake of disruptions (violations) weaken the negative effects of 
buyers’ attributions to suppliers on buyers’ willingness to continue the relationship.  
 
Procedural justice, defined as the perceived fairness of the procedures suppliers employ to 
resolve disruptions (Wang et al., 2014), enables suppliers to adhere to the rules of consistency, 
accuracy, bias-suppression, correctability, integrity, and ethicality in the resolution process 
(Leventhal, 1980b). First, fair procedures signal to buyers (1) that suppliers embrace the blame 
and use actions instead of excuses through consistent and valuable effort and (2) that suppliers are 
trustworthy to work with in the future (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Such effort demonstrates suppliers’ 
credibility and consistency in developing policies and procedures (Griffith, Harvey, & Lusch, 
2006), helps alleviate buyers’ uncertainty in future interactions stemming from suppliers’ 
attributed responsibilities, and rebuilds buyers’ confidence in the focal relationship (Ren & Gray, 
2009). In addition, through fostering a fruitful environment for coordination and trying all means 
to reduce the possibility of future conflicts (Ren & Gray, 2009), suppliers demonstrate their skills 
to resolve conflicts and to work constructively to mitigate negative impacts (Leventhal, 1980b). 
Buyers can then expect facilitated coordination with suppliers in the future if similar violations 
occur, even in other aspects of the exchange (e.g., governance, executing plans, etc.) (Luo, 2007b, 
2008). This expectation further reduces the uncertainty of buyers due to attributed responsibility 
to their suppliers and boosts the relationship’s continuity.  
 
Interactional justice, defined as buyers’ perceptions of the fairness of interpersonal treatment 
received during the enactment of disruption resolution decisions and procedures  (Wang et al., 
2014), reduces the negative effects of buyers’ attributions on continuity. This result is because  
even when suppliers are perceived as causing the violation, the fact that they show  respect, dignity, 
and politeness towards buyers (Bies & Moag, 1986; Luo, 2007b) causes buyers to believe these 
suppliers are truly caring despite their earlier wrongdoings. By speaking directly to the emotional 
side of the inter-organizational interactions (Greenberg, 1993), suppliers are trying to both resolve 
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relational conflicts (Narasimhan, Narayanan, & Srinivasan, 2013) and restore buyers’ confidence. 
Buyers, in turn, perceive suppliers as credible and caring partners and, thus, the focal relationship 
as less risky in the future. This perception dilutes the negative impact of suppliers’ attributed 
responsibility on buyers’ willingness to continue. In addition, suppliers’ adoption of interactional 
justice during the resolution process cultivates a collaborative, respectful interactive experience. 
On the one hand, such interpersonal experiences can help relieve buyers’ unsureness of suppliers’ 
future behaviors—a concern that arises from attributed responsibilities (Liu, Huang, Luo, & Zhao, 
2012; Uzzi, 1997); furthermore, more pleasant experiences can dispel the negative shadow of the 
past (i.e., buyers’ unpleasant experience with prior violations attributed to suppliers). Thus, the 
negative impact of suppliers’ attributed responsibilities on continuity is further diminished. 
 
Distributive justice, defined as perceived fairness in resource allocations buyers receive (Wang 
et al., 2014), can be used to correct causal attributions’ negative impact on buyers’ willingness to 
continue the relationship. First, through making equitable efforts (Adams, 1965) to correct their 
wrongdoings, suppliers signal that they care about the buyers’ welfare and manage to rectify the 
negative outcomes of their wrongdoings (Wang et al., 2014). In other words, the fairness in 
outcome allocation, despite the unfavorable conditions in which suppliers are blamed for causing 
violations, not only reverses the negative impression buyers have developed of their suppliers (e.g., 
risky partners) but also fosters a positive perception of suppliers (e.g., dependable partners with 
whom to collaborate in the future) (Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995; Liu et al., 2012). Second, 
distributive justice also implies that suppliers are consistent in their deliveries to buyers, regardless 
of the disruptions’ causes; in other words, this form of justice ensures that buyers will not incur 
unexpected losses (i.e., risks) but instead gain in proportion to their inputs (Luo, 2007b). Thus, 
even if similar disruptions occur again, there is little chance that buyers will suffer losses 
unproportionally to their resource inputs. Hence, distributive justice dampens the focal 
relationship’s increasing uncertainty that arises from causal attributions. This dampened 
uncertainty may help recuperate buyers’ continuity. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 7. The negative relationship between buyer-attributed suppliers’ responsibility of 
supply chain disruptions and buyers’ willingness to continue relationships with suppliers after 
resolution is weaker (stronger) as suppliers’ use of (a) procedural justice, (b) interactional 
justice, and (c) distributive justice approaches is higher (lower). 
 
Moderations of locus of causality. Finally, we propose the moderation effects of the above 
three justice approaches (to mending causal attributions’ negative effects) on continuity are 
stronger if the locus of causality is external rather than internal. As we have argued, through their 
justice efforts (procedural, interactional, and distributive), suppliers could send positive messages 
to buyers that they embrace the blame and take ownership of the violation, therefore fostering a 
positive image as dependent and caring partners. Because locus of causality reveals the 
disruption’s direct causes—suppliers or external factors (Ford, 1985b; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), 
it could alter how buyers interpret the positive messages of suppliers’ justice efforts. In the 
presence of disruptions caused by force majeure, when suppliers nonetheless take justice actions 
to resolve what they were not directly responsible for, buyers would be likely to perceive the 
suppliers’ justice efforts (a fair process, interpersonal conduct, and outcome allocations) as extra-
role efforts (i.e., voluntary commitments outside their duties) in the focal relationships (Kim & 
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Mauborgne, 1996; Kumar & Nti, 1998). These efforts would (1) create a “halo effect”—
amplifying the positive signals of justice efforts that suppliers could be accountable for, showing 
suppliers truly care about the buyers’ welfare, and making collaboration less tricky in the future—
and (2) encourage buyers’ commitment. In other words, the effectiveness of justice approaches in 
shaping the impact of buyers’ attributed responsibility on relationship continuity might be stronger. 
In contrast, when disruptions are caused internally (i.e., directly) by suppliers, buyers could tend 
to interpret suppliers’ justice efforts as in-role efforts (i.e., what suppliers are supposed to address) 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1996), instead of extra commitments, because suppliers’ justice actions are 
supposed to correct supplier-induced wrongdoings. Thus, the effectiveness of justice approaches 
may be less substantial. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 8. The effects of (a) procedural justice, (b) interactional justice, and (c) distributive 
justice approaches that weaken the negative relationships between buyer-attributed suppliers’ 
responsibility of supply chain disruptions and buyers’ willingness to continue the relationships 
with suppliers are stronger (weaker) when the locus of causality is external (internal). 
METHODS 
Sample, Procedure and Item Generation 
Sample. To examine the causal relationships proposed in our theoretical framework that 
unfolds buyers’ attributional processes and suppliers’ justice actions, we conducted a scenario-
based experiment. Via a private research software company, we recruited 2040 US professionals 
with at least one year’s experience in business-to-business interactions. We removed 12 responses 
of participants who finished the study within five minutes and used 2028 responses as our final 
sample, consisting of professionals with an average of 8.34 years of experience from a wide range 
of industries (e.g., IT, food, automotive, healthcare, finance, etc.). Common titles were managers, 
directors, supervisors, CEOs, and business owners. Of the sample, 52.7% were men; 59% of the 
sample were between 30 and 49 years old.  
 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted online with no financial compensation. Before 
presenting the scenario, we measured participants’ dispositional tendencies that could influence 
their decision-making in a business-to-business context, namely their propensity to trust (Colquitt, 
Scott, & LePine, 2007) and involvement (Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992). Propensity to 
trust measured one’s dispositional willingness to rely on others (Colquitt et al., 2007), while 
involvement measured the degree to which participants are involved in managing the relationships 
with suppliers (Moorman et al., 1992). We then formally introduced the scenario with a leading 
passage common across all treatment conditions. Based on this introduction, participants assumed 
the role of a purchasing manager for a mid-size company manufacturing telecommunication 
equipment. Participants were also informed of their assumed responsibilities. The subsequent 
experiment consisted of two treatments (a before-resolution stage and an after-resolution stage). 
In the before-resolution stage, participants were randomly assigned to one of eight attribution 
conditions characterizing the cause of a supply chain disruption. We manipulated three 
attributional dimensions, namely its stability (high versus low), controllability (high versus low) 
and locus of causality (internal versus external). Descriptions of the attribution conditions, along 
with the introduction passage, are presented in Table A-1.1. Following this treatment, we measured 
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participants’ responses, including responsibility attribution (buyer-attributed supplier’s 
responsibility) and continuity (buyer’s willingness to continue the relationship).  
 
In the after-resolution stage, participants were first presented a statement of the disruption’s 
impact, designed to be the same across all treatment conditions. Participants were then randomly 
assigned to one of eight justice conditions characterizing the resolution actions the supplier used. 
We manipulated three justice approaches: procedural justice (high versus low), interactional 
justice (high versus low), and distributive justice (high versus low). Descriptions of the justice 
conditions, along with the bridging statement about the disruption’s impact, are shown in Table 
A-1.2. Following the manipulation, we measured the same set of response variables as the before-
resolution stage—responsibility attribution and continuity. The experiment concluded with the 
Big-Five personality scale (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) and a set of demographic 
questions (i.e., gender, age and years of experience in business-to-business transactions).  
 
In summary, our experiment represented a mixed factorial design—levels of the attribution 
treatment (2 by 2 by 2) and levels of the justice treatment (2 by 2 by 2) were manipulated between 
participants, whereas the two treatments were conducted sequentially within participants. To 
further confirm our instruments’ validity and clarity, we conducted an online pilot study with 101 
professionals. Responses from the pilot study were reasonable.  
 
Causal attribution manipulation. Based on attribution theory (Weiner, 1986), there are three 
main dimensions—locus of causality, stability and controllability. Locus of causality refers to 
whether the event (i.e., the disruption) is caused internally by the supplier (N = 1012) or externally 
by a major tsunami (N = 1016). We used a single-item question for the manipulation check, asking 
if the incident’s primary cause was a failure of the supplier or an act of nature. All participants in 
the internal-locus condition chose the former, and all participants in the external-locus condition 
chose the latter.  
 
Stability refers to the degree to which a cause is perceived to either fluctuate or remain constant. 
In the high-stability condition (N = 989), participants read that “such disruptions occur rather 
frequently in the past 5 years.” In the low-stability condition (N = 1039), participants read “such a 
disruption rarely occurs in the past 5 years.” Previous research further suggested that among causes 
of an internal locus, examples of stable causes are capacity and ability (those difficult to change in 
the short term), while examples of unstable causes are mistakes and luck (those that shift quickly) 
(Weiner, 1986). Thus, among conditions of an internal locus, we described the disruption due to 
lack of long-term capacity in a high-stability condition and to production schedule mistakes in a 
low-stability condition. The manipulation was checked by asking participants to what degree they 
would agree that disruptions in the past 5 years are frequent, on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (totally). Participants in the high-stability condition expected frequent disruptions 
significantly more than those in the low-stability condition (F(1, 2026) = 166.25, p = 0.00).  
 
Controllability refers to the degree of volitional control one has over the outcome (Weiner, 
1986). In the high-controllability condition (N = 1006), participants were informed that the 
supplier had sufficient resources or capability to control the disruption but “chose not to do so”; in 
the low-controllability condition (N = 1022), participants were told that the supplier had no control 
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over the outcome due to “limited resources.” As a manipulation check, participants were asked to 
what degree they would agree that the supplier’s capability to prevent the disruption from 
happening is high, on a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (totally). The manipulation 
check was successful (F(1, 2026) = 15.12, p = 0.00).  
 
Justice manipulation. Justice theory suggests that three aspects of justice are critical in 
interorganizational exchanges: procedural, interactional, and distributive justice (Colquitt & 
Rodell, 2011; Wang et al., 2014). Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of procedures 
the supplier employs to repair the disruption. In the high-procedural-justice condition (N = 1010), 
the supplier had “a well-organized, methodical procedure to resolve the disruption”; in the low-
procedure-justice group (N = 1018), the supplier’s procedure to resolve the disruption was 
“disorganized and chaotic.” Interactional justice is about the perceived fairness of the 
interpersonal treatment during the resolution. In the high-interactional-justice condition (N = 
1007), participants read that they were treated “in a polite manner with respect”; in the low-
interactional-justice condition (N = 1021), participants read about being treated “in a rude manner 
with little respect.” Distributive justice refers to the outcome distribution’s fairness in resolving 
the disruption. Participants in the high-distributive-justice condition (N = 1020) were informed 
that the supplier covered the total loss, whereas the total loss was not covered for those in the low-
distributive-justice group (N = 1008).  
 
As a manipulation check for all three justice approaches, participants were asked to what 
degree (on a seven-point Likert scale) they would agree that the methods for the supplier to resolve 
the disruption were fair. The manipulations were successful for procedural justice (F(1, 2026) = 
25.99, p = 0.00), interactional justice (F(1, 2026) = 89.11, p = 0.00), and distributive justice (F(1, 
2026) = 55.89, p = 0.00). We further checked the manipulation of distributive justice with one 
additional question—to what degree participants would agree (on a seven-point Likert scale) that 
the supplier covered their total loss. Again, the manipulation was successful (F(1, 2026) = 226.98, 
p = 0.00).  
 
Measured variables. Response variables include responsibility attribution and continuity. 
Responsibility attribution was measured with four items on a seven-point Likert scale (adapted 
from Hartmann & Moeller, 2014), assessing how much responsibility was attributed to the 
supplier. Continuity was measured with three items on a seven-point Likert scale (adapted from 
Wang, Kayande, & Jap, 2010), assessing the intention of continuing the focal relationship with the 
supplier. We also measured control variables of trust propensity (adopted from Colquitt et al., 
2007), involvement (adopted from Moorman et al. 1992), Big-Five personality scale (adopted from 
Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003), gender, age (interval coded), and years of experience. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table A-1.3.  
 
We took two steps to ensure measurement validity and reliability. First, to ensure that our 
constructs were invariant (i.e., comparable) before and after a treatment, we tested measurement 
invariance of variables (i.e., responsibility, attribution, and continuity) repeatedly measured by the 
same participants. We followed Steenkamp and Baumgartner’s (1998) procedures and conducted 
a series of tests (i.e., in the order of configural invariance, metric invariance, and scalar invariance) 
using a multi-group model in MPLUS 7.2. The configural model, serving as the baseline, requires 
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the same items to load onto the same factors across groups. The metric model, adding more 
restrictions to the baseline model, constrains the same factor loadings across groups. The scalar 
model, the most restrictive among the three, constrains the factor means to be equal across groups. 
In our case, groups refer to responses before and after resolution. We removed two items under 
responsibility attribution due to low loadings onto the factor in the configural model. With the rest 
of the items, our measures achieved (1) configural invariance (i.e., the configural model’s good 
fit); (2) metric invariance (i.e., the metric model’s fit is no worse than the configural model’s); and 
(3) scalar invariance (i.e., the scalar invariance’s fit is no worse than the metric model’s). Thus, 
our measures can be meaningfully compared before and after treatments (Steenkamp & 
Baumgartner, 1998). We summarized the results in Table A-1.4.  
 
Secondly, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of multi-item variables (i.e., trust 
propensity, involvement, responsibility attribution before/after resolution, and continuity 
before/after resolution in MPLUS 7.2). The overall model fit is good (χ2 =1175.43, df = 155, CFI 
= 0.97, NFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.057, SRMR = 0.038). All factor loadings are significant (p < 
0.001), indicating good convergent validity, except for the first and fourth items of trust propensity, 
which were thus removed. The average variance extracted (AVE) range is between 0.53 and 0.89, 
providing further support for convergent validity. Composite reliabilities (CR) range between 0.87 
and 0.96, suggesting good reliability. AVE and CR values are shown in Table 3. Factor loadings 
are presented in Table A-1.5.  
Model Specification and Estimation 
In our mixed factorial design, treatment and response variables (before and after resolution) 
were nested within the same subjects. Hence, a hierarchical linear model (HLM) was appropriate. 
In our HLM, we incorporated Level 1 factors (manipulated variables) and Level 2 factors (subject-
level controls). While Level 1 factors allowed us to assess the impact of attribution and justice 
treatments on response variables, Level 2 factors accommodated subject-related variations 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). All variables conformed to normality—a strict assumption of 
maximum likelihood estimation as implemented in HLM (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002)—except 
years of experience, which was log transformed.  
 
To test the main effects of attributional dimensions (H1, H2, and H4), we modeled 
responsibility attribution before resolution as the response variable, three attribution variables as 
Level 1 factors, and subject-related controls as Level 2 factors. To further test the interactive 
effects of attributional dimensions (H3 and H5), we added an interaction term of stability and locus 
of causality, and of controllability and locus of causality as additional Level 1 factors. For H6(a), 
we modeled continuity before resolution as the response variable as well as responsibility 
attribution before resolution and attribution variables as Level 1 factors. The same set of Level 2 
factors was used. For H6(b), we modeled continuity after resolution as the response variable, as 
well as continuity before resolution, responsibility attribution before resolution, and justice 
variables as Level 1 factors, along with the same Level 2 factors. For H7(a)-(c), we added the 
justice variables and the interaction terms of responsibility attribution before resolution with 
justice variables as Level 1 factors. For H8(a)-(c), we split the sample by locus of causality 
(internal versus external locus) and conducted the same analyses across both groups as we did in 
H7(a)-(c) (without the main effect of locus of causality). Across all models, we used a random 
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intercept specification, whereby the intercept of Level 1 factors could vary across subjects 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
RESULTS 
Insights from HLM  
We first examined the main effects of three attribution variables and found support for H1, H2, 
and H4. Buyers attributed more responsibility (1) when the disruption was induced internally by 
the supplier rather than caused externally by force majeure (Model 1: B = .95, p = .00), (2) when 
similar disruptions occurred more frequently in the past (Model 1: B = .47, p = .00), and (3) when 
the supplier had more volitional control over the disruptions (Model 1: B = .58, p = .00). We next 
assessed the moderating effects of locus of causality on stability and controllability, respectively, 
as in H3 and H5. For H3, the interaction term was nonsignificant (Model 2: B = -.07, p = .40); we 
found no support. For H5, the interaction was significant but in the opposite direction as predicted 
(Model 2: B = -.32, p = .00); we found no support. Controllability and locus of causality seem to 
substitute each other in shaping buyers’ attribution. Results are summarized in Table A-1.6. 
 
H6(a) and H6(b) predict that the buyer’s attributed responsibility before resolution negatively 
impacts the buyer’s willingness to continue the relationship before and after resolution. Our result 
supported H6a (Model 3: B = -.27, p = .00), but not H6b; there was a positive, marginally 
significant relationship between responsibility attribution before resolution and continuity after 
resolution (Model 4: B = .04, p = .08). This counterintuitive finding warrants further investigation. 
Results are shown in Tables A-1.7 and Table A-1.8. 
 
Studies have demonstrated three justice approaches’ positive impact on the relationship’s 
continuity (e.g., Wang et al., 2014). Though we did not theorize justice approaches’ main effects 
on continuity after resolution, our results confirmed previous findings that procedural justice 
(Model 4: B = .36, p = .00), interactional justice (Model 4: B = 1.04, p = .00), and distributive 
justice (Model 4: B = .84, p = .00) improved buyers’ continuity after resolution. Among the three 
justices, interactional justice had the most salient impact. H7(a)-(c) predicts that justice approaches 
weaken responsibility attribution’s impact before resolution on continuity after resolution. We 
found support for interactional justice (Model 5: B = -.16, p = .00) and marginal support for 
distributive justice (Model 5: B = -.06, p = 0.10). Results are shown in Table A-1.8.  
 
To compare how interactions between justice approaches and responsibility attribution vary 
based on the disruption’s locus of causality (H8(a)-(c)), we conducted HLM analyses for the 
internal-locus group vis-à-vis the external-locus group and found support, as presented in Table 
A-1.9 (the internal-locus group) and Table A-1.10 (the external-locus group). When the disruption 
was caused internally by the supplier, none of the justice approaches significantly moderated the 
impact of responsibility attribution before resolution on continuity after resolution (Model 7). 
When the disruption was externally caused, procedural justice (Model 9: B = -.09, p = .08), 
interactional justice (Model 9: B = -.24, p = .00), and distributive justice (Model 9: B = -.15, p = 




To test whether our results were sensitive to our random-intercept specification, we ran all the 
models with a random intercept and slope specification with both the intercept and slope of Level 
1 factors allowed to vary across subjects (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We found consistent results 
with our main analyses.  
 
Because participants were randomly assigned to conditions before and after resolution, the 
attribution treatment and the justice treatment should be orthogonal to the subjects’ characteristics 
(i.e., subject-level controls). We ran HLM analyses with the same specification as the main 
analyses but removed all subject-level controls. Results did not change (except p values increased 
slightly), thus verifying our randomized design.  
 
We initially expected that the amount of responsibility attributed to suppliers should be dictated 
by the attribution manipulation but not by the justice manipulation; therefore, responsibility 
attribution after resolution should not significantly deviate from attribution before resolution. To 
check this expectation, we compared means of responsibility attribution before resolution (M = 
3.86) and after resolution (M = 4.12) using the repeated measure ANOVA. Surprisingly, we found 
that responsibility attribution after resolution was significantly higher on average than before 
resolution (F(1) = 36.08, p = .00), indicating that buyers attributed more responsibility to suppliers 
by observing suppliers’ justice efforts. To further examine this surprising pattern, we ran a mixed 
ANOVA, whereby the between-subject factor was locus of causality and the within-subject factor 
was time (before and after resolution). We found that the change in responsibility attribution before 
and after resolution varied significantly depending on locus of causality (F(1) = 37.69, p = .00). 
While on average buyers facing an internally-induced disruption did not change their attributions 
(as expected), buyers facing an externally-induced disruption attributed more responsibility 
through suppliers’ justice resolution. Figure A-1.3 depicts this finding. 
 
We further expected that continuity should be shaped (specifically, should increase) by justice 
manipulation; in other words, buyers’ continuity before resolution should be significantly different 
from after resolution. We first compared means of continuity before resolution (M = 4.29) and 
continuity after resolution (M = 4.05) with the repeated measure ANOVA, and we found a 
significant difference (F(1) = 42.56, p = .00). However, continuity on average counterintuitively 
decreased through suppliers’ justice efforts. This finding suggests that some combination of justice 
approaches was ineffective in correcting continuity. We also ran a mixed ANOVA model in which 
the between-subject factor was justice treatment (eight combinations) and the within-subject factor 
was time (before and after resolution). Table A-1.11 summarizes change in continuity before and 
after resolution for each justice condition. Only the two groups of high levels of both distributive 
and interactional justice showed a significant increase in continuity. The rest, especially those 
having low levels of both interactional and distributive justice, showed a significant decrease in 
continuity.  
Post Hoc Analyses 
As suggested by our main analysis (H8) and robustness checks, responsibility attribution’s 
implications seemed to vary by locus of causality. Thus, we wondered whether responsibility 
attribution would impact buyers’ continuity differently before and after resolution by locus of 
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causality. As a result, we conducted the same HLM analysis as with H6(a) and H6(b) for the 
internal locus group and external locus group, separately. For H6(a), we found that when the 
disruption was internally caused, the more responsibility attributed to suppliers before resolution, 
the less likely buyers would continue the relationship (Model 10: B = -.35, p = .00); when the 
disruption was externally caused, the relationship was nonsignificant, albeit negative (Model 12: 
B = -.20, p = .68). We also explored if the nonsignificance was due to an actual curvilinear 
relationship between the two variables when the disruption was caused externally, and we found a 
U-shape relationship (Model 13: B = -.91 for the linear term; B = .10, p = .00 for the quadratic 
term). The curve’s minimum point was 4.55 (at the 70th percentile). As shown in Figure A-1.4, in 
the presence of externally-induced disruptions, buyers are more willing to continue the relationship 
when either a little or a lot of responsibility is attributed to suppliers; when some ambiguity is in 
the attribution (neither too little nor too high), buyers are less willing to continue the relationship. 
Results are shown in Table A-1.12 (internal-locus) and Table A-1.13 (external-locus).  
 
Similarly, we examined if the positive lingering impact of responsibility attribution before 
resolution on continuity after resolution (H6(b)) would vary across the internal-locus and the 
external-locus groups. We found that when the disruption was internally caused, there was a 
negative impact (Model 6: B = -.05, p =.10). Surprisingly, when the disruption was due to force 
majeure, responsibility attribution’s lingering impact on continuity after resolution was positive 
(Model 8: B = .10, p = .00). This finding suggests that holding suppliers accountable for disruptions 
they do not directly cause could be beneficial to the focal relationship if suppliers have made justice 
efforts. Results are presented in Table A-1.9 (internal-locus) and Table A-1.10 (external-locus). 
DISCUSSION 
As firms increasingly wield supply chains to gain an competitive edge (Hult et al., 2007; Hult 
et al., 2004), they inevitably deal with disruptions arising from supply chains (Craighead et al., 
2007). While scholars have focused mainly on disruptions’ impacts, mostly economic, on firms 
(e.g., Bode & Wagner, 2015; Craighead et al., 2007; Morgeson et al., 2015; Wan & Yiu, 2009), 
less is known about what firms do (or do not do) about supply chains in response to disruptions, 
and more importantly, what drives firms’ actions/inactions. Thus, we have sought to unveil the 
mechanisms dictating buyers’ following actions about the continuity of their relationships with 
involved suppliers when disruptions occur: buyers’ sensemaking, attributional processes of 
suppliers’ violation (attribution theory), and suppliers’ correction of their violation via justice 
actions (justice theory). Using a vignette-based study with 2028 US business managers, we show 
that (1) buyers’ appraisal of suppliers’ wrongdoings along three attributional dimensions dictate 
how much responsibility buyers attribute to suppliers, then affecting their willingness to continue 
the relationship, and that (2) beyond directly improving the focal relationship’s continuity, 
suppliers’ justice actions may or may not shape the impact of buyers’ attributions on continuity.  
 
This study offers several notable contributions. Attribution theory predicts that the more 
responsibilities attributed to suppliers in the wake of disruptions, the more damaging the impact is 
on the relationship continuity (e.g., Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). However, we find this prediction 
holds only when the disruption’s locus of causality is internal. When the locus is external, high or 
low levels of attributions are not damaging. Instead, when buyers’ blame is neither extremely high 
nor low—some ambiguity exists regarding how much suppliers should be blamed, continuity is 
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disturbed the most. In contrast to cases when buyers feel certain about their attributions (i.e., low 
or high levels), their uncertainty about how liable suppliers should be reinforces their perceived 
uncertainties about the relationship due to the disruption; thus, they exit the relationship to avoid 
uncertainties. As Tomlinson and Mayer (2009) suggest, the amount of attribution matters under 
the internal locus but less so under the external locus. We further these scholars’ work by showing 
that under the external locus, while the amount of attribution means little, the attribution’s 
ambiguity matters. Ambiguity is more relevant to externally induced disruptions because the fact 
that suppliers do not cause disruptions makes appraisals of suppliers’ responsibilities ambiguous. 
This result warrants more research into attributional ambiguities’ role (Powell, Lovallo, & 
Caringal, 2006) in (inter)organization decision-making. For instance, the following questions 
could be explored: If the locus of causality is relational—an event caused by interfirm interactions 
(Eberly, Holley, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2011) as opposed to a single party or the context, will 
ambiguities be more salient? If so, how will ambiguities bias firms’ attributions and actions? 
 
Furthermore, while we confirm prior studies’ findings that buyers’ attributions, beyond an 
immediate impact, have a persistent effect on continuity (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Salancik & 
Meindl, 1984) that endures suppliers’ attempt to resolve their violation, we show that this effect 
differs across loci of causality (i.e., a negative effect under the internal locus and, 
counterintuitively, a positive effect under the external locus). Perhaps initial attributions of buyers 
in the wake of externally-induced disruptions shift into empathy with suppliers as they perceive 
suppliers as victims (like themselves) of environmental jolts. Hence, buyers may decide to give 
suppliers a second chance in future interactions. We echo the insight from organization behavior 
studies (e.g., Lepine & Van Dyne, 2001) that employees develop empathy towards their low-
performing peers and thus compensate them if the low performance is attributed to external factors, 
and we extend that insight to inter-organizational settings. We invite scholars to further uncover 
the mechanisms driving attributions’ long-run impacts. 
 
Overall, we show that buyers’ attributions of suppliers’ violations (even when suppliers do not 
cause the event triggering disruptions) are an indispensable herald of their decisions about the 
relationship’s continuity in the short and the long run. This finding highlights the importance for 
suppliers to understand buyers’ attributional process (regardless of the true causes) in order to 
manage on-going relationships. Suppliers that cause disruptions should realize that the damage of 
buyers’ attributions can be persistent and therefore should prepare to have long-term resolution 
strategies. On the other hand, suppliers trapped in disruptions by force majeure should realize the 
potential benefits of buyers’ attributions (e.g., empathy) and leverage those benefits to enhance 
relationship outcomes.  
 
Though justice literature seems to paint a rosy picture of justice in the relationship context 
(e.g., Colquitt & Rodell, 2011; Luo, 2007b; Ren & Gray, 2009), we suggest a more complex story. 
First, while we confirm prior studies regarding justice’s effectiveness in restoring relationship 
damage from negative incidents (Ren & Gray, 2009; Wang et al., 2014), we emphasize that they 
are not equally valuable. Interactional justice and distributive justice are, respectively, 1.89 and 
1.33 times more effective in enhancing continuity than procedural justice. Suppliers should have 
both interactional and distributive justice in place to fully restore the damaged continuity. If either 
is missing, the relationship’s future can be gloomy regardless of procedural justice.  
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Second, while the literature indicates that justice can be used as a repair strategy to modify the 
impact of victims’ attributions (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009), we suggest 
the disruption’s locus of causality creates a critical boundary condition by which justice can or 
cannot effectively shape the impact of buyers’ attributions. This idea reinforces a result from 
service recovery literature indicating that the causes of a failure dictate whether one’s recovery 
effort can correct the failure (Smith et al., 1999). When the locus is internal, the negative impact 
of buyers’ attributions on continuity is too stubborn to be shaped by any of the justice approaches. 
This concept aligns with prior studies indicating that attributions driven by internal factors can be 
too persistent to shape (Jones & Davis, 1965). We invite scholars to incorporate alternative 
perspectives and suggest strategies (e.g., penance) for suppliers to mitigate attributions’ negative 
impact. When the locus is external, three justice actions suppress the relationship benefits that 
suppliers could have gained from buyers’ attributions. Furthermore, these suppliers shoulder more 
blame from buyers. We speculate that suppliers’ justice actions render them more ownership of 
disruptions and signal that they are violators instead of victims, thus defeating the relationship 
benefits that suppliers could obtain from buyers’ empathy. This speculation is consistent with trust 
repair literature indicating that violators’ repair actions (e.g., apologies) can be perceived as 
gestures that assume ownership (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Kim et al., 2006) 
and that acknowledge guilt (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). Nonetheless, the net effects of justice are 
positive. Therefore, we suggest that suppliers in externally-induced disruptions may take justice 
actions in the resolutions; however, they should be cautious of what their justice actions imply. 
 
Finally, in contrast to prior attribution studies of individuals’ emotions and perceptions (e.g., 
Folkes, 1984; Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2003) suggesting a complementary effect between locus 
of causality and controllability, we surprisingly have found that they weaken each other’s 
influence. When suppliers have little ability to influence the cause of disruptions, buyers attribute 
more responsibilities to suppliers if the cause is internal rather than external. However, when 
suppliers are perceived to have control, buyers blame suppliers regardless of the locus of causality. 
We thus suggest additional efforts to explore how established results in the attribution research at 






Table A-1.1: Description of Attribution Conditions 
 
Condition Description # participants 
Introduction Imagine you are a purchasing manager for a mid-sized manufacturing 
company in the United States that makes telecommunication equipment. You 
have worked with the company for the last 5 years, and a major part of your 
responsibility in the company is to manage supplier relationships. Any 
disruption in the supply chain could cause substantial harm to the company. 
You have been pleased (generally) with the performance of all of the 
suppliers since your arrival at the company. However, one supplier—





low stability X 
low 
controllability 
The disruption was caused by TechSup: it was due to the head of its 
manufacturing department who messed up the production schedules and 
produced incompatible components for your newly developed 
telecommunication equipment.  
Unfortunately, given limited resources, TechSup was unable to provide a 
training program in production scheduling to their manufacturing managers.  





low stability X 
high 
controllability  
The disruption was caused by TechSup: it was due to the head of its 
manufacturing department who messed up the production schedules and 
produced incompatible components for your newly developed 
telecommunication equipment.  
However, as a global leader, TechSup had the capability to provide a master 
training program in production scheduling to its manufacturing managers, but 
they chose not to do so. Nevertheless, such a disruption rarely occurs in the 








The disruption was caused by TechSup: it was due to TechSup’s lack of long-
term capacity to produce compatible components for your newly developed 
telecommunication equipment.  Unfortunately, given limited resources, 
TechSup was having a hard time to improve its manufacturing capacity.  








The disruption was caused by TechSup: it was due to TechSup’s lack of long-
term capacity to produce compatible components for your newly developed 
telecommunication equipment.  In fact, such disruptions occur rather 
frequently in the past 5 years.  
However, you believe that, as a global leader, TechSup had sufficient 






low stability X 
low 
controllability 
The disruption was caused by an act of nature: a major tsunami affected the 
key seaport where TechSup has long used to receive its raw materials. As a 
result, TechSup had to halt production of parts used in your newly developed 
telecommunication equipment. Unfortunately, given limited resources, 
TechSup had little capability to obtain raw materials from alternative sources.  




Table A-1.1 (Continued) 
 




low stability X 
high 
controllability 
The disruption was caused by the by an act of nature: a major tsunami 
affected the key seaport where TechSup has long used to receive its raw 
materials. As a result, TechSup had to halt production of parts used in your 
newly developed telecommunication equipment. However, you believe that, 
as a global leader, TechSup was able to obtain raw materials from alternative 
sea ports at minimal costs, but they chose not to do so.  








The disruption was caused by an act of nature: a major tsunami affected the 
key seaport where TechSup has long used to receive its raw materials. As a 
result, TechSup had to halt production of parts used in your newly developed 
telecommunication equipment.  
In fact, such a disruption occurs rather frequently in the past 5 years.  
Unfortunately, given limited resources, TechSup had little capability to obtain 








The disruption was caused by an act of nature: a major tsunami affected the 
key seaport where TechSup has long used to receive its raw materials. As a 
result, TechSup had to halt production of parts used in your newly developed 
telecommunication equipment.  
In fact, such a disruption occurs rather frequently in the past 5 years.  
However, you believe that, as a global leader, TechSup was able to obtain raw 
materials from alternative sea ports at minimal costs, but they chose not to do 





Table A-1.2: Description of Justice Conditions 
 






In retrospect, this disruption delayed the delivery of parts by 3 weeks and cost 
your company significant loss in production and penalties for failing to 
deliver your equipment to your own customers. TechSup’s response to the 








TechSup established a well-organized, methodical procedure to resolve the 
disruption.  
During the whole disruption resolution process, this supplier treated your firm 
in a polite manner and with great respect.       
In the end, this supplier not only offered to pay the entire penalty agreed upon 
in the contract with your company, but will also pay additional to cover your 








TechSup established a well-organized, methodical procedure to resolve the 
disruption.  
During the whole disruption resolution process, this supplier treated your firm 
in a polite manner and with great respect.     
However, in the end, this supplier offered to pay the entire penalty agreed 
upon in the contract with your company, which is lower than the actual cost 








TechSup’s procedure to resolve the disruption was disorganized and chaotic.  
However, during the whole disruption resolution process, this supplier treated 
your firm in a polite manner and with great respect.      
In the end, this supplier not only offered to pay the entire penalty agreed upon 
in the contract with your company, but will also pay additional to cover your 








TechSup’s procedure to resolve the disruption was disorganized and chaotic.  
In the end, this supplier offered to pay the entire penalty agreed upon in the 
contract with your company, which is lower than the actual cost of the 
disruption.  
However, during the whole disruption resolution process, this supplier treated 








TechSup established a well-organized, methodical procedure to resolve the 
disruption.  
In the end, this supplier not only offered to pay the entire penalty agreed upon 
in the contract with your company, but will also pay additional to cover your 
total loss.  
However, during the whole disruption resolution process, this supplier treated 








TechSup established a well-organized, methodical procedure to resolve the 
disruption. However, during the whole disruption resolution process, this 
supplier treated your firm in a rude manner and with little respect. In the end, 
this supplier offered to pay the entire penalty agreed upon in the contract with 
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TechSup’s procedure to resolve the disruption was disorganized and chaotic.  
In addition, during the whole disruption resolution process, this supplier 
treated your firm in a rude manner and with little respect.    
However, in the end, this supplier not only offered to pay the entire penalty 
agreed upon in the contract with your company, but will also pay additional 








TechSup’s procedure to resolve the disruption was disorganized and chaotic.  
In addition, during the whole disruption resolution process, this supplier 
treated your firm in a rude manner and with little respect.      
In the end, this supplier has offered to pay the entire penalty agreed upon in 






Table A-1.3: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Reliability 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Gender               
2. Age .10**              
3. Years of experience .05* .48**             
4. Trust propensity .01 -.01 .02            
5. Involvement -.10** .02 .04* .30**           
6. Extraversion -.12** .06** .07** -.05* .08**          




.13**         
8. Conscientiousness -.14** .08** .09** 
-
.14** .11** .25** 
-
.36**        








.53**       
10. Openness  -.16** .06** .05* 
-




.41**      
11. Responsibility attribution 




.14**     
12. Continuity before 






.25**    
13. Responsibility attribution 








.12**   







Mean 1.55 1.80 8.64 4.46 5.76 4.47 3.14 5.47 2.96 5.29 3.86 4.29 4.12 4.05 
Standard deviation  .52 .65 6.48 1.24 1.37 1.28 1.20 1.28 1.26 1.19 1.73 1.67 1.77 1.85 
Min. 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Max. 2.00 5.00 55.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
Composite reliability    .92 .87      .89 .95 .87 .96 
Average variance explained     .73 .53      .80 .85 .77 .89 
  
   *p < 0.05 
  **p < 0.01 
***p < 0.00  
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Table A-1.4: Measurement Invariance Tests Results 
 
 χ2 d.f. CFI TLI RMSEA D χ2/ 
Dd.f. 
p-value 
Configural Model 4.36 8 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - 
Metric Model 13.47 11 1.00 1.00 0.01 3.04 0.38 
Scalar Model 53.19 16 1.00 1.00 0.03 7.94 0.16 
 
 
Table A-1.5: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results 
 





Responsibility attribution before resolution: Please indicate the 
extent to which you agree with the following statements about the 
previously described situation (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014):  
      
      
TechSup is liablea - - - 
TechSup is responsiblea  - - - 
TechSup is careless .89 .01 70.49 
TechSup is thoughtless .90 .01 70.83 
Continuity before resolution: As a manager responsible for 
managing supplier relationships, please indicate your willingness to 
continue the relationship with TechSup in the long run: (Wang et al., 
2010) 
   
you are willing to maintain the relationship with TechSup far 
into the future .94 .00 245.68 
you expect to continue working with TechSup on a long-term 
basis .95 .00 268.28 
you will sustain the relationship with TechSup .88 .01 149.05 
Responsibility attribution after resolution: Please indicate the 
extent to which you agree with the following statements about the 
previously described situation (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014):  
   
   
TechSup is liable  - - - 
TechSup is responsible  - - - 
TechSup is careless .90 .01 75.41 
TechSup is thoughtless .86 .01 71.78 
Continuity before resolution: As a manager responsible for 
managing supplier relationships, please indicate your willingness to 
continue the relationship with TechSup in the long run: (Wang et al., 
2010) 
   
you are willing to maintain the relationship with TechSup far 
into the future .95 .00 319.04 
you expect to continue working with TechSup on a long-term 
basis .96 .00 358.91 
you will sustain the relationship with TechSup .91 .01 199.78 
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Table A-1.5 (Continued) 
 





Propensity to Trust: Please answer the following questions about 
your general perceptions about trust (Colquitt et al., 2007):    
        One should be very cautious with strangersa - - - 
Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge .71 .01 54.42 
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do .77 .01 69.61 
These days, you must be alert or someone is likely to take 
advantage of youa - - - 
Most salespeople are honest in describing their products .66 .01 45.89 
Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant 
of their specialty .79 .01 76.37 
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly .75 .01 63.20 
Most adults are competent at their jobs .69 .01 51.86 
Involvement: Please describe your view on the subject of 
establishing trust between a company and its suppliers (Moorman et 
al., 1992): 
   
It's Important to me .85 .01 110.14 
It's relevant to me .86 .01 111.42 
It's personally consequential .82 .01 94.84 
It's personally significant .89 .01 138.29 
Gender: Please indicate your gender: Female (1), Male (2), Prefer not to say (3) 
Age: What’s your current age? 18-29 (1), 30-49 (2), 50-64 years (3), 65 years and above (4), Prefer not to 
say (5) 
Big-five personality: Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please 
rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly 
than the other (Gosling et al., 2003): 
        Extraversion: Extroverted, enthusiastic; Reserved, quiet. 
        Agreeableness: Critical, quarrelsome; Sympathetic, warm 
        Conscientiousness: Dependable, self-disciplined; Disorganized, careless 
        Emotional Stability: Anxious, easily upset; Calm, emotionally stable 
        Openness: Open to new experiences, complex; Conventional, uncreative 
 
a. Dropped due to low factor loadings 
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DV = Perceived Responsibility 
Before Resolution (Time 1) 
DV = Perceived Responsibility 
Before Resolution (Time 1) 


























Intercept  2.81 .07 41.28 .00 -.70 .05 -14.56 .00 
Causal Attributions          
Locus of Causality (external as 
baseline) 
H1 
(+) .95 .04 13.62 .00 .31 .06 5.47 .00 
Stability (low as baseline) H2 (+) .47 .07 6.70 .00 .50 .06 8.76 .00 
Controllability (low as baseline) H4 (+) .58 .07 8.38 .00 .73 .07 10.88 .00 
Moderations          
Stability X Locus of Causality H3 (+)     -.07 .08 -.850 .40 
Controllability X Locus of 
Causality 
H5 
(+)     -.32 .08 
-
3.970 .00 
Control Variables (Random 

























Intercept  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Interpersonal          
Involvement  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Trust Propensity  .19 .03 6.20 .00 .19 .03 6.26 .00 
Individual          
Agreeableness  .02 .02 .81 .21 .02 .02 .77 .22 
Openness  .07 .03 2.12 .02 .07 .03 2.00 .02 
Conscientiousness  .11 .04 2.89 .00 .11 .04 2.81 .00 
Emotional Stability  .01 .02 .54 .29 .02 .02 .62 .27 
Extraversion  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Gender  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Age  .00 . . . .00 . . . 



















Intercept  5.88 .07 79.95 .00 
Perceived Responsibility Before 
Resolution (PR_Before) H6a (-) -.27 .02 -12.97 .00 
Causal Attributions      
Locus of causality (external as 
baseline) 
 -.42 .07 -6.42 .00 
Stability (low as baseline)  -.82 .06 -12.74 .00 
Controllability (low as baseline)  .12 .06 1.85 .06 
Control Variables (Random effect 
covariance estimate) 
 




Intercept  .00 . . . 
Interpersonal      
Involvement  .12 .04 2.67 .00 
Trust Propensity  .58 .08 6.93 .00 
Individual      
Agreeableness  .00 . . . 
Openness  .13 .07 1.92 .03 
Conscientiousness  .13 .07 1.71 .04 
Emotional Stability  .01 .06 .09 .46 
Extraversion  .09 .05 1.85 .03 
Gender  .00 . . . 
Age  .00 . . . 




Table A-1.8: Effects of Perceived Responsibility Before Resolution and Justice Variables on 










DV = Continuity After 
Resolution 






















Intercept  .20 .15 1.34 .18 -.31 .19 -1.62 .11 
Perceived Responsibility Before 
Resolution (PR_Before) 
H6b (-
) .04 .02 1.77 .08 .17 .04 4.68 .00 
Continuity Before Resolution  .60 .02 28.68 .00 .60 .02 28.79 .00 
Causal Attributions          
Locus of Causality (external as 
baseline) 
 -.10 .06 -1.61 .11 -.11 .06 -1.73 .08 
Stability (low as baseline)  .04 .06 .69 .49 .05 .06 .76 .45 
Controllability (low as baseline)  .08 .06 1.35 .18 .09 .06 1.39 .17 
Resolution Strategies          
Procedure Justice  .36 .06 5.86 .00 .56 .15 3.77 .00 
Interactional Justice  1.04 .06 17.18 .00 1.65 .15 11.13 .00 
Distributive Justice  .84 .06 13.85 .00 1.06 .15 7.15 .00 
Moderations          
PR_Before X Procedure Justice H7 (a) (-)     -.06 .04 -1.52 .13 
PR_Before X Interactional 
Justice 
H7 (b) 
(-)     -.16 .04 -4.47 .00 
PR_Before X Distributive 
Justice 
H7 (c) 
(-)     -.06 .04 -1.65 .10 
Control Variables (Random 















Intercept  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Interpersonal          
Involvement  .06 .03 1.62 .05 .05 .03 1.44 .07 
Trust Propensity  .34 .06 5.43 .00 .35 .06 5.68 .00 
Individual          
Agreeableness  .17 .07 2.53 .01 .15 .07 2.23 .01 
Openness  .14 .07 1.92 .03 .13 .07 1.78 .04 
Conscientiousness  .02 .06 .28 .39 .02 .06 .28 .39 















DV = Continuity After 
Resolution 























Extraversion  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Gender  .03 .21 .14 .44 .01 .18 .04 .49 
Age  .02 .05 .39 .35 .03 .04 .77 .22 




Table A-1.9: Internal-Locus: Effects of Perceived Responsibility Before Resolution and 










DV = Continuity After 
Resolution 
























Intercept  .40 .22 -1.84 .07 .30 .30 .98 .33 
Perceived Responsibility Before 
Resolution (PR_Before) 
Post-
Hoc -.05 .03 -1.64 .10 -.03 .06 -.49 .62 
Continuity Before Resolution  0.61 .03 21.77 .00 0.61 .03 21.59 .00 
Causal Attributions          
Stability (low as baseline)  .09 .09 1.04 .30 .10 .09 1.09 .28 
Controllability (low as baseline)  .10 .09 1.12 .26 .09 .09 1.11 .27 
Resolution Strategies          
Procedure Justice  .40 .08 4.73 .00 .51 .26 1.94 .05 
Interactional Justice  .95 .08 11.18 .00 1.18 .26 4.48 .00 
Distributive Justice  .85 .08 10.07 .00 .69 .26 2.62 .01 
Moderations          
PR_Before X Procedure Justice H8 (a)     -.03 .06 -.44 .66 
PR_Before X Interactional 
Justice H8 (b)      -.06 .06 -.96 .34 
PR_Before X Distributive 
Justice H8 (c)     .04 .06 .67 .50 
Control Variables (Random 















Intercept  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Interpersonal          
Involvement  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Trust Propensity  .41 .09 4.78 .00 .41 .09 4.79 .00 
Individual          
Agreeableness  .13 .09 1.46 .07 .12 .09 1.40 .08 
Openness  .17 .11 1.59 .06 .17 .11 1.54 .06 
Conscientiousness  .01 .09 .10 .46 .02 .10 .23 .41 
Emotional Stability  .05 .07 .69 .24 .06 .08 .75 .23 
Extraversion  .03 .07 .44 .33 .03 .07 .38 .35 
Gender  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Age  .04 .05 .93 .17 .05 .05 1.03 .15 




Table A-1.10: External-Locus: Effects of Perceived Responsibility Before Resolution and 










DV = Continuity After 
Resolution 


























Intercept  .15 .21 .69 .49 -.61 .25 -2.43 .02 
Perceived Responsibility Before 
Resolution (PR_Before) 
Post-
Hoc .10 .03 3.71 .00 .34 .05 6.67 .00 
Continuity Before Resolution  0.57 .03 18.20 .00 0.57 .03 18.38 .00 
Causal Attributions          
Stability (low as baseline)  -.02 .09 -.26 .80 -.04 .09 -.48 .63 
Controllability (low as baseline)  .04 .09 .45 .65 .04 .09 .47 .64 
Resolution Strategies          
Procedure Justice  .33 .09 3.75 .00 .60 .19 3.26 .00 
Interactional Justice  1.10 .09 12.61 .00 1.89 .19 10.22 .00 
Distributive Justice  .86 .09 9.86 .00 1.35 .19 7.26 .00 
Moderations          
PR_Before X Procedure Justice H8 (a)     -.09 .05 -1.75 .08 
PR_Before X Interactional 
Justice H8 (b)      -.24 .05 
-
4.75 .00 
PR_Before X Distributive 
Justice H8 (c)      -.15 .05 
-
2.93 .00 
Control Variables (Random 

















Intercept  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Interpersonal          
Involvement  .10 .05 1.93 .03 .08 .05 1.62 .05 
Trust Propensity  .23 .09 2.55 .01 .23 .08 2.77 .00 
Individual          
Agreeableness  .17 .10 1.80 .04 .16 .10 1.60 .05 
Openness  .14 .11 1.35 .09 .11 .11 1.02 .15 
Conscientiousness  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Emotional Stability  .20 .09 2.38 .01 .20 .09 2.35 .01 
Extraversion  .00 . . . .00 . . . 
Gender  .09 .18 .51 .30 .10 .22 .46 .32 
Age  .00 . . . .01 .07 .09 .46 




Table A-1.11: Before-After Change in Continuity by Justice Treatment Condition 
 
Justice Treatment Conditions 
Change in Continuity (Continuity 
Before Resolution – Continuity After 













High High High -.81 .09 -.99 -.62 -8.57 .00 
High High Low -.00 .09 -.18 .18 -.02 .99 
High Low High .26 .10 .06 .46 2.56 .01 
High Low Low .98 .10 .77 1.18 9.40 .00 
Low High High -.57 .10 -.76 -.38 -5.83 .00 
Low High Low .38 .09 .21 .54 4.39 .00 
Low Low High .45 .11 .24 .66 4.26 .00 




Table A-1.12: Internal-Locus: Linear and Curvilinear Effects of Responsibility Attribution 




 DV = Continuity Before 
Resolution 
























Intercept  5.63 .14 40.49 .00 6.01 .29 20.67 .00 
Perceived Responsibility Before 
Repair (PR_Before) 
Linea
r -.35 .03 
-
10.83 .00 -.56 .15 -3.73 .00 
PR_Before Squared Quadratic     .03 .02 1.45 .15 
Causal Attributions          
Stability (low as baseline)  -.71 .09 -7.50 .00 -.72 .10 -7.54 .00 
Controllability (low as baseline)  .24 .09 2.54 .01 .22 .09 2.40 .02 
 
a. Results of control variables are omitted. 
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Table A-1.13: External-Locus: Linear and Curvilinear Effects of Responsibility Attribution 




 DV = Continuity Before 
Resolution 
























Intercept  5.76 .09 65.70 .00 6.66 .15 43.02 .00 
Perceived Responsibility Before 
Resolution (PR_Before) 
Linea
r -.20 .03 -7.31 .00 -.91 .11 -8.54 .00 
PR_Before Squared Quadratic     .10 .01 6.98 .00 
Causal Attributions          
Stability (low as baseline)  -.93 .09 -10.61 .00 -.89 .09 
-
10.29 .00 
Controllability (low as baseline)  -.03 .09 -.32 .75 .05 .08 .55 .59 
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WHEN IS THE SUPPLIER’S MESSAGE “LOUD AND CLEAR”?  







Following supplier-induced disruptions, suppliers may undertake recovery actions in hopes of 
reducing damage to the focal exchange with buyers. While research shows that the absence of 
suppliers’ recovery almost always leads to a deteriorated relationship, it is less clear if—or more 
likely when—the presence of suppliers’ recovery efforts guarantees a restored relationship. We 
focus on two boundary conditions for a specific set of recovery actions (i.e., suppliers’ justice 
actions): disruption severity and buyers’ supply chain uncertainty. Through the lens of signaling 
theory, we frame supplier-induced disruptions as negative signals from suppliers (signalers) to 
buyers (receivers), followed by suppliers’ justice actions as positive signals. We develop rival 
hypotheses of whether the negative signal’s strength (disruption severity) and uncertainty in the 
signaling environment (supply chain uncertainty) heighten or dampen positive signals’ 
effectiveness. In addition, we explore whether some signals are more effective than others given 
the type of negative signal (disruptions due to quantity shortage, delays, or quality). Using the 
critical incident technique to capture two disruption events from 302 Chinese buyers (i.e. 604 
observations), we found that the messages of suppliers conveyed through their justice actions may 
or may not be “loud and clear,” depending on the disruption severity, disruption type, and supply 
chain uncertainty. Though justice actions seem to signal suppliers’ positive attributes, in some 
cases they can indicate negative attributes if they fail to fit the specific disruption. In other cases, 
they can deliver messages conflicting with the negative signal. We provide substantive guidance 
for suppliers about the justice action to adopt in response to disruptions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Supply chain disruptions—unplanned delays or stoppages of planned product flow (Craighead 
et al., 2007)—can have a broad impact on firms’ operational outcomes (Craighead et al., 2007; 
Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a) and shareholder value (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003b, 2005c; 
Hendricks et al., 2009). When the disruption is supplier-induced, the event can have a greater 
impact on the focal buyer-supplier exchange (Reimann, Kosmol, & Kaufmann, 2017a; Wang et 
al., 2014). Therefore, suppliers may undertake recovery actions in hopes of reducing the 
disruption’s damage (e.g., restoring trust) to their relationships with buyers (Wang et al., 2014). 
While it has been suggested that the absence of suppliers’ recovery efforts normally leads to a 
deteriorated relationship (Reimann et al., 2017a), the empirical evidence is not yet clear if (or, 
more likely, when) suppliers’ recovery efforts guarantee a restored relationship. As a related 
research stream, service recovery literature indicates that a firm’s recovery effectiveness seems to 
be contingent on such factors as service failure’s severity, customer attributes, and organization 
structure (e.g., Craighead, Karwan, & Miller, 2004; Liao, 2007; Smith et al., 1999; Smith, Karwan, 
& Markland, 2009). Despite these insights, little disruption research has focused on boundary 
conditions (Goldsby, Michael Knemeyer, Miller, & Wallenburg, 2013) related to the effectiveness 
of suppliers’ recovery efforts in the wake of supplier-induced disruptions.  
 
We focus on two such boundary conditions. First, following related research on service failure 
(Craighead et al., 2004; Smith et al., 1999), psychological contract breach (Eckerd et al., 2013), 
and disruption (Reimann et al., 2017a), we identify severity of supplier-induced disruptions as a 
critical condition. Despite the considerable attention on severity, its impact on the subsequent 
recovery’s effectiveness remains unclear (e.g., Craighead et al., 2004). On the one hand, higher 
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severity implies greater loss from negative events (Craighead et al., 2007); therefore, the same 
level of recovery efforts may not be as effective to compensate for the loss as in less severe events 
(Smith et al., 1999). On the other hand, higher severity increases such events’ saliency (Eckerd et 
al., 2013), drawing buyers’ attention; thus, buyers are more likely to observe suppliers’ positive 
gestures by way of their recovery efforts. Hence, two competing lines of argument raise the 
question of whether the severity of supplier-induced disruptions strengthens or weakens the 
effectiveness of suppliers’ recovery actions.  
 
Second, following the notion that firms’ perceptions are shaped by their environment (e.g., 
Bourgeois, 1980; Duncan, 1972), we focus on one such context—buyers’ supply chains. While 
recent studies of disruption and service recovery have explored how surroundings affect recovery, 
they mainly focus on the structure of the focal organization or relationship (Reimann et al., 2017a; 
Smith et al., 2009); little attention is given to the focal supply chain. We identify the risk 
uncertainty in buyers’ supply chains as a boundary condition. On the one hand, uncertainty implies 
a dynamic environment filled with volatile information (Leblebici & Salancik, 1981), making it 
more difficult for buyers to sort through the information and correctly appraise suppliers’ recovery 
efforts. On the other hand, facing high uncertainty, buyers can be propelled to seek information to 
reduce uncertainty; thus, they become more attuned to suppliers’ recovery and value their actions. 
Like those for severity, competing arguments exist for the impact of supply chain uncertainty.  
 
To understand when suppliers’ recovery efforts work, we integrate justice theory with 
signaling theory. Widely used in disruption and service recovery studies, justice theory suggests 
three justice actions (procedural, interactional and distributive) as recovery tools to correct 
negative events’ damage (e.g., Liao, 2007; Smith et al., 1999; Wang et al., 2014). Adopting this 
theory, our study focuses on the boundary conditions of suppliers’ justice actions in the resolution 
process. As firms are information processors trying to make sense of the world (Daft & Weick, 
1984; Thomas et al., 1993), buyers’ processing of messages via a supplier-induced negative event 
and its subsequent recovery shapes buyers’ perceptions (Eckerd & Handley, 2015; Eckerd et al., 
2013; Reimann et al., 2017a). Following this line of reasoning, we adopt the signaling theory 
(Connelly et al., 2011a; Spence, 1973). We frame supplier-induced disruptions as negative signals 
suppliers (signalers) send to buyers (receivers), suppliers’ justice actions as positive signals, and 
focal supply chain as the signaling environment (Connelly et al., 2011a). Furthermore, we use 
buyers’ satisfaction regarding the resolution to assess the effectiveness of suppliers’ recovery. We 
develop competing hypotheses for two moderators—the negative signal’s strength (disruption 
severity) and the uncertainty in the signaling environment (supply chain risk uncertainty2). We 
address whether the two moderators heighten or dampen the positive signals’ effectiveness. Then, 
given three types of the negative signal (quantity shortage, delays, and quality issues), we explore 
whether some positive signals are more effective than others. Using the critical incident technique 
(CIT), we collected survey data of two supplier-caused disruptions (one successfully repaired, and 
one unsuccessfully repaired) from 302 Chinese buying firms. 
 
Our research makes several contributions. While service recovery studies have shown that 
providers’ justice actions improve customers’ satisfaction (e.g., del Río-Lanza, Vázquez-Casielles, 
& Díaz-Martín, 2009; Liao, 2007), we suggest that the signals via suppliers’ justice actions are not 
                                            
2 Risk uncertainty and uncertainty are used interchangeably throughout the rest of this chapter. 
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always “loud and clear”; instead, the messages can sometimes be distorted or less credible. In some 
cases, suppliers’ positive signals can be perceived negatively and hamper buyers’ satisfaction 
(Park & Mezias, 2005). When buyers operate in uncertain supply chains or when disruptions are 
severe—cases in which buyers prefer flexible procedures (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005; Tomlin, 2006) 
over organized, methodical procedures, too much procedural justice seems to indicate suppliers’ 
inflexibility. Similarly, when disruptions are severe or when buyers’ supply chains are stable, 
interactional justice may indicate suppliers’ lack of accountability (use of interactional justice as 
an impression-management tool to avoid responsibility) (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 
2008; Greenberg, 1990a) or incapability to work independently. In other cases, suppliers’ 
messages through their recovery can contradict the negative signal by way of the disruption 
(Balboa and Marti, 2007); thus, those messages can be viewed as less authentic. In resolving 
disruptions due to delayed deliveries, suppliers’ interactional justice that signals their credibility 
can starkly conflict with the preceding message through delays indicating their inadequate 
attitudes. Similarly, following disruptions due to quantity shortage, suppliers’ procedural justice 
indicating their capability in contingency planning may contradict the negative signal—
incapability in production planning—via shortage. Our study thus provides substantive guidance 
regarding when suppliers’ recovery message is “loud and clear”, based on disruption severity, 
disruption type and supply chain risk uncertainty.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Signaling Theory  
Signaling theory is concerned with the information asymmetry between the signaler (e.g., firm, 
employee, etc.) and the receiver (e.g., shareholders, consumers, partners, etc.), in which case the 
signaler is motivated to construct signals to reduce the asymmetry (Spence, 1973, 2002). In a 
typical signaling process (Connelly et al., 2011a), the signaler sends costly signals to the receiver; 
the signal often contains information suggesting a specific quality about the signaler that would be 
otherwise opaque to the receiver; the receiver observes the signal and interprets it, sometimes 
giving feedback (countersignals). Characterized by uncertainty and unexpectedness (Craighead et 
al., 2007; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005), our context—supplier-induced disruption and its recovery—
is especially favorable to signaling. Following a disruption (negative signal) induced by a supplier 
(signaler), the buyer (receiver) seeks information about its supplier’s specific quality (e.g., 
reliability, intention, capability, etc.) by observing the supplier’s recovery actions (positive 
signals); the signaling process occurs in the institutional environment—the buyer’s supply chain. 
 
One fundamental assumption of the traditional signaling theory is that the signaler benefits 
from reduced information asymmetry and, therefore, is willing to invest in signals. In other words, 
signaling is a strategic action that signalers initiate to reveal their less observable, yet good, 
qualities. This assumption holds in our context as suppliers benefit from showing their good 
qualities to buyers through recovery efforts (Craighead et al., 2007; Tomlin, 2006; Wang et al., 
2014). Importantly, for signaling to work effectively, signals must be both observable and costly. 
The former ensures that the receiver can observe the signal, and the latter ensures that signaling 
differentiates between high-quality and low-quality signalers to prevent false signals (Lee, 2001).  
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Scholars have focused mainly on positive signals that signalers intentionally construct to 
indicate their positive qualities. For instance, firms use costly sustainability initiatives as credible 
signals demonstrating to shareholders commitment to sustainability (Connelly, Ketchen, & Slater, 
2011b) and outsourcing activities as signals to influence their market value (Jiang, Belohlav, & 
Young, 2007). Suppliers use certified management standards (ISO14001) (Brockhaus, Kersten, & 
Knemeyer, 2013; King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005) and their good reputation (Wagner, Coley, & 
Lindemann, 2011) as signals demonstrating their credibility to potential buyers. Young firms use 
alliance information to signal their legitimacy to investors (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). Researchers 
have questioned if receivers can interpret a positive signal differently, thus resulting in multiple 
meanings (Park & Mezias, 2005).  
 
 Some scholars have called for attention to be paid to negative signals that are not a result of 
signalers’ strategic actions, but that are often a consequence of their wrongdoings (Perkins & 
Hendry, 2005). In such cases, the signal is still observable and costly (i.e., financial loss due to 
wrongdoings); and its cost is negatively associated with qualities (e.g., capability) the signaler 
intends to demonstrate. For instance, when firms have product recalls but fail to effectively handle 
those recalls, the outcomes can signal the firms’ incapability of leveraging resources (Ketchen, 
Wowak, & Craighead, 2014). While researchers have examined positive and negative signals 
separately, less attention has been given to the joint effect of signals occurring sequentially  to 
determine whether a negative signal’s attributes disturb or enhance the follow-up positive 
signal(Connelly et al., 2011a). 
 
Signals are transmitted in institutional environments with such characteristics as uncertainty 
(Ndofor & Levitas, 2004) and resource availability (i.e., munificence) (Park & Mezias, 2005), 
which further influence the effectiveness of specific signals. For instance, a volatile environment 
tends to introduce noise into the signaling process and, thus, may diminish certain signals’ 
visibility (Jiang et al., 2007; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). How an environmental factor weakens 
or enhances certain signals’ effectiveness is underexplored (Connelly et al., 2011a). In summary, 
we propose in our conceptual framework how positive signals’ effectiveness can be shaped by 
both the strength of a preceding negative signal and the uncertainty of the signaling environment 
(illustrated in Figure A-2.13). All figures and tables are presented in the Appendix 2 of Chapter II. 
 
Supplier-caused disruptions as negative signals. We draw attention to the context of supplier-
induced disruptions to explore signaling between suppliers (signalers) and their buyers (receivers). 
As the literature suggests (e.g., Fischer and Reuber 2007; Perkins and Hendry 2005; Ryan et al. 
2000), negative signals are often consequences of wrongdoings. When suppliers cause disruptions 
(e.g., quantity shortages, delayed shipments, quality issues, etc.), buyers can perceive such 
disruptive events as negative signals, suggesting suppliers’ lack of good qualities. 
 
Justice actions as positive signals. In response to supplier-induced disruptions, buyers may 
question suppliers’ qualities that are not directly observable (e.g., expertise, credibility, and 
integrity) (Wang et al., 2014); thus, these buyers may be very uncertain about focal exchanges 
                                            
3 Our model focuses on an immediate relationship outcome—buyers’ satisfaction about the resolution process. As the dash-dotted 
line in our model indicates, studies have shown that satisfaction fosters relationship continuity (Hofer et al., 2012; Wang et al., 
2014). To sharpen our focus on what is new, we do not include in our model satisfaction’s main effect on continuity. However, a 
supplementary test of this effect is included in our results section. 
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with their suppliers. In such cases, a high degree of information asymmetry can exist (Spence, 
1973, 2002) between suppliers and buyers. The asymmetry is not ideal for high-quality suppliers 
because their buyers can develop unfavorable perceptions of the focal exchange and possibly 
terminate it due to these supplier-induced disruptions, despite the suppliers’ high quality. Nor is 
this asymmetry desirable for buyers because they cannot determine whether the focal suppliers 
causing the disruption are of low or high quality; thus, they may construct faulty appraisals of the 
focal exchange and make wrong decisions (e.g., continuing to work with low-quality suppliers but 
terminating relationships with high-quality ones). Therefore, high-quality suppliers would be 
motivated to signal their positive attributes (via justice actions) following disruptions, and buyers 
would be motivated to search for information (or signals) clarifying suppliers’ quality. Hence, 
supplier-induced disruptions serve as appropriate contexts in which buyers more readily receive 
suppliers’ positive signals.  
 
Justice actions consist of the following: procedural justice, the perceived fairness of 
procedures that suppliers employ to resolve a disruption; interactional justice, the perceived 
fairness of interpersonal treatment received during the resolution; and distributive justice, the 
perceived fairness of resources allocated during the resolution. These various forms of justice 
actions have been increasingly used in supply chain literature to address organizational (Cantor, 
Macdonald, & Crum, 2011) and inter-organizational issues (Griffith et al., 2006; Hofer, Knemeyer, 
& Murphy, 2012). In the disruption context, justice has demonstrated its effectiveness in repairing 
trust damaged during disruptions (Wang et al., 2014). Procedural justice refers to the rules of 
consistency, bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness, and ethicality 
(Leventhal, 1980a). Interactional justice refers to the politeness, dignity, and respect demonstrated 
in suppliers’ personal interactions with buyers (Bies & Moag, 1986; Luo, 2007b). Distributive 
justice refers to the rules of equity (Leventhal, 1980a).  
 
Justice actions can be legitimate signals for the following reasons. First, they are observable to 
buyers. Previous studies have shown that justice actions significantly affect buyers’ perceptions of 
focal relationships (e.g., Hofer et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014). Second, justice actions to resolve 
disruptions are costly; the cost should be lower for high-quality suppliers but higher for low-quality 
suppliers. For instance, to implement well-organized, consistent procedures in order to repair 
disruption damages, suppliers must invest in human capital to monitor the process (e.g., training, 
overtime pay) (Craighead et al., 2007) and in quick-response systems to quickly ramp up 
production (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005). Such investment is lower for high-quality suppliers with well-
trained employees and possibly flexible manufacturing systems, but is costlier for low-quality 
suppliers. Likewise, to  communicate openly  with buyers, suppliers must invest in communication 
channels (Craighead et al., 2007) and likely have teams dedicated to routine interactions following 
disruptions. Such investment is also more affordable for high-quality than for low-quality 
suppliers. Likewise,  to show equity, suppliers may have to reimburse part or all of their buyers’ 
loss based on contracts (Reimann et al., 2017a; Wang et al., 2014). This reimbursement is easier 
for high-quality suppliers who are better endowed than low-quality ones. Overall, the three justice 
actions are observable to buyers and costly to suppliers; thus, they can legitimately signal 
suppliers’ unobservable qualities (e.g., endowment, capability) to buyers.  
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Next, we argue that the qualities signaled via suppliers’ justice actions in the resolution process 
can improve buyers’ satisfaction. When suppliers adopt consistent and methodical procedures to 
resolve disruptions in a timely manner, they demonstrate both resilience (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 
2009) and capability of addressing challenging situations. When suppliers are polite and respectful 
during interactions—even in the presence of stressful disruptions, they demonstrate their dignity 
and considerateness (Wang et al., 2014). As suppliers adopt the equity rule and commit more effort 
and resources than their buyers to help recover buyers’ loss from disruptions (Reimann et al., 
2017a), they demonstrate their genuine concern for buyers’ welfare, and thus their good intentions 
(Wang et al., 2014). Furthermore, they signal their capability of making costly commitments. 
Overall, these positive signals equip buyers with a deeper understanding of the suppliers’ true 
qualities (i.e., capability, reliability, endowment, and good intentions); strengthen buyers’ 
confidence in the relationship; and enhance buyers’ satisfaction. Thus,  
Hypothesis 1. The use of (a) procedural justice, (b) interactional justice, and (c) distributive 
justice is positively associated with buyers’ satisfaction about the resolution process. 
The Moderating Effect of Disruption Severity 
The severity of disruption refers to the extent of damage the disruption causes (Hartmann & 
Moeller, 2014). Service recovery studies have showcased severity’s critical role in shaping the 
recovery’s success (Craighead et al., 2004; Liao, 2007; e.g., Smith et al., 1999). Likewise, 
organization behavior studies reveal that a negative event’s severity can explain various reactions 
to the firms’ justification actions (Conlon & Murray, 1996; e.g., Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 
1994). Because a supplier-induced disruption sends a negative signal, we argue that its severity 
characterizes the signal’s strength (Connelly et al., 2011a; Lampel, Lant, & Shamsie, 2000). The 
question is whether disruption severity weakens or strengthens justice actions’ positive effects on 
buyers’ satisfaction.  In other words, in the presence of mixed signals, how does the strength of a 
preceding negative signal moderate positive signals’ effectiveness? 
 
Two lines of reasoning suggest competing hypotheses. The first focuses on a negative signal’s 
priming effect on (1) buyers’ perceptions of the focal relationship and on (2) buyers’ expectation 
regarding the level of recovery efforts. In the presence of supplier-induced disruptions, buyers 
generate unfavorable evaluations of the focal supplier based on the disruptions’ impact (Wang et 
al., 2014). The more severe the impact, the less likely buyers will positively evaluate the supplier 
and its behaviors. Thus, negative signals in the form of severe disruptions prime buyers with 
negative appraisals of  the focal relationship (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014), creating unfavorable 
shadow of the past (Poppo et al., 2008). Even when suppliers follow up with justice actions to 
signal their positive attributes, suppliers may be unable to dispel buyers’ negative perception of 
them. In this case, these positive signals’ effectiveness may be overshadowed by the negativity 
resulting from severe disruptions. In contrast, when disruptions are less severe, they have less 
impact on buyers’ appraisal of the relationship; the following positive signals may then become 
dominant factors affecting buyers’ evaluations. Thus, in terms of influencing buyers’ satisfaction, 
the strong negativity from more severe disruptions offsets the positivity from justice actions. 
 
Furthermore, as service recovery research indicate, a negative event serves as a reference point 
from which customers evaluate recovery (Smith et al., 1999). Based on the equity expectation, 
customers would like to regain what has been lost from a negative event (Adams, 1965). Thus, just 
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as the negative event’s severity shapes one’s estimation of the resulting loss, it can increase one’s 
expected recovery level; the higher the severity, the greater the discrepancy between estimated 
loss and expected recovery (Liao, 2007). As buyers face more severe disruptions, they raise their 
desired level of suppliers’ recovery efforts. Therefore, for a given level of suppliers’ recovery, 
buyers experiencing more severe disruptions may feel that suppliers’ efforts are less adequate than 
those experiencing less severe disruptions (Conlon & Murray, 1996; Liao, 2007). Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 2. Disruption severity negatively moderates the positive associations between (a) 
procedural justice, (b) interactional justice, (c) distributive justice and buyers’ satisfaction. 
 
The second line of reasoning suggests an opposite effect—a strong signal’s channeling effect 
on the subsequent signaling process. If there is a series of signals about an encounter, previous 
signals may direct attention to the specific encounter and, thus, the subsequent signals. This 
reasoning is aligned with the attention-based view of firms (Ocasio, 1997), arguing that situational 
stimuli, especially the unexpected (e.g., a disruption event), can draw decision-makers’ attention 
and trigger their controlled information processing of the event (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). We 
expect that the stronger a preceding signal is (i.e., the more severe the disruption), the more salient 
the disruption appears (Eckerd et al., 2013) and the more attention the buyer pays to suppliers’ 
follow-up signals conveyed through recovery actions.  
 
As some signaling studies suggest, the effectiveness of positive signals depends on how much 
attention the buyer gives to the signals (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). This reasoning is particularly 
relevant as buyers in modern supply chains may be surrounded by many signals sent from the 
supply base (Hult et al., 2004). Thus, when a severe supplier-induced disruption occurs, buyers 
begin closely monitoring the suppliers’ actions in the resolution process (Craighead et al., 2007). 
As suppliers use justice actions to effectively address the disruption, buyers who have paid 
attention to these suppliers more readily receive the positive signals (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). 
Thus, working as active information processors continually scanning and making sense of the new 
information (Daft & Weick, 1984; Thomas et al., 1993), buyers act on this updated information 
via positive signals and become more satisfied. As a result, the effectiveness of these justice actions 
can be more salient. In contrast, when a less severe disruption occurs, buyers may be less aware of 
the event. Given the small impact on buyers’ operations, buyers may pay less attention to the 
suppliers’ follow-up actions such that the positive signals conveyed through justice actions may 
be less noticed. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 2’. Disruption severity positively moderates the positive associations between (a) 
procedural justice, (b) interactional justice, (c) distributive justice and buyers’ satisfaction. 
The Moderating Effect of Supply Chain Risk’s Uncertainty 
The institutional environment in which a disruption occurs can also shape the effectiveness of 
suppliers’ positive signals (Connelly et al., 2011a). As disruptions and their recovery occur in 
buyers’ supply chains, buyers’ supply chains can be one such environment. We focus on supply 
chain risk uncertainty, defined as the exogenous uncertainties that reside outside the buying firm 
(Hult, Craighead, & Ketchen, 2010). The question is whether supply chain uncertainty weakens or 
enhances the effectiveness of justice actions as positive signals on buyer satisfaction. 
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We propose two lines of reasoning leading to competing hypotheses. The first centers on the 
dynamic information characterizing an uncertain supply chain and hindering the signaling (Jiang 
et al., 2007; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Buyers in a volatile, versus a stable, environment often 
deal with rapidly-changing information (Leblebici & Salancik, 1981; Luo, 2007a); at the same 
time, these buyers can be inundated by enormous amounts of information from their complex 
supply bases (Craighead et al., 2007). For instance, comparing buyers operating in the fashion 
industry with those in the automobile industry, the former group faces constantly shifting market 
demands and operational updates from their suppliers, whereas the latter group has a more stable 
flow of information from both upstream and downstream. In the former case, more signals can be 
competing for buyers’ attention than in the latter case. As buyers are constrained by their attention 
capacity (Ocasio, 1997) and information-processing capacity (Egelhoff, 1982; Srinivasan & 
Swink, 2015), it is more difficult for those in the former group to pay attention to a signal from 
their suppliers than their counterparts in the latter group. Likewise, buyers in the former group may 
experience other disruptions occurring with the focal one; thus, their attention is distracted by these 
events (Ocasio, 1997).Therefore, signals in the form of justice actions from the focal supplier may 
be disrupted by signals from other suppliers competing for the buyers’ attention (Connelly et al., 
2011a).  
 
Furthermore, buyers in an uncertain supply chain—compared to those in more stable 
environments—have probably dealt with more disruptions in the past (Hult et al., 2010). As they 
experience more disruptive events, their information-processing of disruptions becomes more 
automatic and less controlled; when governed by such automatic processing, they pay less  
attention to the focal disruption (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). As buyers’ attention is essential for 
effective signaling (Gulati & Higgins, 2003), the effectiveness of suppliers’ positive signals 
through their recovery efforts diminishes. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 3. Buyers’ supply chain risk uncertainty negatively moderates the positive 
associations between (a) procedural justice, (b) interactional justice. (c) distributive justice 
and buyers’ satisfaction. 
 
In contrast, the second reasoning focuses on the perspective that buyers proactively act on and 
shape their environment, as opposed to merely reacting to it (e.g., Hambrick, 1982; Sirmon, Hitt, 
& Ireland, 2007). A complex and dynamic task environment is characterized by uncertain supply 
chains (Choi & Krause, 2006). Being aware of these characteristics, buyers are more motivated to 
simplify their decision-making by seeking outside signals to gather more information (Higgins & 
Gulati, 2006). In other words, the risk uncertainty in buyers’ supply chains causes buyers to be 
increasingly attuned to signals (Sanders & Boivie, 2004) via suppliers’ recovery efforts. 
Furthermore, the information contained in suppliers’ positive signals provides buyers unique 
value—indicating suppliers’ less observable attributes (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004) that can be 
leveraged to inform buyers’ decisions about the recovery and the focal exchange. Hence, buyers 
more readily receive and value suppliers’ recovery efforts. In contrast, when buyers operate in 
stable supply chains, information asymmetry may already be low between buyers and suppliers. 
Thus, these buyers rarely need extra information unveiling suppliers’ attributes to facilitate 
decision-making. As uncertainty in buyers’ supply chains increases, buyers anticipate more value 
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from suppliers’ signals and grow more attuned to those signals; thus, the effectiveness of suppliers’ 
signals are amplified. 
 
Furthermore, buyers recognizing their task environment’s complexity (Choi & Krause, 2006) 
may realize that their suppliers (like themselves) have less control over the environment (Ford, 
1985a); thus, buyers acknowledge suppliers’ difficulty in operating smoothly and reliably. With 
such awareness, buyers are more likely to justify supplier-induced disruptions by attributing (with 
or without bias) these events to less controllable factors (e.g., suppliers’ endowment) and then 
develop less negative perceptions of suppliers (Eckerd & Handley, 2015; Hartmann & Moeller, 
2014). These perceptions may be carried throughout the recovery process and inflate the buyers’ 
appraisal of the recovery. In addition, buyers may lower their expectation for a successful recovery 
because they are aware of the related challenges in an uncertain and complex supply chain 
(Craighead et al., 2007). Given a certain level of suppliers’ recovery efforts, buyers with lower 
expectations as their reference point for evaluation are more likely to feel more satisfied than those 
with higher expectations (Oliver, 1980). Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 3’. Buyers’ supply chain risk uncertainty positively moderates the positive 
associations between (a) procedural justice, (b) interactional justice, (c) distributive justice 
and buyers’ satisfaction. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sampling and Data Collection 
To test our conceptual framework—how disruption severity and supply chain uncertainty 
moderate the positive impact of suppliers’ justice actions on buyers’ satisfaction, we collected data 
from Chinese manufacturing firms regarding supplier-induced disruption events. To select our 
sample firms, we used the directory provided by the China Statistic Bureau. We randomly selected 
1000 manufacturing firms with the four-digit Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) codes 
ranging between 1311 and 4290 as our final list. 
 
Following Hoskisson et al.’s  (2000) procedure, we developed our survey in English and had 
it translated into Chinese and then back into English by individual translators. In the first half of 
2011, we pilot-tested our survey with 37 US and 31 Chinese senior purchasing managers. In the 
second half of 2011, we started our data collection with face-to-face interviews. The interview 
technique was chosen to increase the participation and completion rates. To solicit participation, 
experienced interviewers contacted the 1000 firms by telephone. These interviewers had more than 
20 hours of interview training and had conducted more than two similar interviews. During this 
initial contact, firms were informed of our research study and of their responses’ confidentiality. 
Among the 1000 firms, 436 agreed (orally) to participate, provided our study’s key informants, 
and verified the interview locations. Some of the respondents who agreed to participate could not 
complete the survey because of unexpected scheduling conflicts. We eventually obtained 302 
interview responses—a 69% response rate.  
 
Driven by our research question, we aimed to capture disruption’ attributes (such as severity) 
and the buyers’ experience (such as perceived fairness) with the suppliers’ resolution process. 
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Thus, we implemented the critical incident technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) to collect data. CIT 
is a useful tool, which taps into characteristics of and respondents’ experiences in a critical 
(positive or negative) incident (Gremler, 2004) and which has been successfully used in service 
marketing and recovery literature (e.g., Bitner, Booms, & Tetreault, 1990; Craighead et al., 2004; 
Miller, Craighead, & Karwan, 2000). We asked respondents to recall two disruption events (one 
successfully resolved and one unresolved) that were induced by two important suppliers in the past 
two years, and to use the events as reference points for their responses. Because we expected 
respondents to be knowledgeable about the disruptions, the resolution processes, and their firms’ 
relationship with the involved suppliers, we chose senior purchasing executives as our key 
informants. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. We cross-validated a random 
subsample of our survey responses (20%) with our respondents via telephone and checked the 
survey-response patterns to ensure that respondents paid attention. Table A-2.1 provides the 
sample profile of 302 buying firms. 
Common Method Bias 
Because we used a single-respondent survey to capture all the variables, common method 
variance—a spurious correlation arising from using the same method to measure the independent 
and dependent variables within a relationship—had to be carefully addressed to ensure our results’ 
validity (Craighead, Ketchen, Dunn, & Hult, 2011). Following Podsakoff et al. (2003), we 
implemented several remedies for common method bias. In terms of procedural remedies, we 
guaranteed respondents’ anonymity, separated items of predictors and outcome variables, and 
improved scale clarity by pilot tests. We then conducted three statistical remedies. First, we 
conducted Harman’s one-factor test, which has been widely used (Craighead et al., 2011). We 
loaded all items onto a single factor in a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) setting and compared 
this single-factor model’s fit with our measurement model using a chi-square difference test. Our 
measurement model had a significantly better fit (p < 0.001). Second, we conducted the marker 
variable technique (Richardson, Simmering, & Sturman, 2009). We added to our CFA 
measurement model a single-item variable—i.e., respondents’ job satisfaction (theoretically 
unrelated to severity before resolution). The correlation between job satisfaction and severity 
before resolution was non-significant (r = 0.05, p = 0.17), indicating that common method variance 
is less of a concern in our study. Third, we added a latent common method factor to our 
measurement model; we allowed all scale items loading onto this factor and their corresponding 
theoretical constructs (Netemeyer, Boles, McKee, & McMurrian, 1997). The items’ factor 
loadings onto theoretical constructs remained significant (p < 0.001), confirming that common 
method bias was not a concern. 
Measure Development and Assessment 
Following the CIT approach, we designed a two-part survey with each part corresponding to a 
supplier-induced disruption (occurring in the previous two years) that the respondents identified—
one successfully and the other unsuccessfully resolved. We directed respondents to use each of the 
two disruptions and the corresponding experiences as their reference point for each part of the 
survey. A seven-point Likert scale and open-ended questions were included. The survey 
instruments are presented in Table A-2.2. 
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We assessed procedural justice, interactional justice, and distributive justice in the disruption 
resolution process by asking the extent to which respondents agreed with each of the justice items 
as they evaluated the resolution process. Procedural justice was measured with five items based 
on the rules outlined by Leventhal (1980a) and Thibaut and Walker (1975). Interactional justice 
was measured with eight items based on the rules outlined by Bies and Moag (1986). Distributive 
justice was measured with five items based on the rules outlined by Colquitt and Rodell (2011). 
 
We assessed severity of disruption before resolution by gauging respondents’ agreement with 
each of the severity items regarding the disruption’s negative impact on the firm’s before the 
resolution was conducted. A six-item scale was developed that tapped into the disruption’s 
negative impact on the firm’s overall performance, internal operations, supply chain operations, 
dollar loss, customer satisfaction, and overall competitiveness.  
 
We assessed supply chain risk uncertainty—the extent to which the firm faced external risks, 
problems and obstacles—with a three-item scale adopted from Hult, Craighead, and Ketchen 
(2010). 
 
Using a five-item scale developed for this study, we measured satisfaction about the resolution 
process—the extent to which the firm was satisfied with the supplier’s resolution process. We 
confirmed this measure’s content validity with our pilot participants.  
We included five sets of control variables. Regarding suppliers, we controlled for each 
supplier’s country. Regarding buyers, we controlled for each buyer’s industry, country, 
performance, size (measured by sales), and age. Regarding relationship, we controlled for 
relationship age, supplier dependence, and frequency of contacts. Regarding respondents, we 
controlled for each respondent’s purchasing experience. Regarding disruption events, we 
controlled for supplier compensation and disruption severity after resolution. By controlling these 
factors, we tried to eliminate some alternative explanations and reduced errors in the analytical 
models (Greene, 2012), improving our estimation’s efficiency. We have provided correlations 
among and descriptive statistics of all constructs in Table A.3. 
 
To assess our measurement model’s convergent and discriminant validity, we conducted 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on our multi-item measures using MPLUS 7.2. We included 
procedural justice, interactional justice, distributive justice, severity of disruption before/after 
resolution, supply chain risk uncertainty, satisfaction with the resolution process, supplier 
dependence, and buyer performance. The results provided a good model fit (χ2 = 2391.76, df = 
783, CFI = 0.91, TLI = 0.90, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMR = 0.05). All the items’ standardized 
coefficients were highly significant (p < 0.001), indicating the constructs’ convergent validity (see 
Appendix). The constructs’ composite reliability (CR) ranged between 0.80 and 0.94, and the 
constructs’ average variance estimated (AVE) ranged between 0.51 and 0.76; both measures 
indicated good reliability (see Table A-2.3). 
 
To ensure the justice constructs’ discriminant validity (Venkatraman, 1989), we compared the 
unconstrained model with the constrained models in which the correlations between any two of 
the three justice constructs were set to one. If the unconstrained model’s fit is significantly better 
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than that of the constrained models, the discriminant validity test is deemed satisfied. The tests 
indicated our constructs’ discriminant validity (see Table A-2.4).  
Model Specification and Estimation 
We collected data about two distinct disruptions and the corresponding resolution processes 
from each of the respondents from the 302 responding firms. Thus, our data were structured in 
three nested levels: data of individual disruptions (e.g., severity, supplier compensation), 
individual resolutions (e.g., supplier’s justice actions), and relationship attributes (e.g., relationship 
age) were nested with the respondent. The respondents’ data (e.g., purchasing experience) were 
nested within the buying firm. Data from the same level (i.e., cluster) might be interdependent due 
to unobserved factors (e.g., culture, capability, etc.). Traditional regression approaches (such as 
ordinary linear squares) cannot account for such interdependence within the same cluster and may 
provide biased estimates (Greene, 2012). Thus, we used the hierarchical linear model (HLM), a 
modeling approach that explicitly accounts for data interdependence within clusters, to test 
hypotheses (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We used the full maximum likelihood estimation, 
allowing us to conduct a fit comparison across nested models. Based on HLM’s strict assumption 
on normality (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), we logged transformed non-normal variables: buyer 
size, age, relationship age, frequency of contacts, and respondents’ purchasing experience.  
To test H1, we estimated a main effect model by regressing buyers’ satisfaction onto three 
justice actions (Level 1), severity of disruption before resolution (Level 1), supply chain risk 
uncertainty (Level 2), and controls. To test moderations as hypothesized in H2/H2’, we added to 
the main effect model the severity’s interaction effects with each of the three justice variables. 
Likewise, to test moderations as of H3/H3’, we added to the main effect model the interaction 
effects of supply chain risk uncertainty with each of the three justice variables. As our main 
interests centered on both within-level (H2/H2’) and cross-level interactions (H3/H3’), we mean-
centered all variables by clusters (i.e., cluster-mean centering) instead of centering at the grand 
mean to ensure unbiased estimates4 (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Raudenbush, 1989).  
RESULTS 
Main Analyses 
Results of our main analyses are presented in Table A-2.5. First, the main effects of procedural 
justice (B = 0.39, p < 0.001) and distributive justice (B = 0.23, p < 0.001) on buyers’ satisfaction 
were significant while interactional justice’s main effect was non-significant (B = -0.06, p = 0.39) 
(Model 1). Thus, we found support for H1(a) and H1(c). Next, we assessed H2/H2’ (Model 2). 
Among the disruption severity’s interactions with three justice actions, none was significant. We 
then assessed H3/H3’ (Model 3) and found that buyers’ supply chain uncertainty negatively 
moderated procedural justice’s main effect on buyers’ satisfaction (B = -0.15, p < 0.001), whereas 
it positively moderated the effects of interactional justice (B = .11, p = .05) and distributive justice 
(B = 0.09, p = 0.06) on buyers’ satisfaction. Thus. H3(a), H3’(b) and H3(c) were supported.  
                                            
4 For Level 2 factors, cluster-mean centering and grand-mean centering are mathematically the same. 
 54 
Supplementary Analyses  
We conducted four sets of supplementary analyses. Our findings that severity failed to 
moderate any of the justice actions deserved further exploration. We wondered if the justice 
actions’ main effects might be quadratic and, thus, if the moderations’ null effects were due to a 
mis specified linear function form of the main and the interaction effects. Therefore, we conducted 
the first set of supplementary analyses (results shown in Table A-2.6) following Haans, Pieters 
and He (2015). As a first step, we added quadratic terms of three justice variables and explored 
whether there were curvilinear effects between justice actions and buyers’ satisfaction (Model 4). 
We found an inverted U-shaped relation between procedural justice and satisfaction (quadratic 
term: B = -0.16, p = 0.04); linear term: B = 0.39, p < 0.001). The curve’s turning point was 0.72 
(at the 86th percentile). This finding suggested that as procedural justice increased, buyers’ 
satisfaction increased up to a certain point; beyond that point, buyers’ satisfaction declined. Figure 
A-2.2 illustrates procedural justice’s curvilinear effect on buyers’ satisfaction. We found a linear 
relation between distributive justice and satisfaction (quadratic term: B = -0.09, p = 0.30; linear 
term: B = 0.23, p < 0.001) and a non-significant effect of interactional justice.  
 
To test moderation of the quadratic effect, we interacted disruption severity with both the linear 
and quadratic terms of procedural justice (Haans et al., 2015). For distributive and interactional 
justice, we interacted severity with only the linear terms. Regarding severity, our results (Model 
5) show that severity moderated procedural justice’s curvilinear effect in that the curve was steeper 
when disruptions were highly severe as compared to when disruptions were less severe (quadratic 
term B = -0.20, p < 0.001; linear term: B = -0.04, p = 0.81). In other words, as severity increased, 
procedural justice’s dark side was more substantial. Also, severity positively moderated 
distributive justice’s linear effect on satisfaction (B = 0.38, p = 0.08). Figures A-2.3 and Figure A-
2.4 illustrate severity’s moderating effect on procedural justice and distributive justice, 
respectively. Interestingly, although interactional justice’s main effect was non-significant, its 
interaction with severity was marginally significant and negative (B = -0.38, p = .09).  
 
We conducted the same procedure for interactions with supply chain risk uncertainty. Our 
results (Model 6) demonstrated that uncertainty significantly moderated the curvilinear effect of 
procedural justice (quadratic term: B = -0.14, p < 0.001; linear term: B = -0.15, p < 0.001). Under 
low uncertainty, procedural justice improved satisfaction at a diminishing rate. The turning point 
was 2 (at the 99th percentile). Under high uncertainty, there was an inverted U relationship between 
procedural justice and satisfaction. The curve’s turning point was 0.16 (at the 64th percentile). As 
for distributive justice, supply chain uncertainty positively strengthened its linear effect on 
satisfaction. Figures A-2.5 and Figure A-2.6 illustrate the moderating effects of supply chain risk 
uncertainty on both procedural and distributive justice, respectively. Notably, the interaction 
between supply chain uncertainty and interactional justice was significant and positive (B = 0.11, 
p = 0.06), albeit interactional justice’s non-significant main effect.  
 
Our second set of supplementary analyses centered on the fact that the interaction terms of 
severity/uncertainty with interactional justice were significant, while interactional justice’s main 
effect was not (as shown by Models 5 and 6). We speculated whether interactional justice might 
be effective in some scenarios (as categorized by severity and uncertainty) but ineffective (or even 
counterproductive) in others. To address this question, we first split our sample into groups of high 
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severity (N = 253) and low severity (N = 302) based on the mean of severity. We separately 
reevaluated the justice variables’ main effects for two groups using HLM. The results showed that 
for the high severity group, there was a significant negative association between interactional 
justice and buyers’ satisfaction (B = -0.28, p = 0.09); for the low severity group, interactional 
justice did not significantly affect buyers’ satisfaction (B = 0.12, p = 0.31). Next, we split the 
sample into groups of high uncertainty (N = 332) and low uncertainty (N = 272) based on the mean 
of supply chain risk’s uncertainty and reassessed justice’s effects for the two groups. For the high 
uncertainty group, interactional justice did not have a significant impact (B = 0.15, p = 0.13); for 
the low uncertainty group, interactional justice had a significant negative effect on buyers’ 
satisfaction (B = -0.23, p = 0.06). As a robustness check, we used medians of severity and 
uncertainty to split the sample and then reassessed the models; the results were consistent with 
mean-splitting. Table A-2.7 and Table A-2.8 summarize the results for groups of high versus low 
severity and for groups of high versus low supply chain uncertainty. 
 
While our main analysis centered on the moderating effect of a negative signal’s strength, our 
third set of supplementary analyses focused on the moderating impact of a negative signal’s type—
disruption type—on justice actions. In our survey, we asked respondents to describe the disruptions 
they recalled. One author manually coded the disruption type based on the provided description. 
To ensure the coding’s reliability, a second author randomly selected 60 cases and recoded the 
cases independently. The interrater agreement as measured by Cohen’s Kappa coefficient (Cohen, 
1960) was 0.93, indicating good reliability. We categorized disruptions into three types: 
disruptions due to quantity shortage (N = 225), delayed shipments (N = 311), and quality issues 
(N = 68). Based on the disruption type, we split the sample into three groups and evaluated the 
three justice variables’ main effects for the three groups. We found that justice’s effectiveness 
varied across disruption types (results summarized in Table A-2.9). When the disruption was due 
to quantity shortage (Model T1), only distributive justice seemed to be effective (B = 1.14, p < 
0.001); interestingly, procedural justice negatively affected buyers’ satisfaction (B = -0.70, p = 
0.05); and interactional justice did not have a significant impact. When the disruption was due to 
delayed shipments (Model T2), both procedural justice (B = 0.65, p < 0.001) and distributive 
justice (B = 0.15, p = 0.07) would work; but the former approach was more effective than the 
latter; in contrast, interactional justice seemed to be counterproductive in shaping buyers’ 
satisfaction (B = -0.21, p = 0.04). When the disruption was due to quality issues, none of the three 
justice actions effectively shaped buyers’ satisfaction. 
 
The fourth set of supplementary analyses demonstrated that the outcome in our model (i.e., 
buyers’ satisfaction about the resolution process) could have a tangible impact on buyers’ decisions 
about the focal relationship (i.e., buyers’ continuity intentions). In our survey, we measured 
buyers’ continuity intention with three items on a seven-point Likert scale (adapted from Wang et 
al., 2010). The construct had a Cronbach alpha of 0.91, suggesting good reliability. We used 
buyers’ continuity as the dependent variable and added buyers’ satisfaction as an independent 
variable along with the predictors we included in Models 1-6 (Tables A-2.5 and Table A-2.6). The 
results showed that buyer satisfaction was positively associated with buyer continuity across all 
six models (satisfaction’s coefficient estimate ranged between 0.41 and 0.44 with p < 0.001), 
suggesting that our outcome variable (i.e. buyers’ satisfaction) could affect buyers’ behaviors.  
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Robustness Checks  
Endogeneity poses a threat to survey research and may arise from multiple sources (Bascle, 
2008). One source—plausibly the most common one (Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017)—is omitted 
variables (i.e. alternative explanations) that account for both independent and outcome variables 
(Bascle, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010). Notably, our model included a deliberate set of control 
variables at different levels (suppliers, buyers, relationships, and respondents), accounting for 
some alternative explanations. In addition, we identified other alternative explanations and 
addressed this issue as follows. First, the degree to which the supplier directly caused the disruption 
might explain the level of its justice efforts (Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2003), whereas it might 
also influence buyer satisfaction (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). We measured this variable by 
asking respondents the extent to which they agreed that the disruption was “caused by the supplier” 
on a seven-point Likert scale; we included this variable as a control and reevaluated our models. 
Results remained consistent. Second, whether the supplier previously caused disruptions might 
affect the supplier’s capability of implementing justice actions (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009) 
and might also shape buyers’ expectation about the supplier’s resolution (Smith & Bolton, 1998). 
We gauged the respondents’ agreement with the fact that “this supplier caused other disruptions 
prior to this disruption” on a seven-point Likert scale; we added this variable and reassessed our 
models. Results remained the same. Third, the supplier’s criticality to the buyer (implying resource 
dependence) could potentially dictate the level of the supplier’s justice efforts and impact the 
buyer’s appraisal of the supplier’s performance in the resolution process (Bode et al., 2011). We 
measured the percentage of the buyer’s purchase that was accounted for by the focal supplier’s 
products (interval-coded: <$10,000 (1), $10,000-49,9999 (2), $50,000- $99,9999 (3), $100,000- 
$499,9999 (4), $500,000 or more (5)). The larger the percentage, the more critical the supplier was 
to the focal buyer. We included this variable and reran the models. Estimates were consistent. 
 
Another source of endogeneity is reverse causality (i.e., independent variables resulting from 
outcome variables) (Bascle, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010). Our design helped alleviate this concern. 
First, independent variables captured suppliers’ recovery efforts, and the outcome variable 
captured buyers’ perception about the recovery. Logically, buyers would be unable to appraise the 
recovery without suppliers’ recovery efforts. If reverse causality existed, a necessary condition 
would be that buyers’ appraisal of recovery preceded suppliers’ recovery (Hunt, 1991), a condition 
that logically would not stand. Along the same line, our moderator—the disruption’s severity 
before resolution—was framed as a precedent to our outcome variable—satisfaction about the 
resolution. Thus, our outcome variable would be less likely to cause this moderator. Second, our 
other moderator—supply chain risk uncertainty—was an exogenous variable measuring buyers’ 
external risks (Hult et al., 2010) and, therefore, is less likely to suffer reverse causality.  
 
The third source of concern is error-in-variables if correlated with independent variables 
(Bascle, 2008). Our design could ease this concern as follows. First, we addressed in a previous 
section common method bias—one of the most common systematic errors (Craighead et al., 2011). 
Second, our multi-item constructs demonstrated good reliability, suggesting lower measurement 





To develop a more nuanced understanding of when suppliers’ justice actions can be effective 
in the wake of supplier-induced disruptions, we complement justice theory with signaling theory. 
Specifically, we frame suppliers’ justice actions in the resolution process as positive signals 
informing buyers of suppliers’ unobservable qualities, ultimately shaping buyers’ satisfaction and 
continuity intentions. More importantly, we leverage insights from signaling theory and identify 
boundary conditions (Goldsby et al., 2013) (i.e., a negative signal’s strength, a negative signal’s 
type, and uncertainty in the signaling environment) by which positive signals are more or less 
effective (or even detrimental).  
 
Our results reveal several interesting insights. First, as Park and Mezias (2005) suggest, one 
signal can have multiple meanings. Echoing this point, we show that justice actions—seemingly 
positive signals—in some cases can deliver negative messages. For instance, we find that too much 
procedural justice can be counterproductive, especially when buyers’ supply chains have high 
uncertainty and when disruptions are severe. A plausible explanation is that buyers operating in 
uncertain supply chains face rapid changes (Hult et al., 2010), so they may prefer a more flexible 
and responsive resolution procedure (Tomlin, 2006) as opposed to an organized and methodical 
one. Likewise, buyers facing severe disruptions may have to deal with a wider range of affected 
facilities and operations and, thus, need flexible procedures to ensure recovery plans across these 
facilities are coordinated and well adjusted (Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005). In both cases, too much 
procedural justice imposes rigidity on the disruption’s repair; instead of a positive signal, it can 
indicate suppliers’ lack of flexibility and harm buyers’ satisfaction.  
 
Likewise, interactional justice can send negative messages when disruptions are severe and 
when buyers’ supply chains have little uncertainty. In the former case, buyers and suppliers may 
have enough on their plate given the magnitude and complexity of resolving severe disruptions 
(Craighead et al., 2007). Thus, buyers may expect suppliers to commit all their resources to the 
tangible—rather than the psychological/social—aspect of the recovery. Buyers may even perceive 
suppliers focusing on interactional justice as conducting impression management (Bolino et al., 
2008; Greenberg, 1990a) to avoid actual responsibility for the disruption, thus the buyers would 
be less satisfied. In the latter case of stable supply chains in which recovery is less unpredictable, 
buyers may perceive frequent interactions as unnecessary; thus, the high interactional justice of 
suppliers may imply that they are (1) incapable of responding independently (i.e., lacking recovery 
capabilities) (Craighead et al., 2007), or (2) expecting buyers to share more responsibility (i.e., 
lacking ownership of the issue) (Reimann et al., 2017a). 
 
Second, signaling research has identified two attributes for a signal to be credible: costly and 
observable (Connelly et al., 2011a). However, we suggest there may be a third criterion—the focal 
signal must deliver messages consistent with preceding ones; otherwise, its credibility may be 
questioned (Balboa and Marti, 2007). Our results suggest two such cases. The first is related to 
suppliers’ interactional justice when disruptions are due to delayed deliveries. Their interactional 
justice—aimed to convey their concerns (Wang et al., 2014)—can conflict with the message of 
lacking accountability as indicated by the delay; this conflict may increase buyers’ suspicion about 
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the credibility of suppliers’ actions. A similar case occurs when suppliers use procedural justice in 
resolving disruptions resulting from insufficient quantities. Buyers may initially attribute the 
shortage to suppliers’ incapability of capacity/material planning. As suppliers arrange methodical 
procedures in the resolution, they emit a signal in stark contrast with the buyers’ initial attribution. 
Buyers may start to wonder whether the shortages are due to suppliers’ inadequate attitudes instead 
of incompetence, and thus become dissatisfied (Eckerd & Handley, 2015).  
 
Third, although studies have identified tangible versus psychological recovery actions 
(Craighead et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2000; Reimann et al., 2017a), less is known about their 
relative effectiveness. Our findings that interactional justice generally does not affect buyers’ 
satisfaction (as much as procedural or distributive justice) provide insight into this issue—buyers 
are seemingly more attuned to signals that speak to the tangible side of the repair (i.e., quick 
handling and compensation) as opposed to the psychological (i.e., apologies and courteous 
interactions) (Reimann et al., 2017a). Distributive justice—the most tangible form of justice—
seems to be consistently effective across various scenarios; i.e., suppliers can always rely on the 
rule of equity in resolving disruptions.  
 
Signaling studies have mainly investigated a single signal’s implication (e.g., Connelly et al., 
2011b; King et al., 2005; Wagner et al., 2011). However, those studies have overlooked the joint 
effect of a combination or series of signals—specifically, how one signal’s impact varies based on 
preceding signals’ attributes (Spence, 2002). For instance, theory is not clear about the role of the 
a preceding signal’s strength in shaping following signals. On the one hand, a more severe 
supplier-induced disruption would prime buyers with negative impressions of the focal supplier 
(Liao, 2007; Wang et al., 2014),  thus dampening the positive effects of follow-up justice actions. 
We find this argument works only for procedural justice, suggesting that procedural justice’s 
effectiveness can be easily weakened if it follows a strong negative signal. On the other hand, a 
more severe disruption can draw buyers’ attention to the focal event; therefore, suppliers’ follow-
up actions as positive signals can be more readily received (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). We find 
support indicating that distributive justice can be more beneficial if the preceding signal (albeit 
negative) is stronger. Thus, we contribute to signaling theory by clarifying that the shaping effect 
(amplifying or dampening) of a negative signal’s strength can differ across positive signals. We 
recommend that suppliers evaluate disruption severity before committing resources to specific 
actions. When severity is low, procedural justice can be especially effective, though distributive 
justice also works. When severity is high, suppliers can leverage disruptions as opportunities 
(Sheffi & Rice Jr, 2005; Wang et al., 2014) to enhance relationship outcomes by adopting equity 
rules in recovery whereas avoid too much procedural justice. 
 
Similarly, theory has been inconclusive about the moderating impact of an uncertain signaling 
environment on shaping positive signals’ effects (Connelly et al., 2011a). On the one hand, buyers 
in an uncertain environment face many rapidly-shifting signals from their supply base (Choi & 
Krause, 2006); thus, the focal supplier’s signals can be barely noticeable. We find that procedural 
justice fits in this case, implying that it sends messages easily overshadowed by other signals. On 
the other hand, uncertainty can propel buyers to be more attuned to signals and, thus, readier to 
search for those from suppliers to reduce information asymmetry (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). We 
find that distributive justice fits in this case, suggesting that it is a signal buyers proactively search 
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for in a noisy environment. In general, the signaling environment’s impact can be complex, 
depending on different signals. We recommend that suppliers develop a fuller understanding of 
the institutional environment in which their buyers operate, thus making better-informed decisions 
about strategies. When buyers operate in dynamic supply chains, both procedural and distributive 
justice can be beneficial; however, distributive justice should be the focus. When buyers operate 
in stable supply chains, procedural justice is effective while distributive justice is less so. 
 
Finally, we explore how the impact of positive signals hinges on different types of negative 
signal. Consistent with the insights from the service recovery literature that justice actions should 
cater to specific service failures (Smith et al., 1999), our results indicate that disruption type is 
another critical factor suppliers should consider in the recovery. With information about disruption 
types readily available, it should be low-hanging fruit for suppliers to ensure recovery’s 
effectiveness. When disruptions are due to quantity shortage, distributive justice works, whereas 
the other two types of justice do not. For instance, the supplier should compensate for the quantity 
shortfall and even reimburse part (if not all) of the financial loss the buyer suffers from the 
disruption in order to secure future business. When disruptions are due to delayed shipments, both 
procedural and distributive justice would work, but procedural justice should be the priority. The 
supplier can first establish methodical plans to expedite delayed shipments, to notify buyers with 
tracking information, and to coordinate with buyers to ensure smooth inbound operations. Next, 
the supplier can follow the rule of equity and consider covering the premiums of expedited 
shipping. When disruptions are due to defective products, none of the justice actions work. Buyers 
probably consider quality a basic requirement, so quality-related disruptions may seriously impair 
the reputation of suppliers and even render them unqualified; in this case, recovery actions cannot 
easily overturn buyers’ evaluations.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Future research can use longitudinal designs, such as a multi-stage experiment, to assess our 
results’ causality (i.e., whether justice action leads to increased buyer satisfaction) and longer-term 
relationship outcomes (i.e., whether justice’s impact on buyers’ satisfaction feeds into repeated 
future interactions). In addition, future research can integrate other theories with signaling theory 
in the disruption context to address alternative strategies suppliers can take in the presence of 
quality-related disruptions. Relatedly, our study has demonstrated the viability of signaling theory 
in the disruption context, and we encourage future research to explore other boundary conditions 
(Goldsby et al., 2013) shaping the effectiveness of positive signals such as the attributes of 
signalers (e.g., credibility) and of receivers (e.g., learning organization). Also, we call for more 
use of signaling theory in related supply chain contexts (e.g., product recalls, ethical supply chains) 
where information asymmetry is prevalent. Finally, it would be interesting to move towards multi-
tier supply chains beyond our dyadic setting—for example, do the effectiveness and visibility of 
signals diminish as the number of tiers between the signaler and the receiver increases, and would 





Table A-2.1: Sample Profile of Buying Firms 
 
 Buying Firms 
Sales in RMB (in millions) Frequency Cumulative% 
0–10 48 15.89 
11–50 171 72.52 
51–100 30 82.45 
101–500 46 97.68 
501–1000 5 99.34 
>1000 2   100 
 302   
   
Number of employees   
0–50 27 8.94 
51–100 85 37.09 
101–200 107 72.52 
201–500 52 89.74 
501–1000 13 94.04 
1001–2000 8 96.69 
2001–5000 5 98.34 
>5000 5 100 
 302  
   
Age    
0–5 15 4.97 
6–10 97 37.09 
11–15 119 76.49 
16–20 41 90.07 
21–25 15 95.03 
26–30 2 95.70 
31–50 8 98.34 
>50 5   100 
  302   
Industry    
computer, communications, and 
electronic equipment  55 18.21 
clothing  40 31.46 
special equipment 29 41.06 
Others 178 100 








“Please recall one major disruption event which involved your firm and one specific supplier and occurred in the 
past 2 years. Please briefly describe the major disruption. [By disruption, we mean the delay of the unavailability of 







Procedural justice (Wang et al., 2014): disruption resolution process 
was    
appropriate .81 .02 49.47 
timely .84 .01 58.36 
efficient .87 .01 69.61 
well-organized .83 .02 56.60 
methodical .85 .01 60.85 
Interactional justice (Wang et al., 2014): during the disruption and 
resolution (or lack thereof),     
this supplier treated your firm in a polite manner .79 .02 34.88 
this supplier treated your firm with respect .76 .02 31.29 
this supplier was sympathetic to your firm's situation .65 .03 21.72 
this supplier treated your firm with dignity .63 .03 21.15 
Distributive justice (Wang et al., 2014): during the disruption and 
resolution (or lack thereof),    
this supplier put in more efforts than your firm to resolve the 
disruption .73 .02 34.86 
this supplier invested more resources than your firm in the 
disruption resolution process .84 .02 57.52 
this supplier spent more time to handle the disruption .81 .02 49.51 
this supplier did well beyond your firm's efforts to resolve the 
disruption .85 .01 62.23 
this supplier contributed more than your firm to the disruption 
resolution process .82 .02 51.02 
Severity before resolution: assuming that no resolution was taken, this 
disruption would have negatively affected your firm’s    
overall performance .80 .02 43.07 
overall internal operations .72 .02 32.08 
supply chain operations .78 .02 40.88 
the amount of dollar loss .76 .02 37.41 
overall customer satisfaction .72 .02 31.13 
overall competitiveness .67 .03 26.22 
Severity after resolution: in reality, this disruption has negatively 
affected your firm’s    
overall performance .83 .02 55.57 
overall internal operations .81 .02 49.72 
supply chain operations .83 .02 54.96 
the amount of dollar loss .84 .01 59.97 
overall customer satisfaction .79 .02 44.99 











Supply chain risk uncertainty (Hult et al., 2010; Chen and Paulraj, 
2004):     
your firm's supply chain is constantly being threatened by external  
risks .92 .02 62.15 
your firm's supply chain constantly faces supply base, operations, 
and/or logistical obstacles .90 .02 59.78 
your firm's supply chain constantly needs to be planned for 
significant external problems that may arise in the supply chains .55 .03 18.05 
Buyers’ satisfaction about the resolution process (Wang et al., 2014): 
describe your overall feelings with respect to the disruption resolution 
processes with this supplier: 
   
pleased .84 .01 62.50 
Satisfied .87 .01 76.21 
contented .89 .01 90.37 
gratified .90 .01 94.45 
fulfilled .85 .01 65.15 
Supply dependence (Wang et al., 2010):     
If our relationship was discontinued with the supplier, the supplier 
would have difficulty    make up the sales volume in this product 
line 
.85 .01 62.93 
It would be difficult for the supplier to replace us .86 .01 64.83 
The supplier is quite dependent on us .86 .01 68.67 
The supplier does not have a good alternative business partner to us. .89 .01 82.50 
Buyer performance:    
customer satisfaction with our products .72 .03 28.96 
market performance of our products relative to competitors .74 .02 30.85 
level of initial market penetration .77 .02 34.59 
projected financial returns on our products   .77 .02 34.06 
Job satisfaction: are you satisfied with the kind of work you do in this job (1 not at all satisfied; 7 very satisfied) 
Years of purchasing experience: log of the number years of experience you have in purchasing 
Buyer industry: dummy variables capturing buyers’ industries 
Buyer/Supplier country: dummy variables capturing buyers’ / suppliers’ country 
Buyer size: log of buyers’ sales in RMB amount (in millions) 
Buyer age: log of the number of the buyer's established years 
Relationship age: log of the number of years since the buyer established a relationship with the supplier. 
Frequency of personal contacts: In a typical month, approximately how many phone and face-to-face contacts 
about business issues do you personally have with this supplier’s personnel (e.g., district manager)? 
Supplier compensation: the disruption was financially compensated for by the supplier (1 completely disagree; 7 
completely agree) 
 
a. All factor loadings have p-values < 0.001 
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Table A-2.3: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations and Reliability 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Years of purchasing 
experiencea                   
2. Buyer industry -.12**                  
3. Buyer country .11** -.08*                 
4. Buyer performance .23** -.06 .16**                
5. Buyer sizea .11* .03 .11** .13**               
6. Buyer agea .26** .01 .03 .12** .35**              
7. Supplier country .02 .01 .02 -.09* .02 .02             
8. Supplier dependence .29** -.20** .11** .37** .22** .18** -.01            
9. Relationship agea .38** -.05 .11** .18** .18** .31** -.03 .23**           
10. Frequency of personal 
contactsa .08
* -.00 -.00 .05 .06 .04 .01 .15** .09*          
11. Supplier compensation  .22** -.20** .05 .27** .09* .04 .03 .39** .14** .04         
11. Severity after resolution .17** -.07 -.00 .15** -.01 .12** .04 .18** .06 -.01 .09*        
13. Severity before 
resolution .18
** -.06 .01 .18** .06 .09* .08 .35** .15** .13** .12** .39**       
14. Supply chain risk 
uncertainty .31
** -.15** .04 .23** .12** .14** -.00 .46** .18** .08* .23** .17** .28**      
15. Procedural justice .24** -.14** .11** .32** .09* .11** .08* .41** .21** .04 .32** .21** .20** .31**     
16. Interactional justice .24** -.02 .07 .26** .10* .09* .16** .30** .16** .07 .25** .19** .29** .30
**
* .61
**    
17. Distributive justice .21** -.12** .07 .31** .13** .13** .13** .43** .17** .03 .29** .15** .27** .27** .59** .64**   
18. Buyers’ satisfaction .28** -.18** .14** .30** .08 .12** .14** .47** .25** .01 .27** .18** .25** .39** .65** .54** .59**  
Mean 1.85 29.31 .32 5.02 3.32 2.41 .67 4.46 1.34 2.07 4.65 5.18 4.93 4.54 4.66 5.09 4.84 4.50 
Standard deviation  .64 9.17 1.41 .80 1.31 .54 .68 1.20 .70 .85 1.41 .84 1.01 1.23 1.14 .91 1.05 1.24 
Min. 0.00 1.00 .00 3.00 .59 0.69 .00 1.00 -1.39 .00 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Max. 3.40 72.00 11.00 7.00 7.60 4.13 7.00 6.75 3.40 5.19 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
Composite reliability - - - .84 - - - .92 - - - .92 .88 .84 .92 .80 .91 .94 
Average variance explained  - - - .56 - - - .75 - - - .67 .55 .65 .71 .51 .67 .76 
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Two tailed p-values are reported. 
a. Log transformed. 
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Procedural justice with 
interactional justice 2671.36 (784) 2391.76 (783) 
279.60 
(1) 0.00 
Procedural justice with 
distributive justice 3356.33 (784) 2391.76 (783) 
964.57 
(1) 0.00 
Interactional justice with 




a. p < 0.05 indicates that the unconstrained model has a significantly better fit than the constrained model. 
 
 65 
Table A-2.5: Main Analysis Results (HLM) 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Coefficient Standard Error t-Value Coefficient Standard Error t-Value Coefficient Standard Error t-Value 
Intercept 4.50 .05 91.54*** 4.51 .05 90.67*** 4.50 .05 91.54*** 
Positive Signals          
Procedure Justice (PJ) .39 .06 6.58*** .39 .06 6.58*** .32 .06 5.18*** 
Interactional Justice (IJ) -.06 .08 -.85 -.06 .08 -.85 -.02 .08 -.25 
Distributive Justice (DJ) .23 .06 3.64*** .23 .06 3.64*** .30 .07 4.63*** 
Negative Signal          
Severity before resolution -.08 .08 -1.01 -.08 .08 -1.01 -.09 .08 -1.09 
Signaling Environment          
Supply chain uncertainty  .29 .04 6.75*** .29 .04 6.67*** .29 .04 6.75*** 
Moderations          
Severity X Procedure Justice    -.18 .17 -.99    
Severity X Interactional Justice    -.22 .23 -.96    
Severity X Distributive Justice    .19 .21 .88    
Uncertainty X Procedure Justice       -.15 .04 -3.66*** 
Uncertainty X Interactional 
Justice       .11 .06 1.94
* 
Uncertainty X Distributive Justice       .09 .05 1.90† 
Control Variables          
Manager’s Characteristic          
Years of purchasing experience  .24 .09 2.82** .22 .09 2.44* .24 .09 2.82** 
Buyer’s Characteristics          
Buyer industry -.01 .01 -2.53** -.01 .01 -2.45** -.01 .01 -2.53* 
Buyer country .07 .04 1.94* .07 .04 1.84† .07 .03 1.94* 
Buyer performance .29 .07 4.45*** .31 .07 4.63*** .29 .07 4.45*** 
Buyer size -.00 .04 -.10 .01 .04 .17 -.00 .04 -.10 
Buyer age .06 .10 .59 .06 .10 .57 .06 .10 .59 
Suppliers’ Characteristics          
Supplier country .21 .06 3.41*** .21 .06 3.41*** .21 .06 3.51*** 
Relationship Characteristics          
Supplier dependence .07 .06 1.25 .07 .06 1.25 .06 .06 1.02 
Relationship age .67 .17 4.06*** .67 .17 4.06*** .67 .17 4.12*** 
Frequency of personal contacts -.20 .17 -1.17 -.20 .17 -1.17 -.22 .17 -1.30 
Disruption Event          
Supplier compensation  -.11 .04 -2.84** -.11 .04 -2.84** -.11 .04 -2.93** 
Severity after resolution .03 .06 .42 .03 .06 .42 .04 .06 .64 
-2 log-likelihood 1709.60 1711.00 1706.90 
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p <0.10. Two tailed p-values are reported. 
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Table A-2.6: Supplementary Analysis #1: Curvilinear Effects (HLM) 
 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Predictors Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value 
Intercept 4.63 .06 82.05*** 4.62 .06 82.86*** 4.62 .06 84.51*** 
Positive Signals          
Procedure Justice (PJ)  .39 .06 6.58*** .42 .06 7.06*** .32 .06 5.18*** 
PJ squared -.16 .07 -2.11* -.26 .06 -4.04*** -.34 .07 -5.08*** 
Interactional Justice (IJ) -.06 .08 -.85 -.08 .07 -1.10 -.02 .08 -.25 
IJ squared -.11 .09 -1.17       
Distributive Justice (DJ) .23 .06 3.64*** .26 .06 4.20*** .30 .07 4.63*** 
DJ squared -.09 .08 -1.04       
Negative Signal          
Severity before resolution -.08 .08 -1.01 .09 .09 .91 -.09 .08 -1.09 
Signaling Environment          
Supply chain uncertainty  .25 .04 5.71*** .25 .04 5.71*** .34 .04 6.86*** 
Moderations          
Severity X PJ    -.04 .18 -.24    
Severity X PJ squared    -.20 .06 -3.45***    
Severity X IJ    -.38 .22 -1.69†    
Severity X DJ    .38 .21 1.78†    
Uncertainty X PJ       -.15 .04 -3.66*** 
Uncertainty X PJ squared       -.14 .05 -3.17*** 
Uncertainty X IJ       .11 .06 1.94** 
Uncertainty X DJ       .09 .05 1.90† 
Control Variables          
Manager’s Characteristic          
Years of purchasing experience  .20 .08 2.38* .20 .08 2.38* .20 .08 2.36* 
Buyer’s Characteristics          
Buyer industry -.01 .01 -2.74* -.01 .01 -2.74** -.01 .01 -2.06* 
Buyer country .07 .03 2.01* .07 .03 2.01* .06 .03 1.80† 
Buyer performance .30 .06 4.64*** .30 .06 4.64*** .30 .06 4.69*** 
Buyer size -.00 .04 -.02 -.00 .04 -.02 .00 .04 .08 
Buyer age .09 .10 .87 .09 .10 .87 .07 .10 .72 
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p <0.10. Two-tailed p-values are reported. 
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Table A-2.6 (Cont’d) 
 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Predictors Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value 
Suppliers’ Characteristics          
Supplier country .21 .06 3.41*** .21 .06 3.41*** .21 .06 3.51*** 
Relationship Characteristics          
Supplier dependence .07 .06 1.25 .07 .06 1.25 .06 .06 1.02 
Relationship age .67 .17 4.06*** .67 .17 4.06*** .67 .17 4.12*** 
Frequency of personal contacts -.20 .17 -1.17 -.20 .17 -1.17 -.22 .17 -1.30 
Disruption Event          
Supplier compensation  -.11 .04 -2.84** -.10 .04 -2.58** -.11 .04 -2.93** 
Severity after resolution .03 .06 .42 .02 .06 .31 .04 .06 .64 
-2 log-likelihood 1699.50 1690.90† 1689.30* 
 




Table A-2.7: Supplementary Analysis #2: High Severity versus Low Severitya (HLM) 
 
  High Severity Low Severity 
Predictors Coefficient Standard Error t-Value Coefficient Standard Error t-Value 
Intercept 4.59 .11 43.28*** 4.53 .08 56.81*** 
Positive Signals       
Procedure Justice  .43 .13 3.32*** .32 .09 3.35*** 
Interactional Justice  -.28 .16 -1.72† .12 .11 1.02 
Distributive Justice  .27 .14 2.02* .28 .10 2.77** 
-2 log-likelihood 769.70 1013.60 
Number of observations 253 351 
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p <0.10. Two-tailed p-values are reported. 




Table A-2.8: Supplementary Analysis #2: High Uncertainty versus Low Uncertaintya (HLM) 
 
  High Uncertainty Low Uncertainty 
Predictors Coefficient Standard Error t-Value Coefficient Standard Error t-Value 
Intercept 4.70 .12 37.69*** 4.06 .14 29.57*** 
Positive Signals       
Procedure Justice  .24 .08 3.07** .48 .09 5.13*** 
Interactional Justice  .15 .10 1.52 -.23 .12 -1.87† 
Distributive Justice  .41 .08 4.91*** .15 .10 1.62 
-2 log-likelihood 878.10 824.60 
Number of observations 332 272 
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p <0.10. Two-tailed p-values are reported. 




Table A-2.9: Supplemental Analysis #3: Effects of Justice Actions by Disruption Typea (HLM). 
 
  Model T1 Model T2 Model T3 
Predictors Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Value 
Intercept 4.07 .27 15.31*** 4.49 .07 67.95*** 4.48 .18 25.50*** 
Positive Signals          
Procedure Justice  -.70 .34 -2.04* .65 .08 7.74*** -.02 .32 -.07 
Interactional Justice  .06 .18 .32 -.21 .10 -2.06* .03 .44 .08 
Distributive Justice  1.14 .18 6.17*** .15 .08 1.85† .10 .33 .30 
Negative Signal          
Severity before resolution 1.62 .31 5.15*** -.27 .11 -2.34* -.09 .08 -1.09 
Signaling Environment          
Supply chain uncertainty  .08 .23 .35 .25 .06 4.71*** .12 .14 .87 
-2 log-likelihood 638.10 897.80 208.80 
Number of observations 225 311 68 
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p <0.10. Two-tailed p-values are reported. 
a. Estimates of control variables are omitted. 
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Figure A-2.2: The Curvilinear Effect of Procedural Justice on Buyers’ Satisfaction 
 
    
Note: We do not theorize satisfaction’s effect on continuity, hence the dash-dotted line. Given the empirical evidence 
(e.g., Wang et al., 2014; Hofer, Knemeyer & Dresner, 2009), we expect that satisfaction should positively affect the 
buyers’ decision to continue the focal relationship 
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Figure A-2.4: The Moderating Effect of Severity on the Linear Effect of Distributive 
Justice 
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UNEXPLOITED POWER IN MULTIMARKET BUYER-SUPPLIER 
NEGOTIATIONS: 




Power plays a central role in buyer-supplier exchanges. Yet, most studies have focused on (or 
assumed) a single exchange between a buyer and a supplier while overlooking multimarket buyer-
supplier exchanges—in which a buyer and a supplier handle multiple exchanges across different 
product markets. We recognize that individual exchanges across markets may interfere with one 
another; thus, insights obtained from the single-market exchange may not be extrapolated to the 
multimarket counterpart. Furthermore, while many power studies assume that firms in a powerful 
position can and will wield power against their exchange partners for favorable outcomes—a focus 
on power use, we recognize conditions under which these firms are held back from using power—
hence our focus on power non-use. Our study aims to identify exogenous conditions inherent to 
the multimarket context (e.g., organization, market, resource) and test how these conditions jointly 
shape power non-use. With theoretical insights grounded in resource dependence theory, 
multimarket literature, and organization design literature, we test our conceptual framework in the 
setting of buyer-supplier negotiation. We conduct an economics-based bargaining experiment 
based on a variation of the alternate-offer game. We identify two scenarios leading to power non-
use. Our result has an additional implication for the procurement literature, suggesting that 
centralized procurement (traditionally viewed as a lever in favor of power use) could restrict power 
use depending on the buyer’s versus the supplier’s bargaining positions within and across markets.  
INTRODUCTION 
Power is defined as the ability of a firm to influence its exchange partner’s decisions and 
conduct (Emerson, 1962) as a result of the latter’s dependence on the former (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). As such, power plays a central role in buyer-supplier exchanges. Studies have identified 
sources of power (Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Lusch & Brown, 1982) and have shown that power 
dynamics within a buyer-supplier exchange could affect the parties’ trust of and satisfaction with 
each other, their integrated operations (Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008 Yeung, 2008), and 
ultimately relationship performance (Benton & Maloni, 2005; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Maloni & 
Benton, 2000; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999). Recognizing that how power drives relationship 
performance remains a “black box,” behavioral operations scholars have shifted their focus to 
power-related behaviors and to how firms leverage power advantages to obtain desirable outcomes 
via those behaviors (e.g., Nair, Narasimhan, & Bendoly, 2011 ; Narasimhan, Nair, Griffith, 
Arlbjørn, & Bendoly, 2009). In doing so, scholars have started identifying the underlying 
process—how a firm’s possession of power affects the firm’s performance in a buyer-supplier 
exchange.  
 
Despite these valuable insights into buyer-supplier power-related behaviors, two major areas 
have been largely overlooked. First, while most power studies have focused on or assumed a single 
exchange between the focal buyer and the focal supplier, these firms in many cases have on-going 
exchanges across multiple product markets5 (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010; Shipilov, 
2009; Trautmann, Turkulainen, Hartmann, & Bals, 2009). We term these phenomena as 
                                            
5 Some papers define multimarket as across multiple geographic-product markets (e.g., Reimann et al., 2017). Our paper, 
however, focuses only on product markets to distant our study from global supply chain management and internationalization.  
 
 74 
multimarket buyer-supplier exchanges (c.f. Reimann, Shen, & Kaufmann, 2017b). With the 
implicit assumption of ceteris paribus in other exchanges, current research focusing on (or 
assuming) single exchanges may run the risk of seeing only half the picture. Yet firms’ conduct 
and outcomes within one exchange may interfere with those in others. For instance, a firm may 
use fewer of its influence tactics than it typically would during its exchange with its partner in one 
market, hoping that its partner will return the favor during their exchange in another market. Such 
interdependence has received little scholarly attention.  One notable exception is Reimann et al. 
(2017), who first drew attention to power dynamics in multimarket buyer-supplier exchanges and 
showed that the increasing degree of multimarket contact has a differential impact on how buyers 
versus suppliers use their power. Like most power studies’ findings (Crook et al., 2017), Reimann 
et al.’s (2017) pertained to power use. However, it remains unclear under what conditions firms in 
multimarket exchanges would restrict their exploitation of power—i.e., power non-use. This lack 
of clarify leads us to the second neglected area. 
 
It has been widely conjectured that firms in a powerful position—i.e., less dependent on their 
exchange partners (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)—can and will fully exploit their power to control 
and influence their partner’s decisions (Frazier & Rody, 1991), thus benefitting their organizations, 
plausibly at the expense of their less-powerful partners’ welfare—e.g., fewer profit shares (Benton 
& Maloni, 2005). However, in some scenarios, a firm’s power advantage over its partner does not 
lead to power use (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). In those cases, a powerful firm’s 
exploitative behavior may be held back by exogenous conditions6. More research is called for to 
investigate such conditions leading to power non-use (c.f. Crook et al., 2017).  
 
Addressing these two voids, this study aims to investigate factors driving power non-use 
behaviors in multimarket buyer-supplier exchanges. Specifically, we focus on three exogenous 
factors inherent to the multimarket context. The first factor is exchange diffusion that speaks to 
focal firms’ organizational structure. It refers to the phenomenon that the power of firms can be 
diffused when they lack the bundling and structuring apparatus to leverage power (Crook et al., 
2017). One such apparatus in a multimarket exchange is the decision-making structure of the 
buyer’s procurement and the supplier’s selling. As firms conduct multiple exchanges, their 
decisions about those exchanges can be centralized or decentralized across markets. We study how 
the centralization versus decentralization of firms’ decision-making affects the use of power across 
markets.  
 
The second factor is spheres of influence, which relate to focal firms’ relative influence within 
and across markets. It refers to the extent to which multimarket exchange partners have dominant 
positions in specific markets (Edwards, 1955; Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999). 
Literature studying multimarket competition (i.e., multimarket dynamics in relationships between 
competitors) has identified spheres of influence as one boundary condition impacting how 
aggressively firms behave (Jayachandran et al., 1999). We argue that in multimarket vertical 
exchanges, the buyer’s and the supplier’s spheres of influence across markets can similarly impact 
how aggressively power advantages are exploited.  
 
                                            
6 By exogenous conditions, we mean conditions that are given and thus less controllable by the decision-makers. 
 75 
The third factor is mutual dependence, referring to the relative importance of the resources two 
firms bring to the exchange as well as the availability of other providers of the same or similar 
resources in specific markets (Crook et al., 2017). Some observational studies have suggested that 
mutual dependence—a different concept from dependence asymmetry—leads to collaborative 
behaviors (e.g., Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007). We thus study how mutual 
dependence drives power non-use.  
 
To explicitly assess power-related behaviors and the corresponding outcomes, we situate our 
study in the context of buyer-supplier negotiations. To investigate the three factors’ roles in driving 
power non-use within multimarket buyer-supplier negotiations, we develop hypotheses grounded 
in resource dependence theory, multimarket competition literature, and organization design 
literature. We then test hypotheses via an economics-based experiment anchored in a bargaining 
game (i.e., a variation of the stylized alternate-offer game) (Binmore, Morgan, Snaked, & Sutton, 
1991; Rubinstein, 1982). We find that a powerful firm’s power non-use is collectively shaped by 
levels of exchange diffusion, spheres of influence, and mutual dependence; in some cases, one 
factor’s shaping effect depends on the others’.  
 
Notable implications emerge. First, while studies of buyer-supplier power dynamics have 
mainly focused on (or assumed) exchanges within a single market (c.f. Reimann et al., 2017b), we 
highlight the underexplored multimarket buyer-supplier exchanges. In doing so, we can identify 
critical factors pertaining to this overlooked multimarket context and demonstrate these factors’ 
relevance in shaping buyer-supplier power dynamics. Second, while literature has often assumed 
that powerful firms could and would fully leverage power to influence their partners and benefit 
their own organizations (Hillman et al., 2009), we challenge this assumption by proposing 
conditions in a multimarket context leading to power non-use (Crook et al., 2017). Empirically, 
we illustrate that the three factors collectively result in power non-use and that one factor’s impact 
may depend on other factors. Third, whereas procurement literature has often proposed 
centralization as an important lever to increase buying firms’ bargaining position when sourcing 
from suppliers (Monczka, Handfield, Giunipero, & Patterson, 2015), we demonstrate the opposite 
in our research context—as a buyer negotiates contracts with its supplier across multiple markets, 
centralization may restrict the buyer from fully leveraging its bargaining power if the buyer does 
not possess dominant (or more powerful) positions across all of the markets against the supplier. 
In fact, when the buyer dominates only a subset of the markets, a decentralized structure benefits 
the buyer in terms of leverage. Finally, although bargaining literature has acknowledged that 
individual negotiators often deviate from the optimal (or equilibrium) bargaining outcome (c.f. 
Camerer, 2011; Kagel & Roth, 1995), studies examining such behavioral deviation have mostly 
emphasized personal or interpersonal characteristics, such as fairness concerns (Katok & Pavlov, 
2013), trust (Beer, Ahn, & Leider, 2017), demographic attributes (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), 
and experience (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Nadler, Thompson, & Boven, 2003). Instead, we 
focus on the structural side of contract negotiation by looking beyond single-contract bargaining. 
In doing so, we discover a bargaining situation in which the negotiators face a gain and a loss 
domain simultaneously (i.e., two different contracts) and exhibit deviation from the equilibrium 




THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Power Use in the Form of Negotiation 
Use of power can be manifested in a variety of scenarios (e.g., conflict resolution, price setting, 
etc.), among which contract negotiation is plausibly one of the most common. In negotiations, 
buyers and suppliers leverage power to acquire favorable contractual terms (Cox, 2001) and, more 
importantly, a larger profit share (Cook & Emerson, 1978). Therefore, profit share can be viewed 
as a surrogate for the degree of exploited power in an exchange, multimarket or not. The larger the 
share gained via a contract negotiation, the more the power is exploited. Hence, negotiation 
(sometimes called bargaining in economics and channel literature) serves as an ideal context to 
directly examine power non-use.  
 
Behavioral operations studies have explored negotiation via laboratory experiments (e.g., 
Carter & Stevens, 2007; Eckerd et al., 2013; Ho, Su, & Wu, 2014; Jap, 2007). Yet, most studies 
have either deployed a principal-agent model to uncover a contract design (e.g., Eckerd et al., 2013; 
Ho et al., 2014) or structured buyer-supplier negotiations as auctions (e.g., Carter & Stevens, 2007; 
Jap, 2007) or take-it-leave-it offers (e.g., Katok & Pavlov, 2013). Such designs have thus ignored 
the back-and-forth negotiation that is more prevalent in buyer-supplier interactions (Nagarajan & 
Bassok, 2008). In contrast, we model the buyer-supplier negotiation as a sequential bargaining 
game by extending a stylized alternate-offer model (Binmore et al., 1991; Rubinstein, 1982), in 
which (a) offers, counteroffers, opening offers and negotiation breakdowns can be explicitly 
observed; and (b) causal relationships between exogenous conditions (i.e., exchange diffusion, 
spheres of influence, and mutual dependence) and subsequent power behaviors can be analyzed. 
We further illustrate the details of our game-theory model in a later section. 
Dependence Asymmetry and Value Appropriation 
One core tenet of resource dependence theory is the relation between power and dependence—
a firm’s power is derived through its resource positions and dependencies via other firms (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). As proposed by Emerson (1962), dependence of one firm on another can be 
defined as negatively proportional to the availability of alternatives outside the focal exchange (see 
also Narasimhan et al., 2009). When a buyer/supplier has more alternative suppliers/buyers to 
purchase/sell its products, the buyer/supplier has low dependence on its partner and thus possesses 
bargaining power. Narasimhan et al. (2009), for instance, framed dependence asymmetry as a 
locked-in situation: when a buyer does not have alternative suppliers while its supplier has 
alternative buyers, the buyer is locked into the exchange and has less power. Notably, it is the 
relative power rather than the absolute power that gives a firm a stronger position in relation to its 
partner; thus, power is reflected as two firms’ dependence asymmetry. Adopting this view, we 
define the more profitable alternatives of a firm in comparison to its partner’s as indicating this 
firm’s power advantage over its partner. 
 
Literature has conjected that powerful firms, via exerting control over less powerful partners, 
can request favorable contractual terms and ultimately appropriate more value (e.g., Cox, Watson, 
Lonsdale, & Sanderson, 2004; Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall, & Ambrose, 2013). Hence, value 
appropriation has been often viewed as a consequence of power and dependence asymmetry 
(Crook & Combs, 2007). In the multimarket negotiation setting, suppose one firm has more 
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alternative partners providing similar resources at a reasonable rate while the other firm has few 
alternatives across markets. The former firm can switch easily to alternatives at relatively low costs 
and thus not lose much if the negotiations break down, whereas the latter firm may find switching 
to a substitute costly if the negotiations fail. Therefore, given its power advantage across markets, 
the firm with profitable alternatives is more likely to exploit its power to capture more profits in 
the focal negotiation (Cook & Emerson, 1978). In the focal context, we view appropriating value 
as capturing profits from a multimarket negotiation. We focus on power-advantaged firms’ value 
appropriation. 
Power in Multimarket Buyer-Supplier Exchanges 
Most power studies either have assumed a single exchange within the focal relationship or 
have at least failed to validate that the exchanges occurred in a single product market. In other 
words, prior findings related to power have been based on the assumption (in many cases invalid) 
that the focal exchange is independent from other exchanges and hence the only locus where power 
is used. However, as firms often conduct exchanges across multiple product markets where these 
exchanges can be interdependent (Reimann et al., 2017b), holding such an assumption can lead to 
overlooked but critical factors shaping the firms’ use of power across markets.   
 
First, depending on the degree of centralization in the focal firms’ decision-making structure, 
decisions for a specific exchange may or may not interfere with decisions for the others. In other 
words, whether the decisions across multimarket exchanges are conducted by a centralized 
decision-maker (e.g., a centralized procurement function) or by decentralized decision-makers 
(e.g., procurement functions of individual business units), a firm’s power advantage in specific 
markets may or may not have a spillover effect. Thus, the centralization of a decision-making 
structure needs to be incorporated. Second, a firm that is powerful in one market may not be as 
powerful in another market. Thus, the power position of a firm in one market may not reflect its 
overall position in relation to the exchange partner; nor does the overall power of a firm necessarily 
render it in a strong position in specific markets. Thus, a granular investigation of firms’ positions 
is needed vis-à-vis the exchange partner in individual markets as well as across markets. Third, 
while two firms could be highly dependent on each other and thus perceive each other important 
in one market, they are not necessarily jointly dependent on each other across multiple markets. 
Thus, while scholars have noted the impact of mutual dependence in a single-market context, 
mutual dependence must be gauged across markets for multimarket exchanges. 
 
We present a conceptual framework proposing three factors that are inherent to the multimarket 
context and that drive power non-use in Figure A-3.1. (All the figures and tables are included in 
Appendix 3.).  
Exchange Diffusion and Power Non-Use 
Exchange diffusion refers to the extent to which a firm’s power is diffused if it lacks sufficient 
apparatus to structure and bundle the power appropriately (Crook et al., 2017). A power- 
advantaged firm’s power tends to be underexploited (as a result of dependence asymmetry) when 
exchange diffusion increases.  
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While exchange diffusion may take various forms (Crook et al., 2017), we argue that in a 
multimarket buyer-supplier relationship, the increasing level of decentralization in the firms’ 
decision-making indicates a higher level of exchange diffusion. When a buyer/supplier 
decentralizes procurement/sales at the business-unit level, individual units of the firm negotiate 
contracts with its partner’s respective units (i.e., decisions are made independently across business 
units without coordination). In contrast, when a buyer/supplier centralizes procurement/sales at the 
corporate level, the two firms centralize contract negotiations across business units (i.e., decisions 
are centralized and coordinated at the firm level). 
 
Studies examining group buying or selling phenomena have recognized the concept of 
exchange diffusion in the form of the decision-making structure. For instance, buyers with less 
power may establish a coalition to enhance their position against a powerful supplier (e.g., Anand 
& Aron, 2003; Jing & Xie, 2011). Similarly, less powerful suppliers can forge a coalition to 
negotiate a single contract with a more powerful buyer and divide the contract within their selling 
group (Wu & Choi, 2005). Relatedly, individual business units within a corporation can be 
centralized to aggregate power (Mintzberg, 1973), even for a short period of time (Siggelkow & 
Levinthal, 2003). Although these studies do not speak directly to dyadic buyer-supplier exchanges, 
they provide insights into the decision-making structure’s role in influencing power dynamics.  
 
Because the focal firm (buyer or supplier) gauges its negotiation moves based on its 
dependence on its partner, the significance of exchange diffusion in light of the firm’s behaviors 
relates to the dominance of the firm-level vis-à-vis the business-unit-level dependence asymmetry. 
Under low exchange diffusion, the negotiation decisions are centralized at the firm level; thus, 
focal firms tend to rely more on the firm-level dependence asymmetry to guide their power use. If 
the firm is less dependent on its partner, it will exploit its firm-level power advantage in negotiating 
across multiple business units regardless of the unit-level dependence asymmetry. Under high 
exchange diffusion, individual units make independent decisions; thus, the unit-level dependence 
asymmetry dominates. Because decentralized decision-makers have limited insight into the power 
dynamics at the firm level in relation to the exchange partner, their negotiation behaviors are more 
likely to be guided by the unit-level power (dis)advantage regardless of how the power aggregates 
at the firm level. Overall, for a firm with a power advantage at the firm level, low exchange 
diffusion highlights its firm-level advantage and hides its unit-level disadvantage (if any). On the 
other hand, for a firm with a power disadvantage at the firm level, low exchange diffusion 
accentuates its weakness at the firm level, whereas masking its unit-level advantage (if any). As a 
result, a firm with a power advantage can capture higher profits with low exchange diffusion. In 
comparison, high exchange diffusion dilutes the power position’s impact (advantage or 
disadvantage) at the firm level. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 1. A high/low level of exchange diffusion reduces/increases the value the power-
advantaged firm appropriates from a multimarket negotiation. 
Spheres of Influence and Power Non-Use 
Spheres of influence—the extent to which exchange partners have dominant market positions 
in specific markets—have been recognized as critical market-related factors that confines firms’ 
aggressive behaviors (e.g., Jayachandran et al., 1999; McGrath, Chen, & MacMillan, 1998). 
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Specifically, it has been argued that spheres of influence can limit interfirm rivalry. Suppose Firms 
A and B compete in Markets I and II. If Firm A dominates Market I (compared to Firm B) while 
Firm B dominates Market II (compared to Firm A), both firms tend to treat their dominant market 
as the primary interest. Thus, Firm A limits its competitive actions in Market II in exchange for 
Firm B’s reduced rivalry in Market I. In other words, such an arrangement of spheres of influence 
gives each firm “retaliatory power” (Jayachandran et al., 1999: 57)—if either firm is attacked in 
its own dominant market, it can deploy attacks in the other’s dominant market. 
 
The same logic can be applied to multimarket buyer-supplier relationships. Suppose the buyer 
and the supplier have on-going exchanges spanning Markets I and II and the buyer has more power 
overall than the supplier in the form of less dependence on the supplier. If the buyer has an 
advantaged position in Market I while the supplier has an advantaged position in Market II 
(although across the two markets, the buyer is more powerful), then both the buyer and the supplier 
may be less aggressive in exploiting their advantaged positions in each other’s dominant market 
so that they can avoid retaliatory behaviors in the other market. In other words, less power is 
exploited, and the buyer appropriates less value. We refer to this arrangement as narrow spheres 
of influence because the power-advantaged firm only dominates a subset of markets. In contrast, 
if the buyer has advantaged positions in both Markets I and II, then the buyer does not withhold 
exploiting power because the supplier does not have a strong foothold and, thus, cannot deploy 
retaliation in either market. We refer to this arrangement as broad spheres of influence because the 
powerful firm dominates all markets. The above argument is the same if the supplier is the more 
powerful firm. Overall, for a power-advantaged firm with narrow spheres of influence, its use of 
power is limited because it likes to avoid retaliation from its disadvantaged partner; a power-
advantaged firm with broad spheres of influence can use more power because its disadvantaged 
partner does not possess retaliatory power. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 2. Narrow/broad spheres of influence reduce/increase the value the power-
advantaged firm appropriates from a multimarket negotiation. 
 
Furthermore, high exchange diffusion’s impact on restricting power use is strengthened as 
spheres of influence go from broad to narrow. When a firm has advantages over its partner across 
all markets (i.e., broad spheres of influence), the impact of high exchange diffusion may not be 
substantial because the business units of the advantaged firm can still exploit its power in specific 
markets, even though its unit-level power is less than its firm-level power. At the same time, the 
disadvantaged partner with weaker positions across all markets is little affected by the level of 
exchange diffusion because this partner has little power to exploit at either the unit level or the 
firm level. Therefore, the share that the advantaged firm gains does not change much. In contrast, 
high exchange diffusion’s impact is more salient if the advantaged firm has a strong position in 
some markets but a weak position in the rest. In this case, the advantaged firm’s weaker units 
negotiate less aggressively because the firm gauges its power position based on the unit-level 
rather than the firm-level dependence asymmetry. If this firm has a centralized structure, the 
negotiation for those weaker units can be conducted more aggressively because the firm-level 
power is leveraged. Thus, 
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Hypothesis 3. The negative relationship between high exchange diffusion and the power-
advantaged firm’s value appropriation is stronger/weaker when spheres of influence are 
narrow/broad.  
Mutual Dependence and Power Non-Use 
As Emerson’s (1962) seminal work has suggested (albeit lost in Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the 
concept of dependence between two firms should be viewed in two ways. First is dependence 
asymmetry, the power imbalance between two firms referred to as their power differential. Second 
is mutual dependence between two firms—the sum of their dependencies regardless of their power 
differential. Mutual dependence (also called joint dependence) captures a buyer-supplier dyad’s 
bilateral dependencies (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Research has shown that within a single-
market buyer-supplier exchange, power imbalance and mutual dependence are two distinct 
constructs that empirically produce different results (e.g., Gulati & Sytch, 2007).  
 
As previous observational studies have suggested, two firms with a high degree of mutual 
dependence tend to promote collaborative behaviors and expect the focal exchange’s continuity 
(e.g., Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Although this insight into interfirm 
relationships is based on exchanges within a market, it applies to those relationships with 
multimarket exchanges, except that mutual dependence must be assessed across markets. When 
mutual dependence is high, the power-advantaged firm can be particularly concerned that the 
power-disadvantaged firm may abandon the focal negotiations if it is pressed too hard. Therefore, 
the power-advantaged firm is more likely to avoid exploitative behaviors in contrast to when 
mutual dependence is low. In addition, it has been shown that mutual dependence triggers equity 
concerns (Gulati & Sytch, 2007), i.e., a fair distribution of the collective value created within the 
relationship. Because of the fairness concern, the power-advantaged firm tends to demonstrate 
higher reciprocity and respect during the interaction and exploit less power, thus appropriating less 
value (Cook & Emerson, 1978). Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 4: High/low mutual dependence reduces/increases the value the power-advantaged 
firm appropriates from a multimarket negotiation. 
 
In addition, mutual dependence moderates the effect of exchange diffusion in that high mutual 
dependence further exacerbates the restrictive impact of high exchange diffusion on power use. 
Because the power-advantaged firm has a decentralized structure, its power is diffused across 
individual business units; thus, each unit negotiates with the partner less aggressively. If at the 
same time this firm has high mutual dependence with the partner, the individual units’ use of power 
is further tempered by equity concerns and the desire to demonstrate reciprocity. Therefore, 
exchange diffusion and mutual dependence create double hurdles to prevent the power-advantaged 
firm from fully wielding its power and capturing value. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 5. The negative relationship between high exchange diffusion and the power-
advantaged firm’s value appropriation is stronger/weaker when mutual dependence is 
high/low. 
 81 
An Optional Breakdown Bargaining Model with Random Proposers 
In this section, we present the analytical bargaining model to depict the focal firms’ negotiation 
moves and further manifest concepts—e.g., power advantages, exchange diffusion, spheres of 
influence, and mutual dependence. 
 
Nash’s (Nash, 1950) seminal work laid the foundation for bargaining games; it presented a 
cooperative game structure for bargaining and proposed the classic Nash bargaining solution. If 
basic axioms are satisfied, there is a unique Nash equilibrium that specifies the profit allocation 
between two bargainers. Later behavioral economics studies have noted that individuals’ behaviors 
often deviate from the Nash solution (cf. Kagel & Roth, 1995). Distinct features of this bargaining 
model (and other cooperative bargaining variations) are such that (a) the model by design does not 
specify the details in the negotiation process (e.g., back-and-forth or one-shot, first mover, etc.) 
and (b) emphasizes players’ payoffs as a collective (in some cases called a coalition) as opposed 
to individual payoffs. While these features may be desirable for studying other topics (e.g., value 
creation, see Leider & Lovejoy, 2016; collaboration, see Nagarajan & Bassok, 2008), they are less 
desirable in our case due to both our interest in negotiation moves determining value appropriation 
and our focus on power—a context often filled with competitiveness. 
 
Instead, we use a variation of Rubinstein’s (1982) non-cooperative bargaining game as our 
analytical model. Rubinstein proposed a sequential bargaining model with complete information, 
designating the structure for a negotiation process consisting of offers and counteroffers. The setup 
of the basic Rubinstein’s game is as follows. Two players (a proposer and a receiver) negotiate to 
split a pie (!), the size of which is shrinking by rounds of negotiation at a time discount "7. In the 
first round of a game, the proposer makes a split offer to the receiver, and then the receiver decides 
whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the two players reach an agreement 
while each gets a share according to the proposer’s offer. If the offer is rejected, the game goes to 
the next round, and the receiver makes a counteroffer to the proposer to split the shrunken pie. The 
proposer may either accept or reject this counteroffer. The game continues with an infinite time 
horizon until an agreement is reached. This model is attractive because it (a) resembles the back-
and-forth negotiation process in business practice and (b) has a pure strategy subgame perfect 
equilibrium (SPE).  
 
Subsequent experimental studies have tested the basic Rubinstein model and its various 
extensions (e.g., various manipulations of time discounts and bargaining power, imperfect 
information, etc.)  (see Camerer, 2011; Kagel & Roth, 1995 for detailed reviews). Generally, 
participants anchor their decisions on two different focal points in the game, and the common split 
is within the range of these two focal points (Binmore, Shaked, & Sutton, 1988; Camerer, 2011; 
Zwick & Mak, 2012): (a) the equilibrium as indicated by the model—suggesting that participants 
recognize and exploit their relative bargaining position to a certain degree (Binmore, Swierzbinski, 
& Tomlinson, 2007; Camerer, 2011) and (b) the 50-50 fair split—reflecting participants’ concerns 
with social norms and fairness (Binmore, Swierzbinski, Hsu, & Proulx, 1993; Bolton, 1991; Zwick 
& Mak, 2012). Relatedly, participants do not fully exploit the bargaining power to the model’s 
                                            
7 The time discount can be common or different to the two players—both have been tested empirically. In this paper, the time 
discount is assumed to be common. In a buyer-supplier context, this discounting factor indicates the incurred transaction cost and 
opportunity cost from more rounds of negotiation. 
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prediction, often using only 60-70% (Anbarci & Feltovich, 2013; Fischer, Güth, & Pull, 2007). 
This under-exploitation may be due to participants’ (a) fairness concerns—taking the partners’ 
utility for fairness into one’s own strategic considerations (Camerer, 2011; Kagel & Roth, 1995) 
or (b) lack of capability in conducting backward inductions (Binmore et al., 2007). Note that both 
are endogenous factors influencing power use.  
 
Among these studies, Binmore et al.’s (1991) study proposed an extension of Rubinstein’s 
model—an optional breakdown model with outside options (w) that models relative bargaining 
power (i.e., dependence asymmetry). Its notable feature is that the two players are assigned 
different outside options that they can take if the negotiation breaks down. A player with a larger 
outside option value than its partner is less dependent on its partner and thus has a power advantage. 
This feature resembles Emerson’s (1962) definition of dependence asymmetry. Behavioral 
operations studies have adopted a similar approach in order to model relative power (e.g., 
Narasimhan et al., 2009). In this model, the negotiation procedure is largely the same as in 
Rubinstein’s model, except that the receiver rejecting the offer can either continue with a 
counteroffer in the next round or leave the table (hence the name optional breakdown). In the latter 
case, the negotiation concludes, and the two players take their respective outside options. Binmore 
et al. (1991) found that negotiations generally end with either a breakdown or a split offering the 
receiver her outside option in that particular round.  
 
We extend Binmore et al.’s model (1991) by (a) randomizing who is the proposer (i.e., who 
makes the offer) for each round within a negotiation (see also Binmore et al., 2007) and across 
negotiations and (b) having the players negotiate two contracts in some treatment conditions while 
a single contract in others. The first extension serves two purposes. First,  it reduces the proposer’s 
first-mover advantage—another source of power advantage that may confound with dependence 
asymmetry (Ertogral & Wu, 2001). Second, it makes the game relatively stationary and thus easier 
for backward induction (Binmore et al., 2007). The second extension operationalizes exchange 
diffusion as hypothesized in our framework (Figure A1.1). 
 
Our settings. Suppose Firm B has Business Units $%and $&. Similarly, suppose Firm S has 
Business Units '% and '&. Units $%and $& each have an exchange with Units '% and '& across two 
markets, respectively. Thus, $( must negotiate how to split the surplus of contract i with '( () =
1,2 ). Suppose Contract i has an initial value of !( , and !% = !& = 10/ . Also suppose !( 
depreciates in value by a time discount factor of " (i.e., opportunity cost of taking time to reach a 
deal) so that the surplus of Contract i in Round t (1 = 1,2… ) is !("45%. Each business unit of Firm 
B and S has its own outside option 67(,68(  (i.e., the alternative profits each unit could obtain 
outside the focal exchange). Similar to !(, 67(,68(  depreciates by a time discount factor of " so 
that the outside option in Round t	(1 = 1,2… ) has a value of 67("45%,68("45%. 
 
 $( has a power advantage over '( if 67( > 68( and vice versa; $( and '( have equal power if 
67( = 68(  (e.g., Binmore et al., 1991). Likewise, Firm B has a power advantage over Firm S if 
∑ 67( > ∑ 68((<%,&(<%,&  and vice versa. To ensure that the two sides are incentivized to be involved 
in the focal exchange in the first place, we let !( ≥ 67( + 68(	, ∀= 1,2. Because the contract 
surplus and the outside options depreciate at the same rate, this incentive holds throughout the 
game. Notably, the power-advantaged firm has a broader sphere of influence if both of its business 
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units have a larger outside option than its partner’s respective units; in contrast, the power-
advantaged firm has a narrower sphere of influence if one of its units has a larger outside option 
than its counterpart, whereas the other has a smaller outside option. Furthermore, the differential 
between the contract surplus and the sum of the two sides’ outside options is conceptually 
equivalent to mutual dependence in RDT (Emerson, 1962), i.e. !( − (67( + 68(), ∀= 1,2, as the 
differential reflects the sum of value both sides obtain by staying in the focal exchange. The larger 
the differential, the higher the focal exchange’s mutual dependence is on both sides.  
 
In the setting of a high level of exchange diffusion (i.e., decentralized decisions by individual 
business units), a negotiation between $(	and '(  over Contract i goes through the following 
sequence of events: 
 
1. In Round t (say 1 = 1), Nature determines who is the proposer via a uniform random 
distribution so that $( and '( have an equal chance of being drawn. 
2. The proposer (say $() makes an offer (A7(4,	 A8(4)	to split !("45% in Round t while the 
receiver is waiting (note !("45% ≥ A7(4 + A8(4). 
3. The receiver ('() sees the offer and decides to 
a. accept the offer, i.e., the game ends and $(, '(	get the payoff (A7(4,	 A8(4));  
b. reject and take the outside option, i.e., the game ends and $( , '(  get the payoff 
(67("45%, 68("45%); or 
c. reject and continue negotiating, i.e., the game goes to Round 1 + 1, on which the 
payoffs depend. 
4. If going to Round 1 + 1, the value of the contract and the outside options is reduced to 
!("4,67("4, 68("4.	Repeat steps through 1-3.  
 
The setting of a low level of exchange diffusion has the same game sequence as that of a high 
level—with one exception. Instead of having Units $(	and '(  negotiate over a single contract 
(Contract 1 or 2), Firms B and S negotiate over Contracts 1 and 2 simultaneously. Notably, we 
specify the contract negotiations’ independence, i.e., decisions over one contract will not interfere 
with those over the other. A negotiation between $ and ' over Contracts 1 and 2 unfolds as follows: 
 
1. In Round t (say 1 = 1), Nature determines who is the proposer via a uniform random 
distribution so that $ and ' have an equal chance of being drawn. 
2. The proposer (say $) makes two offers (A7(4,	 A8(4)	() = 1,2)	to split !("45%	() = 1,2)	in 
Round t while the receiver is waiting (note !("45% ≥ A7(4 + A8(4). 
3. The receiver (S) sees the offers and decides to 
a. accept both offers, i.e., the game ends and $, '	get the payoff (A7%4 + A7&4,	 A8%4 +
A8&4);  
b. accept one offer (say Offer 1) and reject the other (say Offer 2) and take its outside 
option, i.e., the game ends and $,  '  get the payoff (A7%4 + 67&"45%, A8%4 +
68&"45%); 
c. reject both offers and take respective outside options, i.e., the game ends and $, 
'	get the payoff (67%"45% + 67&"45%, 68%"45% + 68&"45%);  
d. accept one offer (say Offer 1) while rejecting the other (say Offer 2) and continue 
negotiating the other, i.e., the game goes to Round 1 + 1 (with Contract 2 only) and 
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$,  '	get the payoff from Contract 1 (A7%4,	 A8%4) (the payoff from Contract 2 
depends on Round 1 + 1); 
e. reject both offers while taking one contract’s outside option (say Contract 1) and 
continue negotiating over the other (say Contract 2), i.e., the game goes to Round 
1 + 1  (with Contract 2 only) and $,  '	 get the payoff from Contract 1 
(67%"45%, 68%"45%) (the payoff from Contract 2 depends on Round 1 + 1); or 
f. reject both offers and continue negotiating over both contracts, i.e., the game goes 
to Round 1 + 1 (with both contracts) (the payoffs from both contracts depend on 
Round 1 + 1). 
4. If going to Round 1 + 1 (only for the contract(s) that is/are chosen to be continued), the 
value of Contract i and outside options is reduced to !("4, 67("4, 68("4.	Repeat steps 
through 1-3. 
 
Mathematically, levels of exchange diffusion should not alter the firms’ behaviors as a result 
of the contracts’ independence. Empirically, however, the decision-makers may change their 
behaviors as their locus of perceived power shifts from the unit-level to the firm-level outside 
options, as hypothesized. All the above information is common knowledge. For this sequential 
game with complete information, an optimal (i.e., Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium) strategy for 
the negotiation is that (a) the negotiation ends in the first round (cf. Binmore et al., 1989) and (b) 
Firms B and S get the split as specified by SPE (details in Appendix 4). 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Setup  
The negotiation experiment’s structure was presented in the previous section. Randomly paired 
players (representing two firms) negotiated to split the contracts’ profit. The initial value of the 
contracts’ profit and the outside options—depreciating by each additional round—was common 
knowledge to both players. Notably, we were not interested in how various levels of dependence 
asymmetry impact value appropriation. Instead, our goal was to study—given a certain level of 
dependence asymmetry between the two firms—how the three exogenous factors lead to under-
used power and thus under-appropriated value. Therefore, in the experiment, Firm B was 
designated to always have a larger number of outside options across the two contracts as compared 
to Firm S, i.e., (67% + 67&) − (68% + 68&) = 7K ECU (experimental credit units). This level of 
dependence asymmetry was fixed across all conditions.  
Treatment and Session Design 
Three treatments, each with two levels, were administered between subjects: exchange 
diffusion (ED), spheres of influence (SI), and mutual dependence (MD). The ED treatment was 
operationalized by manipulating two firms’ negotiation structures. When ED was low, pairs of 
players represented centralized decision-makers for each firm and negotiated over two contracts 
simultaneously; hence, each buyer-supplier dyad had one pair of players. When ED was high, pairs 
of players represented decentralized decision-makers for each firm and negotiated over a single 
contract; hence, each dyad had two pairs of players. The SI treatment was operationalized as the 
number of contracts for which Firm B had a larger outside option than Firm S. When SI was narrow, 
Firm B had the power advantage over Contract 1 but a disadvantage over Contract 2. When SI was 
 85 
broad, Firm B had advantages over both contracts. The MD treatment was operationalized as the 
differential between the contracts’ initial profits and the initial value of the two firms’ outside 
options. When MD was low, ∑ !( − (67( + 68()(<%,& = 7/	DEF ; when MD was high, 
∑ !( − (67( + 68()(<%,& = 11/	DEF.  
 
Table A1.1 shows the permutations of outside options for the two firms across Contracts 1 and 
2 (67%, 68%,67&, 68&) under levels of MD and SI. Table A-3.2 presents the equilibrium split (i.e., 
normative benchmark) of contracts for each treatment condition. Using our pilot, we calibrated the 
outside options’ permutations with two goals: (a) to ensure sufficient effect sizes—distinguishable 
negotiation outcomes—across treatments, and (b) to keep the normative benchmark across 
conditions close to one another so that theoretically the appropriated value across conditions would 
converge.  
 
We randomly assigned treatments to sessions. Table A-3.3 illustrates treatment details across 
sessions. Notably, we did not have a full factorial design as we were not interested in the interaction 
between SI and MD. Thirteen sessions8 were conducted in a behavioral economics laboratory in 
cohorts of 12 to 16 players. Each session lasted 60~90 minutes during which participants played 
4~6 repeated bargaining games (with one additional trial game) (see details in Table A-3.3). We 
had 420 contract observations (i.e., unit-level negotiations) and thus sufficient power to test 
treatment effects. Note that during sessions with a low level of ED, the second-half session (Games 
3 and 4) had the same structure as the first-half (Games 1 and 2), except that the initial values of 
the contracts’ profits and the firms’ outside options were scaled down by half. This design 
addressed endowment effects (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) by equating the low-ED 
group’s expected payoffs (earnings from two contracts) to the high-ED group’s (earnings from one 
contract).  
 
To ensure that our sample behaved similarly to those of previous studies and that our 
experiment procedure worked well, we ran a replication session (i.e., Session 8) with equal power 
(i.e., outside options) between the two firms. 
  
Participants and Procedures 
Participants. We had a total of 176 participants. We randomly assigned our 176 participants 
to treatment sessions; each participated in only one treatment session. All treatment sessions were 
conducted in a behavioral economics laboratory at a large public research institution. Our 
participants were undergraduate and graduate students from a range of majors (mostly business 
and engineering). We recruited the participants through SONA, an online recruiting system, with 
cash as the only incentive to participate. 
 
Procedures. Upon arrival, participants were randomly seated at desks with a privacy screen 
and randomly paired anonymously. No verbal communication was allowed once the session started. 
The pairings were randomly reassigned at the beginning of each new game so that every participant 
was paired with a different partner across games (i.e., stranger matching). Out of a pair of 
                                            
8 We had 12 regular sessions to test treatment effects and an additional session (in which two firms were assigned equal outside 
options) for a validity check.  
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participants at the beginning of a new game, one was randomly assigned as the power-advantaged 
firm (larger outside option(s)) and the other as the disadvantaged firm (smaller outside option(s)); 
this assignment remained throughout the game. Furthermore, each participant’s role as either a 
proposer or a receiver was randomly assigned at the beginning of each round within a game and 
across games to ensure that all participants theoretically had an equal chance of being a proposer 
or a receiver. Details regarding the random assignment of pairings, outside options, and roles were 
explained before the games. Participants were not told the number of games they would play, thus 
alleviating end-of-game effects. The experiment interface was programmed via zTree (Fischbacher, 
2007). 
 
At the beginning of each session, a questionnaire was administered to measure participants’ (a) 
risk preference (Andreoni, Kuhn, & Sprenger, 2015) and (b) cognitive abilities (Frederick, 2005; 
Narayanan & Moritz, 2015). A written copy of the instructions was read aloud to the participants 
(see Appendix 5 for an example instruction). Next, a series of repeated bargaining games, 
including one trial, was administered. Participants were shown their and their partner’s earnings 
at the end of each game. A second questionnaire was administered toward the end of the sessions 
to capture the participants’ (a) demographic information (years in college, GPA, major, and 
gender); (b) experience (negotiation experience, experiment experience, working experience); (c) 
perceived outcome fairness throughout negotiation games; (d) perceived competitiveness of their 
negotiation behaviors; and (e) perceived fair splits of Contracts 1 and 2. At the end of each session, 
participants’ cash earnings were calculated by multiplying their earnings from all games by a 
predetermined exchange rate (known to participants) and adding that amount to a $6 (USD) 
participation fee. All payouts were privately made in cash. 
 
DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Data Preparation 
Our experimental design led to a slightly different data structure across groups of low and high 
levels of ED. When ED was administered at the low level, we directly observed negotiation data 
at both unit- and firm-level as each pair of players negotiated two contracts across units in any 
game. When ED was high, we directly observed only unit-level data as each pair negotiated a 
single contract in any game. Therefore, to create firm-level data for the high-ED group, we 
manually paired unit-level data from Games 1 through 3 (Contract 1) with unit-level data from 
Games 4 through 6 (Contract 2) via a randomly assigned group ID at the beginning of each game. 
For instance, if Players 1 and 2 were assigned to Group 5 in Game 1 while Players 3 and 8 were 
assigned to Group 5 in Game 4, we viewed these two pairs’ data as unit-level data for the same 
pair of firms. Participants were unaware of this assignment in order to mimic the reality that 
business units make independent decisions without knowing other units’ choices within a 
decentralized structure. In doing so, we obtained data at the business-unit and the firm levels for 
all treatment conditions.  
 
Consistent with our theorizing, the outcome variable—value appropriation—was indicated by 
the firms’ captured profits via negotiations. Specifically, this variable was calculated as a firm’s 
total profit captured from the two contracts over the contracts’ total initial value.  
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We also included two sets of controls that could influence negotiation dynamics. The first set 
pertained to the experiment structure. First, due to the nature of repeated games, period (a ordinally 
coded variable) was included to control for learning and fatigue effects (e.g., Beer et al., 2017). 
Second, we included a dummy variable, proposer in the first round, indicating if the focal player 
was the proposer (coded as 1) or the receiver (coded as 2). Players who made the first proposal 
might have perceived a first-mover advantage and thus behaved more aggressively. Furthermore, 
theoretically (based on the normative prediction in Table A-3.2), proposers in the first round had 
an additional advantage in their bargaining position. This advantage would be another source of 
power potentially confounding with our manipulation of power advantage; thus, it needed to be 
controlled for.  
 
The second set related to subjects. First, technically addressing the bargaining game requires 
backward reduction; thus, we controlled for the subjects’ cognitive capability (Narayanan & 
Moritz, 2015) and GPA. The former variable, measured via the Cognitive Reflection Test, 
controlled for the subjects’ tendency to allow abstract, analytical, and structured problem-solving 
processes to monitor, override, or endorse an intuitive, immediately available answer (Frederick, 
2005). The latter variable was an indicator of the subjects’ intelligence. Second, bargaining 
literature has indicated that the subjects’ competitiveness improves the negotiation outcome; 
therefore, we controlled for perceived competitiveness (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). Likewise, 
one’s perception of fairness may affect aggressiveness in negotiation tactics (Leider & Lovejoy, 
2016). We included perceived fairness to capture the degree of equity perceived during 
negotiations. Third, subjects may present an other-regarding preference (Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2000)—i.e., they care about others’ welfare in addition to their own. In this case, subjects may 
underexploit their power as a result of their preference for a more evenly distributed split. We 
asked participants to identify the perceived fair amount that their partners should receive from the 
contracts and used their responses as the control for other-regarding preference. Finally, more 
experienced subjects can be more skillful in negotiation. Thus, we included negotiation experience 
and working experience as additional controls. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
We first assessed the difference between the captured profits of power-advantaged firms and 
those of power-disadvantaged firms via a dependent sample-paired t-test. The results show that 
power-advantaged firms on average captured more profits than power-disadvantaged firms (t = 
2.58, p < .001), thus indicating that players recognized and used their power to benefit their 
organizations.   
Model Specification and Main Results 
Model specification. Because our hypotheses focus on power-advantaged firms’ value 
appropriation, we used the observations of power-advantaged firms as our analytical sample (N = 
278). With the repeated game data structure, we adopted a mixed-effect model specification. Our 
outcome variable was value appropriation (captured total profit in a percentage). To test 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4—the main effects of three treatment variables (ED, SI, MD), fixed effects 
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included three treatments: period, proposer in the first round, and a set of subject controls9. We 
then included a subject random effect to account for individual heterogeneity. To test Hypotheses 
3 and 5, we also included the interaction of SI and ED and the interaction of MD and ED, 
respectively.  
 
Results. Table A-3.4 presents the main and interaction results. Among the three main effects 
(Table A-3.4, Model 1), surprisingly high ED (B = 2.25, p < .05) on average increases power-
advantaged firms’ value appropriation; this result is counter to the prediction, thus not supporting 
H1. As predicted, High MD reduces value appropriation, supporting H4 (B = -3.02, p < .01).  SI 
has a null effect on the outcome variable, thus not supporting H2 (B = .01).  
 
Among the two interaction effects (Table A-3.4, Model 2), narrow SI positively moderates the 
relationship between ED and value appropriation (B = 3.69, p < .05), supporting H3. Yet, due to 
exchange diffusion’s positive main effect, the interaction presents an interesting pattern. As Figure 
A-3.2 illustrates, the positive relationship between ED and the power- advantaged firms’ value 
appropriation is amplified under narrow SI than under broad SI. The interaction between MD and 
ED is positive, albeit nonsignificant (B = 3.27). Thus, H5 is not supported.  
Supplemental Analysis and Results 
A detailed look at interactions. To get a granular understanding of the interaction between ED 
and SI, we split the sample into two groups (narrow and broad SI) and tested exchange diffusion’s 
main effects. Table A-3.5 shows the results. For the group of broad SI, ED has a null effect on 
value appropriation (Model 3a: B = 0.96); in contrast, for the group of narrow SI, high ED 
increases value appropriation (Model 3b: B = 7.21, p < .001).  
 
Value appropriation deviated from the normative benchmark. Normative predictions indicate 
the amount of power a firm should exploit under the assumption of rational, profit-maximizing 
decision-makers. Thus, by assessing how much observed value appropriation deviated from 
normative predictions, we evaluated the behavioral bias in exploiting one’s power. Specifically, 
we calculated deviated value appropriation as the difference between observed total profits and 
the normative benchmark, divided by the normative benchmark (in percentage). We also evaluated 
the mean of deviated value appropriation for power-advantaged firms (M = -.09, t = -11.59, p 
< .001) and power-disadvantaged firms (M = -.04, t = -2.54, p < .05). The result suggests that firms, 
regardless of their power positions and the three treatments’ potential impact, tend to underexploit 
their power compared to the normative benchmark. This pattern is consistent with previous 
behavioral economics studies (c.f. Binmore et al., 2007; Camerer, 2011). 
 
Next, we ran analyses with deviated value appropriation as the outcome variable and treatment 
factors (i.e., main effects and interaction effects) as predictors, along with the same controls as 
main models. In doing so, we evaluated the behavioral bias in using power, as accounted for by 
the three treatments. Table A-3.6 summarizes the results. Among the three main effects (Model 4), 
narrow SI restricts power use and leads to even lower captured profits deviating from the normative 
benchmark (B = -4.58, p < .01); in contrast, ED and MD have null effects. As for the interaction 
                                            
9 Each firm observation had two negotiated contracts. Thus, we averaged the scores of subject-specific controls across the 
subjects who participated in each of the two negotiations 
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effects (Model 5), narrow SI positively moderates the relationship between ED and deviated value 
appropriation (B = 9.54, p < .05). Figure A-3.3 illustrates that with low ED and narrow SI, captured 
profit is significantly lower than the benchmark and much lower than the other three cells. 
Robustness Checks 
Subsample of negotiations with closure. Our sample contained negotiations with both closure 
(agreement reached) and breakdowns (agreement not reached) (see other papers distinguishing the 
two cases, Leider & Lovejoy, 2016). Although both cases could occur, closure would yield a more 
efficient outcome for the dyad than a breakdown because the maximum collective value to be 
captured would equal the two contracts’ total value (20K ECU) in the former case but would equal 
the number of outside options (strictly less than 20K ECU) in the latter case.  
 
We wanted to explore how the three treatment factors jointly affect value appropriation for 
negotiations only resulting in an efficient outcome. Therefore, we reran the same model 
specification as in our main analysis, using the subsample of negotiations with closure (N = 205). 
Table A-3.7 presents the results. The main effects reveal a pattern similar to our main analysis. 
High MD increases value appropriation (Model 6: B = 2.16, p < .05). Yet, high MD’s negative 
effect is only partially significant (Model 6: B = 2.27, p = .09). SI still has a null effect. The 
interaction effects also exhibit a similar, albeit slightly stronger, pattern. Narrow SI strengthens 
ED’s impact on value appropriation (Model 7: B = .5.47, p < .01). More interestingly, high MD 
also significantly strengthens ED’s impact (Model 7: B = 4.89, p < .05).  
 
Alternative model specification. As an alternative to the mixed-effect model, we used the 
specification of pooled ordinary linear squares (pooled OLS) to test our hypotheses. In the pooled 
OLS model, we included the deviated appropriation as the outcome variable as well as the three 
treatments and the same set of controls as predictors. We estimated the model with the clustered 
standard error structure (clustered by subjects). This model specification imposed fewer restrictive 
assumptions than the mixed-effect specification, albeit producing less efficient estimates 
(Wooldridge, 2010). Results were highly consistent with our main mixed-effect specification.  
 
Omitted subject characteristics. If omitted, other subject characteristics may bias the results. 
One of those characteristics is risk preference. Because our negotiation structure involved decision 
uncertainty, a subject that is highly risk averse may resort to a suboptimal outcome (Davis & 
Hyndman, 2018). We controlled for risk preference and had consistent results. Another 
characteristic is gender. We added a dummy variable of gender to the model and had the same 
results. Third, participants with experience in a similar economics-based experiment might better 
understand the game structure and infer the equilibrium outcome. We included a dummy variable 
indicating relevant experiment experience and found similar results. Finally, undergraduate and 
graduate students might behave differently due to their training level. Thus, we included years in 




While buyers and suppliers often manage multiple exchanges with each other across markets, 
such a multimarket phenomenon has received little scholarly attention (c.f. Reimann et al., 2017b). 
Yet, individual exchanges across markets can be interdependent. Thus, previous research, while 
studying the focal single exchange, may incorrectly assume ceteris paribus in other exchanges. 
Addressing this void in the research, our study focused on power dynamics—a critical element in 
buyer-supplier exchanges—in a multimarket setting. Drawing attention to multimarket buyer-
supplier exchanges, Reimann et al. (2017b) studied how varying degrees of multimarket contact 
in a buyer-supplier relationship affected power-related tactics across buyers and suppliers. While 
that study was insightful, factors specific to the multimarket context potentially influencing power 
dynamics remain unknown. Hence, our study, while holding the degree of multimarket contact 
constant, identifies such factors—exchange diffusion, spheres of influence, and mutual 
dependence—and demonstrates these factors’ joint effect on power-related behaviors. In doing so, 
we provide insights into multimarket buyer-supplier exchanges that cannot be offered by studies 
on single exchanges.  
 
Second, while studies using resource dependence theory (RDT) have often assumed that 
powerful firms could and would fully leverage power (derived from resource dependence) to 
influence their partners and benefit their own organizations (Hillman et al., 2009), empirical 
evidence has suggested otherwise (e.g., Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Thus, RDT has been criticized for 
its lack of boundary conditions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hillman et al., 2009), and there has 
been a call for research on conditions leading to power non-use (Crook et al., 2017). So far studies 
have explored endogenous conditions controlled by the focal firms—when firms withhold using 
power—such as reciprocity (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009) and fairness concerns (Narasimhan et al., 
2009). Yet, little attention has been given to the exogenous conditions (e.g., decision-making 
structure, alternatives in the markets) under which firms are held back from using power. 
Answering the call, our study proposes three such conditions and identifies two scenarios leading 
to power non-use.  
In one scenario, the two focal firms are mutually dependent on each other. Consistent with 
observational study (Gulati & Sytch, 2007), buyers and suppliers with mutual dependence may 
engage in more cooperative behaviors. Aggressive behaviors are restricted because the partner 
would likely retaliate against such behaviors, knowing that both parties are locked into the focal 
relationship (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005); hence, if aggressive behaviors are exhibited, both 
parties face a less profitable situation. In fact, as our post-hoc result suggests, the observed 
cooperative behaviors are driven by profit-maximizing rationality. Decision-makers facing high 
mutual dependence realize that their welfare will be hampered by aggressive behaviors and thus 
strategically opt for cooperation to avoid retaliation.  
 
In the other scenario, the powerful firm does not dominate all the exchanges across the markets 
while managing those exchanges in a centralized manner. In this case, the powerful firm exhibits 
a strong downward bias in estimating its overall power, therefore under-capturing close to 45% of 
the profits that should be appropriated. Insights from the prospect theory may serve as a plausible 
explanation: individual decision-makers tend to place more weight on losses than on gains 
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(Holmes Jr, Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As 
power-advantaged firms have a centralized decision-making structure, their decision-makers face 
both contract decisions: one contract indicating dominance (gain domain) and the other indicating 
lack of dominance (loss domain). These decision-makers may then attribute more weight to the 
loss-domain contract than to the gain-domain contract in appraising the aggregated power; hence, 
such appraisal bias restricts the use of power use. Managers facing multimarket exchanges may 
need to look beyond their own organization and markets while further understanding their partners’ 
organizations (i.e., whether partner firms make decisions in a centralized or decentralized structure) 
and markets (i.e., partner firms’ bargaining position in relation to their organization within a 
market and across markets).   
 
Related to the aforementioned finding regarding centralization, we also contribute to the 
procurement literature and practice. Studies have often proposed centralization as an important 
lever to increase buying firms’ bargaining position when sourcing from suppliers (Crook et al., 
2017); similarly, companies moving towards centralized procurement often hope to increase 
leverage via transformation (Monczka et al., 2015). Yet, our study reveals an opposite finding: as 
buyers negotiate contracts with suppliers across multiple markets, centralization may restrict 
buyers from fully leveraging their bargaining power if they do not possess dominant positions 
against suppliers across all markets. In contrast, a decentralized structure is more beneficial in this 
case—buyers are better off separating the negotiations occurring in their dominant markets from 
those in the markets without dominance. Although the decision-making structure may not be easily 
changed, at least centralized buyers can be more strategic in choosing what cards to show during 
the negotiation as opposed to putting all their cards on the table.  
 
Finally, bargaining studies have emphasized the often-observed behavioral deviation from the 
optimal (or equilibrium) bargaining outcome (Camerer, 2011; Kagel & Roth, 1995), and 
behavioral studies have examined conditions causing deviation. However, most of those studies 
have focused on (inter)personal factors such as equity concerns (Katok & Pavlov, 2013), trust 
(Beer et al., 2017), demographic attributes (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), and experience 
(Lumineau & Henderson, 2012; Nadler et al., 2003 2003). Instead, our study investigated the 
structural side of contract negotiation that may create behavioral deviation by looking beyond 
single-contract bargaining. With a two-contract design, we discovered a bargaining situation in 
which the negotiators face gain and loss domains simultaneously and observed 10% more 
deviation from the equilibrium (in addition to the deviation accounted for by personal 
characteristics such as fairness and competitiveness). In contrast, when the negotiators only face 
gain domains across the two contracts (albeit different levels in gain), no additional behavioral 
deviation was observed.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The aforementioned insights need to be considered in juxtaposition with our study’s limitations. 
First, our study relied on a student sample, with the goal of focusing on the economic, profit-
maximizing behaviors while avoiding unnecessary contextually confounding variables (e.g., 
participants’ prior negotiation experience, organization policy, and culture). Yet, we recognize  
such factors’ important role in influencing the negotiation conduct in practice. Therefore, future 
research can use samples of managers to understand the pertinent role of such factors as experience, 
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organizational culture, etc. Likewise, to keep the design simple, we disregarded other contingency 
factors such as product characteristics (e.g., customization, risk, etc.) and relationship attributes 
(e.g., relationship history, trust, etc.). Research can also incorporate such factors and test their 
impact. Second, our study used the perspective of resource dependence theory to study key 
constructs. However, we realize that power and mutual dependence can be operationalized in 
alternative ways. For instance, power can be manifested in coercive versus noncoercive strategies 
(Benton & Maloni, 2005; Frazier & Rody, 1991). Mutual dependence can be indicated by the 
criticality of the exchanged product (Gulati & Sytch, 2007) or the relationship-specific investment 
(Nair et al., 2011). Future studies can investigate those alternative ways of operationalization and 
test whether our results hold. Third, our study held the degree of multimarket contact constant 
(exchanges in two markets). Yet in practice, companies often have more multimarket contacts. It 
would be interesting to study whether and how our key constructs’ impact varies depending on the 
degree of multimarket contact. Finally, our design assumed symmetricity in exchange diffusion 
across buyers and suppliers; in practice, two sides may have different levels of exchange diffusion 
(centralized vis-à-vis decentralized). Future studies could examine how focal firms behave 








APPENDIX 3: TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table A-3.1: Parameter Table for Outside Optionsa 
   
MD = Low MD = High 
SI=Broad 67% = 7000, 	68% = 1500 
67& = 3000,68& = 1500 
67% = 7000, 	68% = 500 
67& = 1000,68& = 500 
SI=Narrow 67% = 8500, 	68% = 0 
67& = 1500,68& = 3000 
67% = 7500, 	68% = 0 
67& = 500,68& = 1000 
 





Table A-3.2: Session Detailsa  
 
 
First Halfb Second Halfb # of 
subjects  
Equilibriumd 
Contract 1 Contract 2 Total 
Session 
7, 12 
ED = Low 
MD = High  
SI = Broad 
ED = Low 
MD = High  






6() c  












ED = Low 
MD = Low 
SI = Broad  
ED = Low 
MD = Low 




















ED = Low 
MD = High 
SI = Narrow 
ED = Low 
MD = High 






6() c  











ED = High 
MD = High (contract 1) 
SI = Broad 
ED = High 
MD = High (contract 2) 
SI = Broad  
 












ED = High 
MD = Low (contract 1) 
SI = Broad 
ED = High 
MD = Low (contract 2) 
SI = Broad   












ED = High 
MD = High (contract 1) 
SI = Narrow 
ED = High 
MD = High (contract 2) 
SI = Narrow  
 











ED = High 
67% = 68% = 4700 
Equal outside options  
ED = High 
67& = 68& = 1000 
Equal outside options  












a. ED: exchange diffusion. MD: mutual dependence. SI: spheres of influence of the power-advantaged firm. 
b. For sessions with low level of ED, first (second) half of the session contains 2 games; for sessions with high level of ED, first 
(second) half contains 3 games. 
c. During the second half of low-ED sessions, the initial value of both contracts and outside options are scaled down by half. 
d. Under this column, we show equilibrium split for each contract in the form of (Firm B’s share, Firm S’s share). There are two 
set of splits for each row: the first split represents the equilibrium when Firm B is the proposer; the second split represents the 
equilibrium when Firm S is the proposer. Theoretically, two firms should reach agreement on the equilibrium split in the first 
Round (when the size of contract is the largest). For games during the second half of low-ED sessions, the equilibrium split is half 
in size of those shown in the table.  
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Table A-3.3: Summary of Treatment Manipulationa 
  
 ED = Low  ED = High  
SI = Broad MD = High (session 7,12)  
 
MD = High (session 5,11) 
   
MD = Low (session 1,6) 
   
MD = Low (session 2,3) 
 
SI = Narrow MD = High (session 4,10) 
   
MD = High (session 9,13) 
 
 
a. ED: exchange diffusion. MD: mutual dependence. SI: spheres of influence of the power-advantaged firm.  














DV = Power Advantaged Firms’ Value 
Appropriation (In Percentage) 
Model 1 Model 2 




Intercept  28.45*** 8.59 27.33*** 4.43 
Treatments      
Exchange diffusion (low as baseline) H1 (-) 2.25* .87 5.63*** 1.41 
Spheres of influence (broad as baseline) H2 (-) .01 .99 1.76 1.38 
Mutual dependence (low as baseline) H4 (-) -3.86*** 1.02 -1.41 1.24 
Moderations      
Exchange diffusion X Spheres of influence H3 (+)   3.69* 1.77 
Exchange diffusion X Mutual dependence H5 (+)   3.27 1.63 
Controls      
Period  .04 .49 .10 .45 
Proposer in the first round (dummy)  -2.53** .86 -2.47** .84 
Subject controls      
Cognitive ability (avg.)  .74 .42 .60 .36 
Negotiation experience (avg.)  -2.89* 1.18 -2.96* .96 
Working experience (avg.)  .07 .05 0.10* .04 
GPA (avg.)  1.94 1.00 1.70 1.03 
Perceived competitiveness (avg.)  .87* .32 1.09 ** .31 
Perceived distributive fairness (avg.)  1.22*** .32 1.16** .32 
Other-regarding preference (avg.)  -6.58 3.58 -4.69 2.88 
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood)  1810.20 1791.20 
Number of observations  278 278 
Number of subjects  142 142 
 
Note: The sample included observations of power-advantaged firms. Dummies for majors were also included in models, but the 
coefficient estimates were not reported for simplicity. All controls were averaged scores across subjects participating in the two 
contract negotiations. 


















Intercept 46.05*** 5.69 -.31.57** 9.18 
Treatments     
Exchange diffusion (low as baseline) 0.96 0.97 7.21*** 1.74 
Mutual dependence (low as baseline) -3.71*** 0.97 - - 
Controls     
Period -.22 .63 .05 .63 
Proposer in the first round (dummy) -2.47* 1.04 -2.51 1.51 
Subject controls      
Cognitive ability (avg.) .82* .42 -0.25 .79 
Negotiation experience (avg.) -2.30 1.05 -1.81 1.48 
Working experience (avg.) .06 .08 .08 .05 
GPA (avg.) 2.42 1.42 1.21 1.67 
Perceived competitiveness (avg.) .92* .42 1.33* .65 
Perceived distributive fairness (avg.) 1.25* .56 .61 .61 
Other-regarding preference (avg.) -10.18* 5.16 -8.40 4.94 
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood) 1213.40 542.10 
Number of observations 186 92 
Number of subjects 93 49 
 
Note: The sample included observations of power-advantaged firms. Dummies for majors were also included in models, but the 
coefficient estimates were not reported for simplicity. All controls were averaged scores across subjects participating in the two 
contract negotiations. 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Two tailed p-values are reported. 
a. Due to the fractional factorial design, we do not have variation in the MD treatment in Narrow-SI group. Hence, there are no 









DV = Power Advantaged Firms’ Value Appropriation 
Deviated from Equilibrium (In Percentage) 
Model 4 Model 5 
Predictors Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept -70.06*** 13.83 -71.21*** 7.19 
Treatments     
Exchange diffusion (low as baseline) 2.38 1.53 9.43*** 2.17 
Spheres of influence (broad as baseline) -4.58** 1.76 0.20 2.29 
Mutual dependence (low as baseline) -0.48 1.81 1.19 2.12 
Moderations     
Exchange diffusion X Spheres of influence   9.54* 2.98 
Exchange diffusion X Mutual dependence   1.76 2.92 
Controls     
Period -0.05 .76 -.06 .72 
Proposer in the first round (dummy) 6.73*** 1.37 6.86*** 1.36 
Subject controls     
Cognitive ability (avg.) 1.32 .75 1.14 .62 
Negotiation experience (avg.) -4.40* 2.06 -4.11** 1.49 
Working experience (avg.) .10 .09 0.13* .06 
GPA (avg.) 3.42* 1.74 2.99 1.72 
Perceived competitiveness (avg.) 1.21* .55 1.55* .53 
Perceived distributive fairness (avg.) 2.05*** .57 2.01*** .56 
Other-regarding preference (avg.) -11.26 6.14 -10.84* 5.06 
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood) 2053.50 2033.30 
Number of observations 278 278 
Number of subjects 142 142 
 
Note: The sample included observations of power-advantaged firms. Dummies for majors were also included in models, but the 
coefficient estimates were not reported for simplicity. All controls were averaged scores across subjects participating in the two 
contract negotiations. 





Table A-3.7: Effects of Treatments on Power-Advantaged Firms’ Value Appropriation: 




DV = Power Advantaged Firms’ Value Appropriation (In 
Percentage)  
(subsample) 
Model 6 Model 7 
Predictors Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept 65.07*** 5.30 61.84*** 4.90 
Treatments     
Exchange diffusion (low as baseline) 2.16* 1.00 7.03*** 1.55 
Spheres of influence (broad as baseline) -0.22 1.05 2.96 1.56 
Mutual dependence (low as baseline) 2.29 1.27 1.31 1.97 
Moderations     
Exchange diffusion X Spheres of influence   5.47** 2.05 
Exchange diffusion X Mutual dependence   4.89* 2.37 
Controls     
Period .20 .52 .17 .50 
Proposer in the first round (dummy) -3.00** 0.93 -2.58** 0.87 
Subject controls     
Cognitive ability (avg.) .61 .46 .42 .43 
Negotiation experience (avg.) -2.90 1.40 -2.32 1.21 
Working experience (avg.) .03 .04 .05 .04 
GPA (avg.) 1.33 1.35 1.17 1.26 
Perceived competitiveness (avg.) 0.95* .37 1.17** .38 
Perceived distributive fairness (avg.) 1.06*** .35 0.96** .36 
Other-regarding preference (avg.) -12.90* 4.23 -13.12** 4.55 
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood) 1316.80 1295.00 
Number of observations 205 205 
Number of subjects 127 127 
 
Note: The sample included observations of power-advantaged firms. Dummies for majors were also included in models, but the 
coefficient estimates were not reported for simplicity. All controls were averaged scores across subjects participating in the two 
contract negotiations. 








































Figure A-3.3: The Moderating Effect Spheres of Influence on Deviated Value 
Appropriation (Supplemental Analysis) 
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APPENDIX 4: THE UNIQUE SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM (SPE) 
In this appendix, we offer a formal demonstration of the subgame perfect equilibrium for our 
bargaining model—an optional breakdown model with random proposer. The setup of our model 
is illustrated the main manuscript. We reiterate the parameters as follows. Suppose two firms (B 
and S) negotiate to split a single contract valued at ! (notice that the case in which firms negotiate 
two independent contracts at the same time has the same SPE). The contract depreciates by a time 
discount factor "	(0 < " < 1) that is common to both firms, in that the negotiable value of the 
contract in Period 1 is: 
 
!4 = !"45%  
 
The game has infinite time horizon (cf. Binmore et al., 1989; Rubinstein, 1982). Two firms 
have respective outside options for the focal contract, valued at 	LM	, where	R = $, '. Suppose 
L7 ≥ L8. Both sides’ outside options depreciate by the same time discount factor ", in that the 
value of outside options in Period	1 is: 
 
      LM4 = 	LM"45%, where	R = $, '	  
 
The SPE refers to the Nash equilibrium of each iteration of a repeated game. For every repeated 
game with finite players and perfect information (such as this game), there exist pure strategy SPEs 
that can be derived with backward induction (Osborne, 2004). Following Shaked and Sutton (1984) 
and Sutton (1986), a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by a strategy profile in 
which the proposer offers a split corresponding to this perfect equilibrium at each subgame, and 
the receiver accepts that split at each subgame. This is important for the following demonstration 
of the SPE.  
 
Note that the feature of random proposer–in each iteration of the repeated game (subgame) the 
two firms have equal chance of being a proposer—makes our game stationary. Thus, each subgame 
has exactly the same structure as its preceding and following period (if any). This means that the 
firms need to look no further than one period into the future for backward inductions that help 
form their decisions at SPE.  
 
Let SM	(TM) represent the maximum (minimum) of payoff that Firm R	(R	 = $, ') gets if Firm 
R	(R	 = $, ') is the prosper in a SPE. It follows that in Period 1: 
 
! −S7 ≥ TUA{[0.5"T8 + 0.5"(! −S7)],L8}    (1) 
! −S8 ≥ TUA{[0.5"T7 + 0.5"(! −S8)],L7}    (2) 
T7 ≥ ! −TUA{[0.5"S8 + 0.5"(! −T7)],L8}    (3) 
T8 ≥ ! −TUA{[0.5"S7 + 0.5"(! −T8)],L7}    (4) 
 
Inequality (1) means that, Firm S must receive the amount no less than the right-hand-side; 
otherwise, Firm S will reject. The right-hand-side amount refers to the least Firm S can get if not 
accept the offer—as the maximum of Firm S’s outside option (if quit the negotiation) and Firm 
S’s expected payoff of Firm S if it continues bargaining into the next period. This inequality sets 
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an upper bound for how much Firm B can request in a SPE. The same logic applies to inequality 
(2)—the upper bound for how much Firm S can request in a SPE. Inequality (3) means that, Firm 
S will always accept an offer if it exceeds the right-hand-side amount. The right-hand-side mount 
refers to the most Firm S can get if not accept—as the maximum of Firm S’s outside option (if 
quit the negotiation) and Firm S’s expected payoff if it continues bargaining into the next period. 
This inequality sets a lower bound for how much Firm B can request in a SPE. By the same token, 
inequality (4) sets a lower bound for how much Firm S can request in a SPE. To solve this, we 
distinguish six cases. 
 
I.		L8 ≥ 0.5"S8 + 0.5"(! − T7) and L7 ≥ 0.5"S7 + 0.5"(! − T8) and 
It is easily shown that 
! −L7 ≤ T8 ≤ S8 ≤ ! −L7 , 
! −L8 ≤ T7 ≤ S7 ≤ ! −L8. 
















if Firm B is the proposer of this Period, Firm B and Firm S get the split (! −L8,L8) in SPE; 
if Firm S is the proposer of this Period, Firm B and Firm S get the split (L7, ! −L7) in SPE. 
 
II. 0.5"T8 + 0.5"(! −S7) < L8 < 0.5"S8 + 0.5"(! −T7)  and 0.5"T7 + 0.5"(! −S8) <
L7 < 0.5"S7 + 0.5"(! −T8) 
It can be shown that the inequalities show contradiction that " > 1. 
 
III. L8 ≤ 0.5"T8 + 0.5"(! −S7) and L7 ≤ 0.5"T7 + 0.5"(! −S8) 
It easily shown that 
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!) in SPE; 




!	) in SPE. 
 
 
IV. L8 ≤ 0.5"T8 + 0.5"(! − S7) and L7 ≥ 0.5"S7 + 0.5"(! −T8). 
It can be shown that 
! −L7 ≤ T8 ≤ S8 ≤ ! −L7 , 
! − [
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(! −L7)) in SPE; 
if Firm S is the proposer of this Period, Firm B and Firm S get the split (L7, ! −L7) in SPE. 
 
V. L8 ≤ 0.5"T8 + 0.5"(! −S7) and 0.5"T7 + 0.5"(! −S8) < L7 < 0.5"S7 +
0.5"(! −T8). 
There is no solution as it leads to an empty set of L7  that satisfies the inequalities and the 
assumption. 
 
VI. 0.5"T8 + 0.5"(! −S7) < L8 < 0.5"S8 + 0.5"(! − T7) and L7 ≥ 0.5"S7 +
0.5"(! −T8). 
There is no solution as it leads to an empty set of L8 that satisfies the inequalities and the 
assumption. 
 
The SPE for Period 1 applies to the rest of periods (i.e. any Period 1) due to the same game 







APPENDIX 5: INSTRUCTIONS 
Introduction Instructions for Lab Experiment 
 
1. Introduction  
Thank you for being here today. You are about to participate in an experiment in economic 
decision making. Please follow the instructions carefully. At any time, please feel free to raise your 
hand if you have a question. At the end of today’s session, you will be paid your earnings privately 
and in cash.  
 
You have been randomly assigned an ID number for this experiment. You will never be asked to 
reveal your identity to anyone. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In 
order to keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices or otherwise communicate 
with any other participant. Importantly, please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur 
during the experiment. While you are welcome to ask questions as we read the instructions, please 
refrain from suggesting what choices you or others should make as this may compromise the 
scientific value of the experiment.  
 
Today’s session consists of three parts: Questionnaire 1, Experiment 1, and Questionnaire 2. Your 
inputs for Questionnaire 1 are irrelevant to the following experiment. Experiment 1 consists of a 
series of negotiation games. Here, you will earn money based on decisions made during the 
experiment. Finally, we will conclude with Questionnaire 2. 
 
We will now begin Questionnaire 1. If you will, please double-click the green leaf icon in the 
middle of your screen. Please only double-click it once. Afterwards, a window may pop up. If it 
does, please click “Run”. When this is done successfully, you will see a grey screen with a tree 
and a leaf icon. Once you see this screen, please wait for further instruction. 
 
Instructions for Main Experiment 
 
1. Introduction  
During Experiment 1, you will earn money based on decisions you make in a series of negotiation 
games. Decisions in each game are independent of one another, meaning your decisions in one 
negotiation game will not impact results in any other negotiation games. The number of games 
you will play is uncertain, meaning you will not know the total number of games in this session. 
At some point during the experiment, we will switch certain condition and you will be notified. 
We will play through one practice round before beginning the “real” games. Earnings from the 
practice round will not be included in your total earnings. 
2. Experiment 1 
For each negotiation game, you will be randomly paired with another participant. This pairing will 
stay the same within the current game and be randomly re-assigned for each following game. You 
will not know the identity of your partner.  
 
You and your partner represent two firms and negotiate to split the profit of a contract, valued 
initially at 10,000 ECU. To do this, you will participate in a series of negotiation rounds whereby 
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you might make offers and counteroffers over multiple periods. However, each time you advance 
to another period of negotiation, the profit of the contract will decrease by 10%. Therefore, the 
contract will lose 10% of its value for each additional period of negotiation until you both agree 
on a split.  
 
Below we have provided an example table of the profit of the contract over periods in Game 1. 
The current value of the contract will be displayed on your decision screen during each round of 
negotiation. 
Period # of 
Game 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 … 
Contract profit 10,000 9,000 8,100 7290 6561 5905 5315 4784 4307 3876 … 
 
Note that you will go through multiple games. Also note that the exchange rate of ECU to USD is 
0.0008. 
3. Negotiation decisions 
At the beginning of each game, one member of your group (you or your partner) will be randomly 
assigned as a proposer and the other as a receiver. Notice the assignment of the roles (proposer 
and receiver) will be randomly determined before each period (within a game) and each new Game. 
In other words, on average each participant has equal chance of being the proposer or receiver 
throughout the session. 
 
Additionally, both of you have outside options for the contract—if the receiver rejects the 
proposer’s offer and wants to quit the negotiation for the contract, both players will take their 
outside options (in ECU). Your outside option will be randomly assigned at the beginning of each 
game. Notice you might have a different outside option than your partner. You and your partner’s 
outside options will be known to each other. Furthermore, the value of outside options decreases 
by 10% for each additional negotiation period, within a game.  
 
Therefore, both the contract and your outside options decrease in value (by 10%) for each 
additional stage of negotiation.  
 
The proposer’s decision 
The proposer goes first and determines how to split the profit of the contract with the other member. 
The amount proposed to both members should add up to the profit of the contract in the current 
period.  
 
The receiver’s decision 
The receiver waits for and responds to the proposer’s offer. There are three ways to respond to the 
offer:  
(1) Accept the offer. In this case, both members receive the sum of amounts stated in the offer 
as the earnings for this game, and the contract is resolved. No further decisions will be 
made during this game. 
(2) Reject the offer. In this case, both members get the sum of their respective outside options 
(displayed on the screen) as the earnings for this game. And this ends the negotiation 
process for the contract. No further decisions will be made during this game. 
(3) Continue bargaining. In this case, negotiation over the contract will advance to the next 
period. No earnings are gained by either player at this point. Additionally, the contract 
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value and outside option values are reduced by 10%. Further, the roles of the 
proposer/receiver will be randomly reassigned for the next period. The newly assigned 
proposer will make decisions to split the profit. The newly assigned receiver will have the 
3 options listed here and above. 
The negotiation can last for a number of periods until one of the following happens: (1) the offer 
on the contract is accepted (2) the negotiation is stopped, and the outside options are taken (3) the 
profit of the contract has become negligible, determined by the system. In this case, both you and 
your partner receive no profit from the contract or your outside options. You will not know how 
many periods the game will go until the contract is considered negligible. 
Calculation examples 
Below we present a practice example to make sure that you understand the payoff structure for 
yourself and your partner. This following scenario features a negotiation over a contract, 
mimicking the actual experiment: there will be one contract per game, and you will receive the 
final value of your contract decision.  
 
Scenario:  
Suppose you are the proposer in Period 1. For the contract, you and your partner are given outside 
options of (3000, 4000) ECU respectively. The contract has an initial profit of 10,000 ECU.  
Further, suppose you allocate 7500 ECU to yourself and 2500 ECU to your partner: 
• If your partner accepts the offer, you will get ____ ECU while your partner will get ____ 
ECU; 
• If your partner rejects the offer and quits the negotiation, you will get ____ ECU while 
your partner will get ____ ECU. 
 
Furthering the scenario: 
Suppose your partner chooses to continue bargaining. Negotiation continues.  
In Period 2, suppose you are randomly assigned as the receiver and your partner as the proposer. 
The contract has a present profit of 10000 ECU * (1-10%) = 10000*(.9) = 9000 ECU. The outside 
options also fall by 10%, i.e., (2700, 3600) ECU for you and your partner.   
• Suppose your partner allocates 5000 ECU to herself, and she would allocate _____ ECU 
to you. 
• If you accept the offer, you will get _____ ECU and your partner will get _____ ECU; the 
current game ends. 
• If you reject the offer, you will get ____ ECU and your partner will get ____ ECU; the 
current game ends. 
• If you choose to continue bargaining, you two will enter Period 3. In Period 3, the new 
contract value will be 9000 ECU * (1-10%) = 8100 ECU. Your outside option will be 
2700*(.9) = 2430 ECU. Your partner’s outside option will be 3600*(.9) = 3240 ECU. And 
so forth, as long as the randomized receiver chooses to continue bargaining and the contract 
remains above the negligible level. If the negotiation process continues so that the contract 
is deemed negligible, both you and your partner receive ZERO ECU. 
 
Summary:  
The proposer makes offers over the split of a contract and the receiver has three options to take, 
accept, reject and take outside options, or continue bargaining. For each period within a game, 
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both members are equally likely to be a proposer or receiver. The value of the contract and outside 
options is reduced by 10% over each additional period. You will see the current value of the 
contract and outside options on the screen each time you need to make a decision. It will be 
important for you to look at this information before making a decision, either as a proposer or a 
receiver. 
After you and your partner reach agreement or take outside options, the current game ends. All 
participants in this room will be randomly re-matched to a different partner for a new game.  
Please note that, sometimes when you and your partner finish the current game, you have to wait 
for the other participants in the room to finish their games. Please sit quietly while waiting for the 
next game to start. 
 
Now ready for the experiment! 
At this time, if you have questions about the instructions or procedures, please raise your hand. If 






This dissertation consists of three essays, investigating decision-making in buyer-supplier 
exchanges. Specific decision-making is investigated as the exchange is situated within either a 
normal mode of operations or a disrupted mode; and each is evaluated in terms of contextual 
influences. Essay 1 provides insights regarding buyers’ reactions to supply chain disruptions as a 
function of buyers’ attributional processes and suppliers’ recovery actions. One key finding of 
Essay 1 lies in the disruption causes’ significant role—depending on whether the cause is within 
the supplier organization or due to force majeure, buyers’ reactions vary distinctly. In response to 
this finding, Essay 2 focuses on supplier-induced disruptions; a contingency framework 
demonstrates when buyers would perceive suppliers’ recovery as satisfactory in response to 
supplier-induced disruptions. Both the disruption’s severity and the uncertainty within the supply 
chain have significant shaping effects. While Essays 1 and 2 focus on the focal exchanges’ 
disrupted mode, Essay 3 investigates power non-use in the context of multimarket buyer-supplier 
negotiations and identifies two scenarios pertaining to the multimarket context leading to power 
non-use. 
 
In the future, this research area will present more opportunities. For instance, it will be interesting 
to take a more evolutionary perspective and study the changes in decision-making as buyer-
supplier exchanges go from the normal mode to the disrupted mode and recover from the disrupted 
mode to return to the normal mode. In addition, a cross-culture perspective may be worthy of 
future investigation. Essay 1 discusses a US sample while Essay 2 discusses a Chinese sample; 
future research could focus on the cross-cultural difference in terms of buyers’ reactions and 
suppliers’ recovery. Furthermore, the multimarket context studied in Essay 3 is still emerging. In 
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